Compiled almost a year after the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Mitvim Institute’s 2024 Israeli Foreign Policy Index reveals broad public agreement on two fundamental issues.
The first issue is the government’s dysfunctional performance in managing Israel’s strategic and foreign affairs. The second is its rejection of the conflict management approach combined with the public ambition to seek decisive solutions on the core issues of the Gaza war and the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
However, it is the latter that divides Israelis: the recognition that strategic decisions can no longer be avoided, leading to two radically different perceptions of what these decisions signify.
The index, based on an annual survey conducted by the Rafi Smith Institute in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, highlights polarization between the two camps.
Pragmatists vs. fundamentalists
The pragmatists, comprising 40-50% of the public, support the setting of a political horizon with the Palestinians within a broad regional framework; recognize the limitations of military power; and seek diplomatic cooperation to solve Israel’s security problems.
The other camp, the fundamentalists, are a large minority (about 30%) that currently adopts positions affiliated with the radical Right prior to the war. This camp favors annexation of the West Bank and resettlement in Gaza, intended escalation vis-à-vis Iran, and reliance on an independent military force, even at the cost of international confrontation.
The survey findings reflect a nearly unanimous negative assessment of the government, the Foreign Ministry, and the foreign minister’s performance, giving them the lowest score (3.84 out of 10) since Mitvim began compiling the index in 2013. The score also marks a sharp decline from the relatively low grade (4.82) the public gave in Mitvim’s 2023 survey, conducted two months before the war and eight months into the term of the most right-wing government in Israeli history.
Moreover, while previous annual surveys found a direct correlation between satisfaction with the government’s performance and respondents’ political opinions, the broad dissatisfaction this year transcended political divides.
Some 77% of Center-Right voters and over half of those identifying as right-wing voters gave the government a relatively low grade (1-5).
Failing Foreign Ministry
Foreign Minister Israel Katz of the Likud party also did poorly (4.02), with over half of right-wing voters, including over half of those who voted for Likud in the 2022 elections, giving the government’s foreign policy performance a relatively low grade. Under Katz’s leadership, the state of the Foreign Ministry received the lowest score since Mitvim launched the index. Not surprisingly, the index also reflected a significant decline in the public’s assessment of Israel’s standing on the international stage.
US SUPPORT of Israel, on the one hand, and the hostile attitudes of Russia and China, on the other, had a decisive impact on Israelis’ geopolitical perceptions. The survey found a shift in public attitudes regarding the most important alliances for Israel to maintain in an era of increasing East-West conflict (China and Russia vs the United States and European countries).
A large majority (60%) said it attached great importance to Israeli membership in the global liberal-democratic camp, compared to only 18% who attributed little or no importance to such an alignment. An overwhelming majority also attached great importance to an alliance with the United States to ensure Israel’s survival.
On the question of the public’s rating of the three most important countries to Israel (apart from the US): Russia’s diplomatic value plunged (from 32% last year to 12%), as did China’s (from 26% to 7.5%), compared with a sharp increase in the importance attributed to Western European countries – the United Kingdom (44%), Germany (41%), and France (30%).
Western eyes
HOWEVER, THE increased importance attributed to the West does not necessarily translate into greater openness to Western pressure or criticism of Israel’s conduct. Thus, the public rejects the involvement of countries perceived as critical of Israeli policy on the Palestinian issue. For example, after years of gradual improvement, the European Union (EU) is currently perceived by a growing percentage of the Israeli public as an adversary rather than a friend. Over half the respondents rejected any European involvement in the West Bank.
This trend was also evident on questions about the US presidential candidates. Only 14% of respondents (excluding the “don’t-knows”) see Vice President Kamala Harris as the candidate who will best serve Israeli interests, compared to an overwhelming majority of 68% who see former president Donald Trump as far better for Israel. Harris’s criticism of the Israeli government’s handling of the Gaza war deters significant segments of the Israeli public – including many in the political center who are not Netanyahu fans (only some 20% of centrist voters supported Harris).
This finding may also indicate different attitudes by left-wing voters (nearly 60% of left-wing Jews supported Harris) and centrist voters regarding support for increased American pressure to change government policy.
One of the clearest trends we identified already in our November survey last year, which is gaining momentum among the Israeli public at large, is the complete rejection of the status quo.
Asked about the desired strategic goal in relations with the Palestinians, only 12% said Israel should avoid strategic measures and adhere to the current situation. Only 7% support the continued limited warfare against Iran and its proxies as the preferred strategy for dealing with the Iranian threat.
The public expresses a fervent desire for strategic decisions and decisive steps. With the decline of the “interim” options of “managing” the conflict or postponing decisions on its outcome to a later date, the public has shifted to polarized positions regarding the nature of the decision that Israel must make.
THUS, THE survey found distinct polarization on the core questions regarding the continuation of the Gaza war and its aftermath.
On the one hand, we identify the emergence of a fundamentalist camp – about 1/4 to 1/3 of the respondents – holding positions previously considered the province of the extreme Right. They support annexation of the West Bank (29%), renewal of settlement, and full control of Gaza (29%), and oppose sanctions against settler violence toward Palestinians (33%). This camp espouses the use of increased military force to determine the outcome of the Gaza war, even at the cost of undermining cooperation with partners and neighbors. Those identifying with this camp also support an independent Israeli military campaign against Iran and its proxies as the best strategy (32%).
On the other hand, the results point to the consolidation of a moderate camp – constituting a relatively small majority of the public (40-50%). This camp displays a clear tendency toward pragmatism regarding Israel’s long-term relations with its enemies and allies. It backs international and regional cooperation as a primary means of advancing an end to the war.
It also supports a package deal that includes normalization, a US security umbrella, and the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state (44%), as well as long-term solutions to the conflict that include Palestinian self-sovereignty (50%).
Members of this camp recognize the limitations of independent military force and see a regional coalition as the main solution to the Iranian threat (46%). They support the deployment of a multinational force that includes moderate Arab states as a temporary solution after the cessation of hostilities in Gaza (46%), and international sanctions against violent settlers (50%).
The findings demonstrate that the extent of religious belief is the defining element separating the camps. Currently, the degree of religiosity in Israel’s Jewish sector is a critical component in shaping attitudes toward the country’s strategic and diplomatic policies. It is a more reliable indicator of identification with the fundamentalist or pragmatic camp than identifying with the political Right or Left. For example, 67% of those defining themselves as religious (including ultra-Orthodox) expressed support for annexation of the West Bank and Gaza, compared with 56% of those defining themselves as politically right-wing.
Proactive action needed
THE INDEX calls for visionary action from Israel’s political opposition. It points to the consolidation of a pragmatic majority that clearly favors a long-term arrangement with the Palestinians, a Palestinian state as part of a package deal, and a diplomatic-regional alliance to contain Iran.
These publicly articulated views should provide an impetus for opposition leaders to present a bold and clear vision for Israel’s future.
The findings reflect a relatively broad public mandate to oppose the government and the views it represents, and a clear demand – especially on the part of moderates – for clearcut policy decisions.
The survey reveals that the public not only adopts the opposition’s positions on core substantive issues but often also goes beyond the relatively cautious discourse of opposition leaders.
On the other hand, the survey data also clarifies the severe risk inherent in inaction on the part of the opposition. The formation of a broad fundamentalist camp among the public demonstrates that without an effective, deep, and visionary alternative, the minority government of Netanyahu and Smotrich will be able to present a solid public base of support for critical moves that the majority of the Israeli public rejects.
The writer is the CEO of the Mitvim Institute. This article is based on the findings of Mitvim’s 2024 Foreign Policy Index. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. Commercial use of publications by the Mitvim Institute and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation without written permission is strictly prohibited.