Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision to fire Defense Minister Yoav Gallant harms Israeli security, but not nearly as much as it would have had he followed through on his plans to fire Gallant in March 2023 or in September 2024.
It harms Israeli security because none of the three major fronts of the war are yet decided, Gallant is the one major military expert in the government and one of the only figures willing to tell Netanyahu inconvenient truths, and major decisions may now be made without a real security team or fully educated cabinet.
Will the government get the hostages back? Who will the government hand Gaza over to so as to avoid Israel being stuck with the bill to rebuild and provide humanitarian aid? How will military policy be best used to achieve Israel’s goals on these issues?
At the same time that Israel is deciding what to do about these strategic questions, Netanyahu is trying to find a way to provide the haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties in the government with an ongoing exemption from military service.
How can this be the government’s policy when around 12,000 soldiers have been wounded and 900 killed, and the IDF is desperate to replace them lest the borders be left under-guarded and the country left open to another future invasion?
Will anyone in the government, without Gallant, resist the haredi exemption that so obviously undermines the country’s national security goals regarding Gaza and the many borders that need to be guarded?
Regarding Lebanon, when should the IDF withdraw from southern Lebanon? What military means will be used to make sure Hezbollah does not return to southern Lebanon? Further, what military means will be used to make sure Iran does not resupply Hezbollah with powerful rockets via land from Syria, sea, and air?
How will these military means be properly balanced in such a way as to avoid unnecessary new large conflicts, while being tough enough to actually prevent rearmament?
Iran has been adamant that it will hit Israel with a third attack, following its April and October 1 massive aerial attacks. Who will direct the defense? Who will direct the likely needed counterstrike, once again balancing a strike that deters Tehran but does not prolong these exchanges in an endless manner?
Through all of this, who will maintain US backing and trust in the government when it is known that the Biden administration has no trust in Netanyahu or his close lieutenants who are unwilling to ever contradict him? Will the loss of Gallant as the most trustworthy interlocutor lead to less American support in defending against Iran and in providing weapons to fight Hezbollah and Hamas?
Not having Gallant, who all parties agree was an experienced, daring, and creative general, and replacing him with Israel Katz, who has significant experience as a minister, including foreign minister, but not in the military, will harm how Israel responds to all of these challenges.
News could be worse
But the news is not as bad as it would have been if Netanyahu had fired Gallant earlier.
In March 2023, Netanyahu wanted to fire Gallant to facilitate his judicial overhaul.
Had the judicial overhaul gone through in March as is (there are more moderate versions of it that could have gone through with less drama) and Gallant remained fired, Hamas might have done far more damage on October 7 to an even more distracted, drained, and dilapidated military than it did.
Likewise, had Netanyahu fired Gallant in mid-September before the IDF decapitated Hezbollah from the air and took over southern Lebanon on the ground, Hezbollah might have succeeded in showering the whole home front with rockets, killing thousands and ravaging central Israel.
Had Netanyahu fired Gallant then, before the exchange with Iran on October 1 and October 26, Israel’s defense and counterstrike might have been far weaker, and the results could have been disastrous.
With all of the above question marks, the fact is that Netanyahu kept Gallant in office until the point where Hamas and Hezbollah were basically beaten and the drama with Iran is likely close to its end.
Also, there are plenty of other qualified generals besides Gallant; he is not the only one who could be defense minister.
From that perspective, firing Gallant, in and of itself, at this much later point in the war, may not be a game changer at all. The problem is that Katz has been appointed for his lack of independence and to keep his head down.
Netanyahu has the right to have a defense minister he trusts. But he also needs a defense minister who will put national security first, even if it interferes with some of Netanyahu’s coalition politics.
Katz will not oppose exempting haredim from the IDF, which after October 7 is not only a political injustice but a national security disaster.
Some think that Netanyahu fired Gallant now and appointed Katz to pave the way to fire IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi and Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar.
The truth is that both Halevi and Bar should resign for their roles on October 7. But that is in a universe where Netanyahu, who was equally responsible, also resigns.
The public has seen some disastrous results when a distinguished officer like Daniel Levy was appointed police chief under condition that he move the police in the direction of the government’s political interests.
If after replacing the defense minister with someone less militarily qualified like Katz, the IDF chief and Shin Bet chief are replaced by qualified people, but with understandings that they must subordinate national security to Netanyahu’s politics, how much worse will the results be?
Also, the fact that Netanyahu is replacing Gallant comes against the backdrop of his previously firing defense ministers like Ehud Barak, Moshe Ya’alon, Avigdor Liberman, and Naftali Bennett. It also comes against the backdrop of Netanyahu being jealous of Gallant being given credit for many of Israel’s victories during the current war.
Netanyahu has a right to his pick for defense minister, and firing Gallant now is not as damaging as it would have been earlier in the war, but it still may cause significant harm, and the reasons he decided to fire him and what he plans to do, especially regarding the haredim, are highly problematic.