The defense pact signed last week between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan rightly made headlines. Its central clause – stipulating that any attack on one will be considered an attack on both – was widely perceived as dramatic, almost a Muslim version of NATO’s Article 5.

Yet behind the declarative language lies a far more complex reality. Rather than a strategic revolution, the pact reflects decades of existing security and economic ties that Riyadh and Islamabad have deliberately cloaked in ambiguity.

Pakistan has maintained a military presence in Saudi Arabia for decades. Today, between 1,500 and 2,000 Pakistani soldiers are stationed in the kingdom in training, advisory, and security roles. Since the 1960s, Pakistan has trained thousands of Saudi soldiers and, in moments of crisis, deployed troops to Saudi soil to protect its borders. The current agreement thus fits into a long continuum of cooperation rather than marking a genuine turning point.

On the nuclear dimension – the most sensitive aspect – the pact leaves the ambiguity intact, perhaps intentionally. Rumors of a Pakistani “nuclear umbrella” for Saudi Arabia have circulated for years, fueled by Riyadh’s generous financial assistance to Islamabad in general and to its uranium enrichment program in particular. Still, the agreement as published makes no reference to nuclear weapons. Pakistan maintains its official position that its nuclear arsenal is intended solely to deter India, not to serve as a regional umbrella.

Saudi Arabia may view Pakistan as a potential nuclear fallback, but whether Pakistan sees it the same way is far less certain. Ironically, by making the alliance more public, Riyadh and Islamabad have intensified speculation – questions once whispered in closed rooms are now debated openly.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif embrace each other on the day they sign a defence agreement, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, September 17, 2025.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif embrace each other on the day they sign a defence agreement, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, September 17, 2025. (credit: SAUDI PRESS AGENCY/HANDOUT VIA REUTERS)

The significance of the pact

The timing of the pact is no coincidence and adds to regional unease. Israel’s rare strike in Qatar, a close American ally, has rattled the Gulf states and raised new doubts about Washington’s reliability as a security patron. At the same time, Iran and Israel appear to be preparing for another round of confrontation, while Yemen’s Houthis are escalating their missile attacks – some of which have disintegrated over Saudi airspace en route to Israel. In an environment of perpetual regional warfare, Riyadh seeks to project that it is not isolated: behind it stands a large, powerful, and nuclear-armed Muslim ally.

Still, this pact is not an unconditional guarantee. Pakistan has previously drawn redlines vis-à-vis Riyadh – for example, its refusal in 2015 to join the Saudi-led war in Yemen – when it judged its national interests at stake. Similarly, Saudi Arabia is unlikely to intervene militarily in any India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir. Above all, this is a political declaration: a signal to adversaries, reassurance for domestic audiences, and a reminder to Washington that the Gulf is exploring alternative security options.

For decades, Saudi-Pakistani relations symbolized strategic ambiguity: Saudi financial largesse, preferential oil credit, and economic aid intertwined with covert security cooperation, but rarely with public declarations. The new agreement partially changes the picture: for the first time, Riyadh and Islamabad have publicly announced an explicit mutual defense clause.

Yet even as the “hidden” becomes more visible, the ambiguity persists. Critical questions remain: How would such a commitment be implemented in a crisis? What level of operational coordination exists? Are there unwritten understandings regarding nuclear weapons?

It is important to recall that the alliance is not limited to deterrence. Its foundations are also economic and social: oil credits, financial aid, millions of Pakistani workers in the kingdom, and the binding framework of the Hajj.

Sending a message

Saudi Arabia is sending a message across the region: It has forged a partnership with a Muslim nuclear state formally committed to its defense. The new alliance does not dispel ambiguity; on the contrary, it magnifies it. From now on, speculation will grow regarding Israel’s place in Saudi threat perceptions.

For decades, Riyadh viewed Iran as its principal rival – leaked satellite images showed that Saudi ballistic missiles were aimed at Iran, not Israel. Yet the ongoing war and especially the exchange of blows between Israel and Iran are reshaping Gulf strategic thinking in ways that demand Israel’s close attention.

Israel should avoid misinterpreting the pact as a hostile alignment aimed directly at it. Rather, Riyadh’s decision to formalize its ties with Islamabad reflects growing Saudi anxiety over US reliability, Iranian aggression, and the volatility of the regional environment. For Israel, the prudent response would be to offer reassurance rather than threats.

Jerusalem should quietly expand its strategic dialogue with Riyadh, including back-channel discussions on regional defense architectures, missile defense, and maritime security. At the same time, Israel must calibrate its rhetoric and actions to avoid feeding Saudi suspicions that it is a destabilizing actor in the Gulf.

Ultimately, the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact is more about signaling – to Iran, to domestic audiences, and to Washington – than about binding operational commitments. Yet by making the alliance public, Riyadh has raised expectations and questions that will linger for years.

Israel, for its part, should recognize that the Gulf’s strategic map is shifting and ensure that it is perceived not as part of the problem but as a responsible partner in managing regional security.

The writer is a senior researcher and head of the Gulf program at the Institute for National Security Studies and a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington.