Analysis: Iran's new elite - The Revolutionary Guards
The Corps has long formed the strong arm of the clerical regime in Teheran.
By JONATHAN SPYERiran revolutionary guards white wigs 224(photo credit: AP)
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad delivered a speech of great ferocity to the UN General Assembly last week. That forum is no stranger to rhetoric directed against Israel, Zionism and the West, but the Iranian leader seemed determined to surpass himself on this occasion.
Israel was described as a "cesspool," Zionists were derided for their supposed control of the financial centers and politics of the Western world. The "American Empire" was told that its days were numbered.
Ahmadinejad's speech was that of an ideological leader confident and determined in his path. The Iranian president is the most well-known representative of a broader trend in the balance of power within the Iranian regime: namely, the rise to prominence of a younger, radical-conservative elite, centered mainly but not exclusively on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps.
The Corps has long formed the strong arm of the clerical regime in Teheran. It was the instrument used by the mullahs to destroy their former "allies" in the years following the 1979 revolution.
Recent years, however, have seen an unprecedented number of Revolutionary Guards figures rising to positions of political power.
According to a recent report by analyst Ali Alfoneh, since Ahmadinejad assumed the presidency in June 2005, Revolutionary Guards members have come to occupy nine of the 21 ministerial posts in the Iranian cabinet. The portfolios held by Revolutionary Guards members and those close to them include the Defense, Commerce, Energy, Welfare, Industries and Mines, Justice, Culture and Islamic Guidance.
In addition, according to Alfoneh, Ahmadinejad has cleared out reformists and centrists from the governorships and deputy governorships of Iran's 30 provinces. Again, he has replaced them with Revolutionary Guards members or individuals from associated organizations.
Provincial governors in Iran exert considerable power on the national stage, because of their ability to divert funds and patronage to favored candidates.
As well as political power, the Revolutionary Guards is thought to control about a third of Iran's economy - through the use of subsidiaries and trusts, including arms companies, university laboratories, a car manufacturer and a construction and engineering wing. Through such activities, the Revolutionary Guards controls the new Imam Khomeini airport in Teheran.
The Majlis (parliamentary) elections last March offered the clearest indication yet of the advance of the Revolutionary Guards and its allies within the system. Conservatives won about two-thirds of the seats, against a third for reformists.
Two important aspects were noted: First, a split became apparent in the conservative camp between the more radical, pro-Ahmadinejad element, and a more cautious element around former chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani (the pro-Ahmadinejad element won the larger number of seats.)
Second and more important, the build-up to the vote was notable for the involvement of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Council of Guardians in swaying the elections in favor of the pro-Ahmadinejad faction. Khamenei expressed support for candidates who "separate their line unequivocally from the enemy [the United States]."
He appointed former Revolutionary Guards commander Ali Reza Afshar to oversee the elections. The Council of Guardians then set about rejecting the applications of large numbers of reformist would be-candidates - facilitating the victory of the radical conservatives.
Khamenei's apparent inclination toward the radical conservatives is crucial. He is the ultimate decision-maker on foreign and security policy in the Islamic Republic. Many Iran analysts consider that Khamenei sees this group as the most reliable element in resisting demands for reform from below, preserving the regime, and pursuing an assertive path on the international stage.
So on all fronts, the power bloc associated with the radical views of President Ahmadinejad is advancing. The members of this group, like Ahmadinejad, are not clerics. Rather, they come from pious families who owe their advancement from their humble origins to the existence of the clerical regime.
Most of them are veterans of the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. This conflict, and the revolution that preceded it, form their core, shared experiences. Having advanced through the machinery of the organs created by the revolution, this generational grouping is now moving toward power.
Like other revolutionaries in other times and places, they are aware of the gap between the hopes of the revolution and what it has achieved. The Islamic Republic today is a hugely corrupt, unpopular and inefficient oligarchy, facing insistent calls for reform from below.
The rising political/military bloc of which Ahmadinejad is a part wants above all to revive what it sees as the authentic spirit of the revolution of 1979 and the war that followed it - in the face of the current decay. An aggressive, anti-Israeli, anti-Western foreign policy is a central element of this ambition. The achievement of a nuclear capacity, in turn, is a key element in making such a foreign policy feasible.
The next big test in Iranian politics is the presidential election next June. Iranian presidents are permitted to serve two terms, and Ahmadinejad is standing again. His victory would represent an additional advance for the radical conservative bloc of which he is part.
But the prominence of Ahmadinejad is only part of a larger story. A new, largely nonclerical elite of political, military and security functionaries is in the process of assuming the commanding heights of political power in Iran.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's speech at the UN General Assembly gave a fair reflection of the beliefs of this new elite, and of the seriousness of its ambitions.
Dr. Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs Center, IDC, Herzliya.
