The IDF is set to present in July the findings of the investigation into the October 7 massacre.
The investigative teams will present the findings to the Chief of Staff and the Israeli public.
The military investigation should be a base for a comprehensive investigation by a state commission of inquiry, which has not yet been established due to political obstruction. Only a state commission of inquiry will enable investigation of the political and military echelons along with the Israeli intelligence establishment.
Important questions that must be asked include how was the strategic array conducted which affirmed Hamas was deterred, and, from a tactical point of view, why was the warning not given before the invasion?
The General Staff operations branch
The main question, however, is how such a significant reduction of forces at the Gaza border was allowed, while abandoning the residents to their fate. Another central question is how the defense system was conducted in the first hours of the attack.
The Israel Air Force
In the first hours of the attack, the air force did not function optimally. It failed in preparing for the defensive war and failed to read the threat in the first hours. According to testimonies collected since then, the management of the air force in the first hours was slow and disorganized to the extent that citizens made WhatsApp calls to the only two combat helicopter pilots who were on standby on October 7.
Another question is why the fighter jets were launched only in the afternoon for the mission of stopping the invasion.
The Navy
While the Navy is doing a very good job in public relations trying to distance itself from the failure of October 7 - the Navy has failed miserably. Navy intelligence did not provide an alert on the plans of the naval commando units invade Israel.
The sea barrier near Zikim Beach, which cost hundreds of millions, did not deliver the goods. The Ashdod base of the navy was not prepared for an attack on October 7. Terror ships managed to land on the beach and carried out a massacre on Zikim Beach. The lack of coordination between the sea and ground forces was poor. A question which must be raised is whether the navy strove to achieve full contact when the terror ships landed on the beach.
Southern command
The command's intelligence and operational systems will be examined. The core issue which is set to be examined is how the control mechanisms of the command did not function and did not prevent the invasion. In addition, here too, the question of how the command allowed such a massive reduction of forces in the Gaza border communities will be examined. The decision-making during the defensive battle.
The Gaza Division
The division collapsed on the morning of October 7. The investigations will deal with the question of the readiness of the division and the management of the defense system.
In addition, the generals' and division commander's manner of command during the defense is expected to be examined. The include the invasion of Kibbutz Be'eri, the management of the battle inside the kibbutz, among other things the battle over Pesi Cohen's house. In addition, investigations will be conducted in the kibbutzim in which were testimonies that forces avoided making contact with the terrorists, among them Nir Oz, Nirim, Kissufim and more.
The investigation in Be'eri will determine whether Brig.-Gen. Barak Hiram functioned in a reasonable and adequate manner in conducting the battle. Emphasis, as mentioned, on the management of the shooting towards Psi's house. where, as I recall, an order was given to a tank to fire two shells into a house where terrorists were holding about twenty Israeli citizens as hostages.
Hiram is set to enter the role of head of the Gaza Division, however, the Gaza border communities have stated that they will not cooperate withy the division if he is indeed appointed.
During the defensive battles in the Gaza border communities, hundreds of stories of heroism and sacrifice were revealed by the investigative teams.
On the part of fighters, officers, policemen, Shin Bet personnel and civilians. Heroic stories of rescuing casualties from the Nova Party and the settlements in the Gaza border communities, conducting face-to-face battles with terrorists, striving for contact knowing that they might not return from the battle.
The IDF needs investigations. The Landau Commission, which investigated the functioning of the Shin Bet in the izzat nafsu case and that of line 300, established a saying: "A festering wound can only heal in sunlight."
Today the IDF needs the Israeli summer sun to allow the festering wound that erupted in the fall of October to heal.