The statement by US President Donald Trump that Iran would be held responsible for continued attacks by the Yemeni Houthi movement on shipping in the Red Sea sharply raises the temperature in the ongoing escalation between US forces and the Yemeni Shi’ite Islamist movement in that area.
“Every shot fired by the Houthis will be looked upon, from this point forward, as being a shot fired from the weapons and leadership of IRAN, and IRAN will be held responsible, and suffer the consequences,” read the president’s message.
In a speech on Sunday, meanwhile, Houthi leader Abd al-Malik al Houthi vowed to “respond to the American enemy in its raids, in its attacks, with missile strikes, by targeting its aircraft carrier, its warships, its ships.” He added that “We also still have escalation options. If it continues its aggression, we will move to additional escalation options,” according to a report by the Associated Press.
How might this situation now develop? And what might be learned from it?
The Houthis are unique in the Iran-led regional alliance since they have experienced no real setbacks or humiliation in the regional contest that has been underway since the Hamas mega-attack on Israel on October 7, 2023.
The organization commenced its attacks on shipping in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden route in November of that year and continued them until the ceasefire of January 15, 2025. In that time, they succeeded in effectively imposing a naval blockade on this vital global trade artery.
The port of Eilat all but ceased to function. Many shipping companies preferred to send vessels down the Cape of Good Hope route when seeking to pass from the Red Sea to European waters. This increased costs, and sailing time, massively.
Other members of the Iran-led axis, including Iran itself, have emerged from the fighting of the last 18 months mauled and humbled, their deficiencies and inabilities exposed. Lebanese Hezbollah lost almost all of its strategic weapons, its historic leadership, and a good many of its mid-level activists.
Hamas, while not destroyed, has suffered huge losses and brought catastrophe on its Gaza fiefdom. The Assad regime ceased to be.
Even Iran itself was exposed in its inability to prevent Israel’s destruction of its air defenses. Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh at a closely guarded IRGC facility in Tehran indicated Israel’s intelligence penetration of the regime.
Houthis undeterred
THE HOUTHIS, by contrast, have not been humbled. Although they have suffered damage from US, Israeli, and British air action, and generally have been unable to penetrate Israeli airspace, their campaign against international shipping has not been thwarted by the West or Israel.
The Houthis chose to halt their campaign unilaterally when the recent ceasefire began, and then announced its renewal in early March, apparently triggering the US action.
The status of the Houthis as the last-man-undamaged of the Iran-led bloc has correspondingly increased their status and importance within it.
Evidently undeterred, the Houthis on Monday claimed two attacks on the USS Truman, in response to the latest US strikes. The exchanges of fire look set to continue.
The US clearly needed to ratchet up the pressure. It remains to be seen if Trump’s threats will translate into action. Certainly, his decision to bring Iran into the picture is the logical response. Houthi attacks are made by Iranian assistance. There is no reason to maintain the Iranians’ preferred fiction of their non-involvement.
In this regard, however, a certain inconsistency in the US stance is discernible.
An interesting and less discussed aspect of the Houthis’s network of alliances is their deepening relationship with Russia. Already a year ago, US officials revealed that operatives of Russian military intelligence were present in Sana’a, advising the Shi’ite Islamist group.
A Wall Street Journal article then revealed that Moscow had offered the Houthis data tracking systems that improved their ability to track and target shipping in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden area. Russian (and Chinese) vessels, in turn, were ensured and have received safe passage through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The March 5 US Treasury Department statement announcing action against seven high-ranking Houthi members referenced the burgeoning Moscow-Sana’a relationship, noting: “These individuals have smuggled military-grade items and weapon systems into Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen and also negotiated Houthi weapons procurements from Russia.
“The Office of Foreign Assets Control is also designating one Houthi-affiliated operative and his company that have recruited Yemeni civilians to fight on behalf of Russia in Ukraine and generated revenue to support the Houthis’s militant operations.”
All the subsequent details regarding the seven individuals focused on their dealing with Russia. Muhammad Ali al-Houthi was described as having “communicated with officials from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to ensure that Houthi militants do not strike Russian or PRC vessels transiting the Red Sea.”
Another Houthi operative, Ali Muhammad Muhsin Salih al-Hadi, was described as a “key financier of Houthi weapons procurement, using his position on the Specialized Criminal Court and shell company to fund and obfuscate purchases of military-grade equipment on behalf of the Houthis. As part of this effort, he has traveled to Russia to secure defense equipment for Houthi militants and investment in Houthi-controlled industries.”
The Russian relationship with the Houthis has a clear logic. Moscow is developing an ever-closer strategic relationship with Iran. Seeing itself as at war with the West in Ukraine, and engaged in a broad strategic effort to erode and weaken the US and its allies, it evidently identified the successful effort by the Houthis to disrupt shipping on the Red Sea as a node of counter-pressure that it was happy to get behind.
This Russian stance is evidence of a sophisticated and comprehensive strategic outlook. Engaged in a long struggle to erode and roll back US and Western power, Moscow identifies potential allies and points of pressure and finds its way to assist them. This approach is applied consistently.
As a result, the outlines of a global anti-Western axis, including Russia, China, Iran and its various clients and proxies, and North Korea may now be identified along practical lines of cooperation in fronts stretching all the way from Kursk to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
The US decision to raise the temperature against the Houthis, and now against Iran, also makes obvious sense. Until now, the Yemeni Shi’ite Islamists had established a precedent that terror on shipping routes delivered desired results, at little cost. The Iranians had found a way of backing acts of war against their enemies at no cost to themselves at all.
That time, hopefully, is over. Yet the US administration, at least for now, appears to fail to notice the broader alliance taking shape behind these forces, and the interconnectedness of the current assault on the West.
As a result, it accommodates the said alliance on one front (Ukraine) while challenging it on another (the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden). Moscow, apparently, is not returning the courtesy. Hopefully, Washington will soon notice.