IDF incursions into Gaza over the past few days have been targeted and short, engaging a small number of peripheral Gaza fighters.
Three weeks of airstrikes have done far more damage, so the impact of the incursions was fairly limited.
Neither have the media been impressed because expectations had been geared to three weeks of a massive ground assault – the largest ever into Gaza – drawing on 360,000 reservists.
What has transpired has not even reached the limited invasion of 2014.
Delaying the ground invasion until now is questionable, especially as further delay could reach a point at which international pressure on Israel to end the war will escalate.
But assuming the trumpeted large-scale invasion starts moving soon, the concept of rolling out the invasion in stages, starting with a variety of lightning “in-and-out” sorties, is smart.
Some analysts thought this process had started two weeks ago, only to learn that reported incursions into Gaza were just barely over the border to gather bodies and did not even really engage Hamas.
Hamas’s only way to survive at this point is to bog Israel down with ambushes, booby-traps, and hit-and-run attacks deep in Gaza’s cities to neutralize Israel’s aerial and technological advantage.
Essentially, the IDF is not taking the bait and is turning guerrilla warfare against Hamas.
Guerrilla warfare is almost as old as war itself. Traditionally it was used by the weaker, more agile side to hold off the larger, less agile side.
Since terrorists, whether operating against Israel or the US, started to employ guerrilla methods systematically and using human shields in urban settings, Washington, and sometimes Jerusalem, have started to figure out that being the larger and more powerful force does not mean forfeiting agility and the element of surprise.
By making targeted incursions and regularly changing the points where the incursions take place, the IDF is keeping Hamas on edge.
Put simply, Gaza’s terror rulers do not know where the IDF may jump out from next.
This is designed to make Hamas antsy to the point of impacting morale, to make it second-guess its defensive posture, allow the IDF drone and other surveillance platforms to observe Hamas movements adjusting that posture (which helps reveal hiding places), and to get Hamas to activate booby-traps and ambushes prematurely without being able to maximize their impact on larger groups of IDF troops.
Flipping the script
These guerrilla warfare tactics can also flip Hamas’s pre-October 7 game of luring Israel into complacency on its head.
True, Hamas is disciplined and may be able to see through a number of small incursions while maintaining readiness for the later main invasion, but it is only natural that its readiness will decline as Hamas fighters get used to minor incursions and “false alarms.”
If the IDF applies the tactic properly, it will make simultaneous multiple targeted incursions to confuse Hamas about what will happen next, and then strike the moment Hamas lets its guard down.
This will enable the larger IDF force to gain an initial foothold in Gaza before Hamas can fully adjust and mount a counter-offensive.
None of this means that the IDF can avoid significant casualties.
At some point, troops will need to exit their armored personnel carriers and go house to house, street corner by street corner, to root out terrorists hiding in tunnels, attics, and anywhere else that drones and technological platforms may miss.
Hamas will then get its chance to blow up IDF troops as they open a house door, to gun them down through holes in walls just large enough for the barrel of a gun to slide through, and to fire anti-tank missiles on IDF vehicles that are bogged down in an area set up for a crossfire ambush.
But fighting guerrilla warfare with guerrilla warfare shows respect for the adversary, forces IDF troops to maintain a greater agility and operational awareness, improves understanding of Hamas’s defensive posture, and should improve IDF morale in the initial stages of the invasion.
In short, initial limited incursions need not significantly delay or replace a larger invasion. But if employed properly, they can substantially enhance the chance of a successful full-scale invasion.