He has been known as the “Teflon prime minister’ and the politician who seems to always find a way back from the clutches of defeat. And while Israel’s longest-serving prime minister has faced numerous challenges over the last 30 years since he catapulted to the top of the Likud list, none have been as dire as the situation Benjamin Netanyahu faces right now.
Yes, he has lost elections, but none of them had the potential to end with the establishment of a state commission of inquiry that would most definitely find him responsible for some of the failures that led to the October 7 Hamas massacre. Yes, he has faced tough decisions in the past, but none had the potential to bring down his government while he is at his weakest point in the polls, on trial for corruption charges, will soon need to take the stand himself, and is about to face street protests never seen before in Israel.
He has been through a lot, but nothing like this.
The dilemma he and the government face is not one to envy. One option is to make a deal (assuming it is even possible) with Hamas to save as many of the hostages as possible and, in exchange, postpone an offensive in Rafah, potentially losing the coalition at the same time. The other option is to find a way to prevent a hostage deal (assuming Hamas doesn’t reject it first) and enter Rafah, raising the ire of the public that wants to see the hostages return as well as the international community, which has already said it will not support such an operation.
While the coalition will remain intact in such a case, National Unity leaders Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot will quit the government, setting off a spark that will lead to unprecedented street protests against the government, making what we saw during the judicial reform look like child’s play. This, too, will be hard to overcome.
Each option has its advantages and disadvantages. Agreeing to the hostage deal will come at a steep price. It will include the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners and a suspension of the war for an extended period. Nevertheless, it is the right decision, it is the just decision, and it will bring Israel some closure that it desperately needs. While the world has moved on from October 7, Israelis have not. Every day, when they look at the pictures of the hostages it is a reminder of the gaping hole that is still open in their hearts.
Keeping Hamas strong
On the other hand, not going into Rafah will keep Hamas strong and potentially in power in the Gaza Strip. According to IDF estimates, Hamas has approximately four or five battalions that are still standing in Rafah, amounting to about 15,000 armed men. This is in addition to the terrorist infrastructure it has there - command centers, arms caches, and, of course, the tunnels it operates along the border with Egypt, which until a few months ago were still bringing in advanced weaponry into the Strip.
Not damaging that infrastructure or eliminating those fighters almost definitely means that Hamas will remain in control of Gaza. It will have the weapons and the men enabling the terrorist organization to restore its control over the parts of Gaza that Israel will vacate, as seen recently in the north, where, after Israel pulled back its forces, Hamas returned and fired rockets.
Netanyahu is trying to keep it all together without letting either side down – his political base, which wants a continued offensive in Gaza and for the IDF to enter Rafah, and the public, which wants to see the hostages released – as well as the Americans, who want this war to be over. It is a hard balancing act that no one in his shoes has ever had to do because no prime minister had overseen such a disaster while on trial, tanking in the polls, and facing street protests for more than a year.
The one recent comparison would be to Ehud Olmert, who, in the aftermath of the Second Lebanon War, faced calls from reservists to resign and established a state commission of inquiry and then police investigations, which eventually forced him to step down. But Olmert was not indicted and not on trial while in office. On the other hand, what Olmert showed was the ability of a prime minister to remain in power even after a war that was viewed as a failure. He stayed on for another two and a half years.
That is why, despite everything that is happening, it would be a mistake to write off Netanyahu. It is hard now to see how he can overcome this struggle, but his political demise is not at all a done deal. With that said, there is no underestimating the challenges he now faces. The keys to his political future and his potential freedom lie in the hands of two people who cannot exactly be counted on – Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir, a pair for whom rational political thinking does not always apply. However, there is no reason to feel sorry for Netanyahu. He created this mess. He legitimized Ben-Gvir as a cabinet minister and a coalition partner. Yes, he would not have had a government without the former Kach rabble-rouser, but he was warned plenty of what to expect if he got into bed with him.
At the end, though, this should not really matter. Instead, what should matter is the future of the State of Israel, the resilience of its people, and the message that will be sent in both cases – if we, as a nation, prioritize the return of the hostages or if we do not and prioritize an operation in Rafah.
These are the kinds of decisions that showcase the ethical standard of a nation and will not only go down in history but also send a message that will resonate globally. As the son of a historian, Netanyahu, a history enthusiast himself, knows this. He knows that Ben-Gvir and Smotrich are unlikely to take up more than a few paragraphs when this period of Israeli history is chronicled for the generations to come.
However, the choices he makes now possess the potential to create ripple effects throughout the military, Israeli society, and the broader Jewish community for decades to come. The responsibility rests squarely on his shoulders.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post.