Hamas was planning to attack in 2022 but postponed its plans for a variety of reasons. This is the conclusion drawn based on new documents that were discovered in Gaza.
The documents, which consist of multiple pages and include minutes of meetings and numerous images that Hamas had collected of Israeli targets, illustrate how advanced Hamas’s planning was by 2022. They also display how Hamas was thinking in terms of several different types of attacks, although it remains unclear just how far Hamas progressed in some of the plans. Lastly, the documents appear to demonstrate that Hamas was deeply invested in coordinating with Iran and Hezbollah and informed its Doha-based leadership of its progress.
Further, reporting that revolved around these documents raises numerous questions. There are reports in The New York Times and also The Washington Post. These include stories about the minutes taken at 10 separate meetings by Hamas. A 59-page document and a 36-page slide show are involved.
The Jericho Wall plan
Hamas’s plans to go back many years were already known. In fact, Israel had obtained hints of this plan, dubbed the “Jericho Wall” plan, which was known to Israel prior to October 7. Israeli officials dismissed it as they disregarded warnings from IDF women observers about Hamas preparations, but the fact is that aspects of Hamas’s plan were known.
The new evidence sheds light on how Hamas seemed to have been sharing this plan a lot before the attack. This raises questions about why regional as well as Western intelligence agencies did not pick up on that.
Iran has denied prior knowledge of the plan in the past. In addition, reports have sought to claim that the Hamas leadership in Doha did not know about the genocidal attack. Doha had told Israel prior to October 7 that Hamas was only interested in cash and was deterred. If Hamas leaders in Doha knew about the plan, then this raises questions about why Qatar, a US ally, did not. If Doha did know, then this raises concerning questions about why Israel was not informed.
Hamas leaders, outside of a small circle, seemed to know about this plan. The reports indicate Khalil al-Hayya, a Hamas member, knew about it. Hayya met with top Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Mohammed Saeed Izadi in Lebanon. The fact that Hamas was holding meetings with the IRGC and this did not, allegedly, set off any alarm bells is concerning. Other key Hamas members who were in on the plan included Yahya Sinwar, Sinwar’s brother Mohammed, Mohammed Deif, and Marwan Issa. Issa and Deif have been killed in the war.
Hamas’s plans progressed from its demands for support from Iran that were made in June 2021, right after the 10 days of conflict that year, through April and November 2022. The plan continued to build up steam through August 2023. Hamas wanted calm to cover up its plans. It succeeded in obtaining this. Israel was distracted by the elections in 2022 as well as Hezbollah threats which forced it into a US-brokered maritime deal with Lebanon. Israel was also distracted with internal domestic politics in 2023, as well as a rising terror wave in the West Bank.
What we know now
Overall, the new documents tell us a few things. They reveal that Hamas did try to coordinate with the IRGC in Iran and with Hezbollah. Iran likely coordinated with militias in Iraq and Yemen to prepare for the “big project,” as Hamas called the lead-up to the war.
They disclose that Ismail Haniyeh in Doha knew of the plans. He was killed in Iran this year. Esmail Qaani, head of the Quds Force of the IRGC, also knew of the plans. His status is currently unclear. In essence, Israel has settled scores with many of those behind the Hamas genocidal plan.
ALTERNATIVELY, OTHER aspects of these documents leave room for speculation. Hamas had been planning the October 7 operation for years. It also apparently thought up other plans such as major attacks in Tel Aviv. How far advanced were those plans? This question leaves one wondering about Hamas’s overall planning process.
The fact that Hamas kept minutes of the meetings and put them on a computer as well as have Hamas members speak with Hezbollah and the IRGC in meetings seems to make one question Hamas’s operational security. Storing the minutes of a secret terrorist meeting and plans on a computer is a sure way for those plans to be found unless the computer is never hooked up to the internet or a network. All of this raises doubts as to whether no other governments in the region were truly not more keyed into Hamas’s plans. While it stands to reason that many governments do not monitor Hamas communications, some of them do monitor Hezbollah or the IRGC. In addition, Hamas leaders reside in Doha, a US ally.
The discovery of the Hamas plans, which were apparently found back in January in Khan Yunis, Yahya Sinwar’s hometown, leaves many questions about the October 7 massacre unanswered. What they do tell us is that Hamas wanted close coordination with Iran. It was always assumed that Iran was pushing the multifront war and unification of the “arenas” to surround Israel.
Hamas is now portrayed as a more senior partner than in the past. Hamas drove Hezbollah towards war with Israel. That is important and shows why many countries should have paid closer attention to the rising Hamas danger. The documents also make it look increasingly like the Great Return March protests in 2018 and the 2021 short conflict were dry-runs for the October 7 attack.
They also raise questions about whether the maritime deal in which Israel was pushed to appease Hezbollah encouraged Hamas to believe that Israel was weak. The desire to derail normalization with Saudi Arabia and to attack Israel before new laser air defenses were rolled out also apparently played into Hamas’s thinking and timing.