Defense Minister Yoav Gallant will likely fly to the US and meet with Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in the end, just as, ultimately, US President Joe Biden did speak with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Wednesday.
Eventually, Tuesday night’s drama over Netanyahu delaying Gallant’s scheduled trip to the US until he spoke with Biden by phone and the cabinet-approved military action against Iran will be forgotten – just another blip on the radar of their often fraught relationship, along with numerous other crises: some real, some overblown, some imagined.
The reflexive reaction by many in the media was to present this as just another example of Netanyahu at his worst – sacrificing national interests on the altar of his own ego and political rivalries.
In this telling, Netanyahu could not bear the thought of Gallant being welcomed in Washington while he was still waiting on a call from Biden, mainly since the two leaders had not spoken in about seven weeks. In this narrative, Netanyahu aimed to make Gallant’s life so miserable, given his desire to fire him, that the defense minister would quit.
But there is another interpretation: Israel wants to retain the freedom to respond to last week’s Iranian ballistic missile barrage on its own terms. A cabinet decision on the matter is necessary, and Netanyahu must directly communicate the country’s position to Biden before Gallant travels to Washington, where the Americans are likely to try to dissuade him from an overly aggressive response.
Biden has already made it clear that he does not want to see strikes on either Iran’s nuclear or oil facilities. If the cabinet decides on a course of action prior to Gallant’s trip, he will be able to claim that his hands are tied as a decision has already been made when he visits Washington.
Oversharing with an ally
Israel faces a dilemma: How much of their plans should they share with the US?
On one hand, withholding information could benefit the US by providing plausible deniability, allowing them to convincingly claim ignorance and potentially avoid reprisal attacks. On the other hand, if they do share the plans and the US says “No,” what should their next step be?
Various media reports indicate that the White House is increasingly upset with Israel’s lack of transparency and was angered when it only heard afterward about the assassinations of Hezbollah Chief of Staff Fuad Shukr in Beirut, Hamas head Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran, and later Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut.
According to these reports, Washington is concerned that such actions could trigger a spiraling regional war, drawing the US in, and that Iran’s proxies might respond by targeting US assets in the region.
But Israel has its own concerns about revealing plans to the US, and it’s not just the fear of a veto.
For instance, last week, just before the ground maneuver in Lebanon, which the US opposed, American media outlets reported that such an invasion was imminent. They may have been tipped off by someone within the administration who wanted to stop the maneuver by making it public.
There’s a lack of trust here that runs both ways.
Then there is the dilemma of what course of action to follow if the Americans are against it. This is not the first time Israel has faced this dilemma. Netanyahu himself, during a 2015 speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee just before his controversial address to Congress (which former president Barack Obama strongly opposed), highlighted key moments in history when Israel acted against Washington’s wishes.
“It started at the beginning,” Netanyahu said during the speech. “In 1948, Secretary of State [George] Marshall opposed David Ben-Gurion’s intention to declare statehood. That’s an understatement – he vehemently opposed it. But Ben-Gurion, understanding what was at stake, went ahead and declared Israel’s independence.”
“In 1967,” Netanyahu continued, “as an Arab noose was tightening around Israel’s neck, the United States warned prime minister Levi Eshkol that if Israel acted alone, it would be alone. But Israel acted – alone – to defend itself.”
Netanyahu recalled how Menachem Begin took out the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, even though former president Ronald Reagan was so incensed that he temporarily halted the delivery of fighter planes to Israel. He also cited Ariel Sharon, who continued with Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, despite former president George W. Bush calling on him to stop.
Netanyahu could have mentioned – but didn’t – that in 2007, Ehud Olmert ordered the destruction of a Syrian nuclear facility, even though the US preferred to address the matter at the UN.
Israel has shown that when its vital interests are at stake, it listens to advice but ultimately does what it believes necessary to secure its future.
With the alliance between the two countries so close, acting independently is never done lightly, but as history shows, it happens from time to time. If Netanyahu were to take action that the US opposes – such as greenlighting an attack on Iran’s nuclear or oil facilities – there may be no more opportune time than now, just before an election.
Though Biden might be furious at such a move, punishing Israel – as Reagan did after the Iraqi reactor strike – is unlikely just four weeks before an election, as this could alienate Jewish and other pro-Israel voters in key swing states right before a very close race. Such a move right now would be politically risky.
There are ample precedents of Israel defying US wishes, but this time, with the US on the eve of an election, it’s not just Israel’s next move on the line. The future of US-Israel relations for the next four years may also hang in the balance. If Kamala Harris wins the election – and according to the polls, that is now an even bet – Netanyahu’s defiance of Biden may deeply color their working relationship.