What National Unity party leader and war minister Benny Gantz did on Saturday night was to force Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to reveal his true war and post-Hamas strategy.
Gantz, as well as Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and the IDF high command, have made it clear that winning the war requires removing Hamas from power.
They believe that removing Hamas from power requires choosing a replacement to manage Gaza and that this replacement should be a mix of the US-EU-Arab allies and the Palestinian Authority.
In order to avoid returning to large battles in Jabalya, Shifa Hospital, Zeitoun, and other locations in northern Gaza which were supposed to be cleared, injecting a new Gaza manager must happen at the same time as fighting any Hamas insurgency.
Gallant and the IDF had predicted needing to fight a three to nine month low-grade Hamas insurgency from January-February until later in 2024.
But they, and Gantz, are furious to be fighting whole, newly reconstituted Hamas battalions in northern Gaza still in May, at a time when low-grade clean-up fighting was supposed to be against single digit numbers of Hamas terrorists at a time.
There are debates about what Netanyahu’s true strategy is since, at least publicly, he has repeatedly and vehemently resisted having the Palestinian Authority involved in any part of managing Gaza.
Interestingly, sources say he was ready to bless PA-affiliated Gaza personnel taking over the Rafah Crossing with Egypt as long as they did not identify themselves as connected to the PA, but this was a non-starter with the authority and Egypt – and the West and Israel’s Arab allies (Egypt, UAE, Jordan, Morocco, and Bahrain) have all pushed for a reformed PA to be involved to achieve legitimacy with Gazans.
There are only three options at this point of what he prefers: Hamas control of Gaza, without formally admitting it; Israeli control of Gaza without formally admitting it; or ensuring Gaza remains at a certain level of chaos long enough with a hope that at some point, the US, EU and Arab allies would take over managing Gaza without the PA involved (a gamble which seems highly unlikely.)
All of this also connects to the hostage deal with Hamas.
Who will be the enemy when the IDF finishes in Rafah
Now that Israel has started its Rafah operation, there will soon be no one else to officially fight against in Gaza, other than in the form of putting down insurgencies.
Gantz did not say why he had set a June 8 deadline for Netanyahu, but it could very well be because that is around when the Rafah operation or at least significant aspects of it will have concluded, or a breaking point with the US over the future of the operation may have been reached by then.
Once there is no large Hamas force left to fight in Gaza, there will be little basis for the government to reject an extended pause in fighting in order to gain a return of the hostages.
There can be many fights about the details of such a deal, but having gone through Rafah, the last bastion of Hamas will have been addressed by the IDF, so it would be less clear what Israel would lose in a pause.
This would also force Netanyahu to decide what his plans are for who will replace Hamas.
The other major war decision that Gantz seeks to force Netanyahu’s hand on is dealing with Hezbollah.
Gantz has set September 1, the new school year, as a deadline date for resolving the issue of returning evacuated northern residents to their homes.
Until now, Gantz, Gallant, and the IDF high command have repeated that there must be a deal with Hezbollah by then or a larger military operation to restore security.
But after repeating this mantra for months, it has lost its luster, and it is doubtful whether Hezbollah is taking the threat seriously.
Giving Hezbollah an ultimatum – by which it needs to decide if it will risk Israel being “crazy” enough to do a larger operation against it versus whether the terror group should cut its losses and agree to some kind of diplomatic deal where it will demilitarize within significant portions of southern Lebanon – will force it to take the threat seriously.
On the positive side, Hezbollah might finally agree to Israel’s terms.
On the negative side, setting such an ultimatum is dangerous business, because it could also force Israel to initiate a major war or to be exposed as bluffing, both of which could have grave consequences.
Netanyahu historically hates making such fateful decisions and tries instead to defer them until he really cannot postpone making them anymore.
Gantz’s speech forces him to show his hand on whether he is ready to present Hezbollah with an ultimatum or whether he is bluffing and willing to leave northern residents evacuated from their homes for a much longer period than Gantz wants to.
Regarding the North, another possibility is that a hostage deal and an extended pause with Hamas is reached that leads to a ceasefire with Hezbollah.
In this case, top defense sources have told The Jerusalem Post something which no Israeli politicians have said out loud: given a ceasefire; that around 90% of Hezbollah fighters have already fled southern Lebanon; and doubling or tripling the number of soldiers on the northern border, the government might eventually suggest to the northern residents to return with more of a “fudged” unofficial deal with the Lebanese-based terrorist group.
Hezbollah might simply not send its forces back to southern Lebanon without formally agreeing not to.
This would leave open the threat of a future Hezbollah return, but is another possible scenario.
In any case, if Netanyahu and Gantz do not reach a deal, Gantz will likely seek to blame the prime minister for failing to remove Hamas, blowing a hostage deal, and failing to get the northern residents back to their homes.
There are other major points of disagreement between Netanyahu and Gantz, including how many haredim (ultra-Orthodox) should serve in the IDF, but that issue is more about domestic politics than grand war strategy between Hamas and Hezbollah.
If Gantz and Netanyahu agree on a grand war strategy, they would also probably find a way to agree or buy time on the issue of haredim in the IDF.
One way or another, by June 8, the way forward on both the southern and northern fronts of the war will be much clearer.