Who is to blame for October 7 massacre? A guide for the perplexed

Anyone who got lost the last couple days while trying to follow the flood of new leaks about errors that allowed Hamas to invade southern Israel, kill 1,200 people, and kidnap around another 240 should not feel badly.

Even for those of us who have been living and breathing this information constantly for nearly five months, it was not that easy to follow.

Just as important, it took time to analyze who was behind the different leaks (it was different parties) and why they leaked what they did.

To assist with understanding these issues, below is a short guide for the perplexed:

Leaks about IDF intelligence Unit 8200

Leaks about IDF intelligence Unit 8200: The latest leaks that came out about Unit 8200 discussed an internal IDF report that mostly exonerated the unit’s current commander, “Y,” from any special fault. The report did not shield Y from blame but said that the failure to take Hamas seriously and to properly understand and warn of the data collected about Hamas’s plans was a chronic, decade-or-more-long policy within Unit 8200 that was not related to any specific commander.

This leak appears to have come from Y or supporters of Y who are trying to clear his name or at least dilute his personal responsibility for the failure. Likewise, the leak could dilute responsibility for those currently serving below him. Also, the leak puts more responsibility on others in IDF intelligence, the IDF generally, and the political class.

Leaks about the IDF and Shin Bet not reacting to Hamas activating Israeli SIM cards in Gaza: A leak by Channel 14, associated with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, not only revealed the plain fact that the IDF and Shin Bet did not properly respond to Hamas activating between dozens and hundreds of Israeli SIM cards in Gaza but also divulged what it seems all relevant parties have repudiated – that IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi knew about it and withheld the information from Netanyahu.

Leaks about the IDF and Shin Bet not reacting to Hamas activating Israeli SIM cards in Gaza

It is not 100% clear why Halevi was not told about it, but it appears to be because IDF intelligence analysis officials believed this was part of a pattern – that Hamas had carried out similar moves during many drills – or was, at most, a small-scale operation to kidnap a couple of soldiers on patrol.

While the Shin Bet decided to send a small group of reinforcements to the area where they thought a small attempted kidnapping might take place, no one in the IDF or Shin Bet believed there was any chance of a major attack; hence, they told Halevi that they could give him an update much later in the morning – hours after the invasion began.

This does not absolve Halevi or Netanyahu. Neither of them took Hamas seriously enough for years. And Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul campaign, whether justified or not in terms of the specific domestic issues at stake, badly weakened IDF readiness on October 7 and in the months leading up to then. There is also evidence that this weakness was perceived by Hamas as an even greater reason to launch a larger attack. In contrast, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant was in favor of aspects of the overhaul in principle but believed it needed to move slower and with more consensus so as not to harm the defense establishment.

Leaks that IDF intelligence blocked sending helicopters to IDF Southern Command and that drones and aircraft were prevented from assisting until it was too late

 A series of leaks Monday night as well as months ago suggest that the Air Force could have provided more help and more quickly to slow or prevent the invasion but that it was blocked by IDF intelligence. These leaks are likely from IDF Southern Command officials or supporters of the commander, Maj. Gen. Yaron Finkleman, who blame IDF intelligence or the Air Force for not giving them enough support.

The leaks also carefully highlight that Finkleman immediately ended a family vacation in the North in the middle of the night, hours before the October 7 attack, when he learned about some of the worrying signs. The criticism of IDF intelligence and the Air Force for refusing the requests to send air power to the border is valid. However, Finkleman, like other top IDF officials, stationed only around 600 soldiers and 12 tanks on the border.

He could have stationed far more. Even 1,500 or so of the IDF’s 460,000-500,000 forces (counting reservists) might have been enough to stop the invasion of 3,000 Hamas terrorists. Neither Netanyahu, Halevi, IDF intelligence, nor Finkleman took Hamas seriously, and all of them overly relied on technological warnings and obstacles as opposed to having sufficient troops on the ground. In fairness, only a tiny number of intelligence officials took Hamas seriously over the last decade-plus, and the whole country, until October 7, was constantly pressing the political class and the IDF for troop cuts, a smaller army, and shorter service times.