Stunning: the only word appropriate for Israel’s decision to withdraw from Khan Yunis in southern Gaza on Sunday.
Some political and defense officials tried to offer apologetics for how it was hinted to, or consistent with Israel’s strategy to date – but it simply was not.
For months, Israel’s consistent strategy was that the only way the IDF could convince Hamas to return more hostages would be to pressure it in its hometown of Khan Yunis.
Hamas Gaza chief Yahya Sinwar and military chief Muhammad Deif are both from Khan Yunis; it would be personal for them.
The best Hamas fighters were from Khan Yunis – losing them would be unspeakably demoralizing.
An intricate tunnel network, which puts the northern Gaza tunnels to shame, was in Khan Yunis. Overtaking them after millions of dollars and years were invested in them by Hamas would take the air out of the terrorists’ sails once and for all.
This is especially true after witnessing the fall of Gaza City in northern Gaza, Hamas’s capital.
Withdrawal from Khan Yunis marks end to stranglehold strategy
Over the last two months, the line has been that as long as the IDF kept its forces in Khan Yunis, it acted like a stranglehold on Hamas, and at any moment, the terrorist group would gasp for air badly enough to agree to a deal.
The withdrawal of forces from Khan Yunis on Sunday, then, ends this strategy, and is an admission of failure.
But, this doesn’t mean the hostages will not come home. The IDF did defeat Hamas in both northern and southern Gaza, destroyed much of its tunnel network, and killed many senior officials.
Leaving Khan Yunis now does not negate those tremendous gains, gains that have set Hamas back years in terms of military capabilities.
But now, Israel will either need a new strategy or make bigger concessions to Hamas to get back more hostages, including opening up the north of the enclave.
A new strategy could be the hope that invading Rafah will bring Hamas to its knees. By this logic, once the IDF closes in on Rafah – something Hamas believes Israel is afraid to do – Hamas will finally crack and agree to a more reasonable deal. It could even work.
There is no specific reason why Israel cannot send its forces into Rafah.
Moreover, if the IDF has no presence in Khan Yunis, large numbers of Palestinian civilians may voluntarily leave Rafah and go back there without needing to be formally evacuated.
This may alleviate America’s concerns about whether Israel can successfully evacuate 1.4 million Palestinian civilians.
Also, the IDF could lure Hamas into a false sense of security and pull off a Shifa Hospital-style clean-up operation, just as soon as the terrorist group concentrates too many of its forces in one place.
The problem with this line of thinking is that even if it is true, there was no hint to it until US President Joe Biden dropped the hammer on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Thursday.
Within hours of a phone call between the two, Netanyahu opened Erez Crossing for transferring humanitarian aid, which was never going to open again after Hamas destroyed it on October 7.
He had also opened the port of Ashdod for transferring humanitarian aid, another action he had vowed never to take.
By Friday, the IDF had fired or dismissed several very senior officers under pressure from the US and the international community for killing seven aid workers.
And on Sunday, the military suddenly pulled out of southern Gaza.
Even if this truly is a new strategy and even if it might work, there is very little credible way to argue that a significant cause for the radical shift was US pressure and that the shift is an admission that the old strategy of a bunch of months has failed.
There is also an outside shot that this was part of some unofficial Cuban Missile Crisis-style secret informal deal, where if the IDF withdraws from southern Gaza, Hamas will be able to claim enough victory to make concessions to the IDF regarding the hostages and northern Gaza.
The big question now is whether this shift will be sufficient to maintain at least lukewarm US support for invading Rafah or whether America may already have decided to force Israel into a hostage deal, even if it potentially undermines finishing off Hamas.
According to this theory, Washington supported Jerusalem for almost six months and through 33,000 dead Palestinians, but finally hit its breaking point.
While we wait for that question to be answered, Hamas will at minimum be able to restore some of its governance in southern Gaza simply because Israel never decided to allow anyone else in to take over.
The clock is running out on both Hamas’s potential return, invading Rafah, and the fate of the hostages.