By the time this goes to press, Yoav Gallant may no longer be defense minister. Or if he is, he may be about to be ousted after his expected firing was temporarily frozen on September 19 due to the anti-Hezbollah beeper explosions operation. But as long as he stays in office, he will also likely remain the second-most-powerful defense figure in Israel, as he has been for most of his term dating back to January 2023.
Gallant was on this list last year, but the article on him and security threats faced by Israel did not even mention Hamas, with only a quick note about a successful short operation by the IDF against Islamic Jihad in Gaza in May 2023.
Rather, the focus was on Hezbollah, Iran, and West Bank terror because “everyone knew” that Hamas in Gaza – which apparently had been so deterred that it did not even help Islamic Jihad fight Israel in May 2023 – was not considered a threat.
Gallant and everyone else (other than one junior intelligence officer and a few junior Gaza border lookout officers) within the political and defense establishment classes (and within the media) never saw Hamas coming on October 7, 2023.
His decades-long legacy as an aggressive and heroic general within the IDF was supposed to be topped off with addressing the Iranian nuclear threat, which he had spoken about so often.
Instead, his legacy will be forever marred as the defense minister in place when 1,200 Israelis were killed and around 250 kidnapped while a weak, makeshift militia of a few thousand fighters ransacked 22 villages all over southern Israel.
In historical terms, probably more of the blame will be placed on IDF intelligence for ignoring the warning signs and on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for being one of the key architects of a “containment” policy for Hamas dating back to 2009. But Gallant will not be able to escape blame for not raising more questions about whether Hamas was really deterred and whether technological border solutions could fully replace having more boots on the ground next to the border fence.
However, Gallant will also receive some historical credit.
He is the defense minister who directed the successful invasions of Gaza City, Khan Yunis, and Rafah. Regarding Rafah, in order to retain US support, the initial invasion plans were altered. However, The Jerusalem Post has learned that significant aspects of the invasion plans were a copy-paste from plans proposed by then IDF Southern Commander Gallant during the 2008-2009 conflict with Hamas, when his political and military superiors blocked the move.
When the Biden administration lost faith in Netanyahu at critical points during the war, Gallant has been the go-to Israeli official to assure the US and manage cutting deals to smooth over the disputes, the Post has learned.
In bizarre fashion – given that during his time as IDF Southern Commander, many IDF lawyers regarded him as a bombastic cowboy – he has been one of the forces in the government for upholding the rule of law within Israel and human rights law for Palestinians. He has also been a thorn in Netanyahu’s side regarding any attempts to carry out a judicial overhaul – or an overhaul without buy-in from some of the opposition parties.
Whenever National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir attacked Israel’s defense chiefs or provoked its Arab allies, Gallant was the grownup who tried to set things straight.
Haredi parties and Netanyahu have tried to ignore the new realities of the war regarding the need for more from the ultra-Orthodox sector to serve in the IDF. Gallant, along with the High Court of Justice, held the line, saying that coalition politics could no longer exempt them when so many Israelis from all sectors are losing sons and daughters to the war on a daily basis.
Gallant’s legacy on Hezbollah remains unclear.
He pushed the hardest for attacking Hezbollah with a major operation on October 11, something that Netanyahu vetoed along with Benny Gantz and the US.
Will Israel come out of this war having reduced the Hezbollah threat due to persistence over the last year, a major operation on August 25, major operations (attributed by Hezbollah and the world, and with significant details confirmed by the Post) on September 17-18, and other as-yet-untold stories?
Or will Israel leave itself vulnerable to Hezbollah after a year of sacrificing its sovereignty in dozens of villages, including the evacuation of 60,000 northern residents?
Will Gallant be credited for forward-thinking on October 11, which Netanyahu and others had to get in line with later?Or will Netanyahu’s approach of postponing the issue until Hamas is mostly defeated be validated?
Gallant has fought with Netanyahu – and lost – to get him to offer the Palestinian Authority a role in post-war Gaza so as to replace Hamas and to try to get him to cut a deal in July-August to return 18-30 hostages in return for withdrawing, at least temporarily, from all of Gaza, including the Philadelphi Corridor.
Who will history judge as having been correct on those issues?
Gallant believes that the Likud under Netanyahu has gone stray and that he is the true continued legacy of Ze’ev Jabotinsky and Menachem Begin, who were right-wing but had common sense and respect for non-partisan officials in the courts and military.
Netanyahu views Gallant as a disloyal soldier who frequently defected to the opposing team after receiving a significant role in the government.
How Gallant will go down in history will remain uncertain for the time being. But no one can dispute that he has been a major historical player.