A ceasefire with Hezbollah and Lebanon will most likely include a phased 60-day withdrawal by the IDF from southern Lebanon, with no leftover security perimeter, a senior defense source said on Thursday.
Additional likely ceasefire terms included: a US side letter of guarantees to Israel and American supervision of UNIFIL, and empowering the Lebanese army to truly gain and maintain control of southern Lebanon from Hezbollah.
These terms would be in addition to Hezbollah’s acceptance of a withdrawal of its own forces to points north of the Litani River, and the US, France, and others committing to help guarantee that Hezbollah will be unable to resupply itself with rockets and other weapons from land, air, or sea.
The official specified that the American letter – which will likely not be made public – will delineate between different scenarios: where Israel can act against Hezbollah violations without checking in with any third party, and in what situations would it need to first complain to an international body before taking action.
For example, the official said that the IDF and security forces could act immediately against any immediate threat, but would need to first lodge a complaint if it noticed Hezbollah starting the process in southern Lebanon of manufacturing new rockets, digging a new tunnel, or organizing some other new military site – in some cases even north of the Litani River, though this element is more ambiguous.
Israel is expected to receive the right to continue to collect intelligence on threats within Lebanon from the air, either in the deal with Hezbollah-Lebanon or in the side deal with the US, the source stated.
The role of UNIFIL
In addition, though the Lebanese army with help from the US and others is expected to take over southern Lebanon, UNIFIL will remain in the picture in some kind of limited coordination capacity.
While generally, Israel views UNIFIL as somewhat useless in stopping Hezbollah, its presence can still add to stability factors in the area, along with more robust guarantees from the IDF’s own actions and the Lebanese army, said the defense official.
While the exact parameters of the staged 60-day withdrawal may still be up for debate, the idea is that splitting the process into stages would allow Israel to evaluate using benchmarks at multiple points regarding Hezbollah’s compliance, the source noted.
The source emphasized that the most important item is Israel’s ability to act to enforce the agreement regardless of what the deal itself says.
In contrast to 2006, where Israel felt that it was lucky, in some ways, to receive any improved deal on paper – which also made Jerusalem somewhat fearful about enforcement – the source said that now, the IDF feels that it is in the driver’s seat and that the added leverage will likely both discourage Hezbollah from near-term violations of the deal and leave the IDF more ready to enforce it.
Broadly speaking, Israel views a ceasefire as having three components: the right to independently attack Hezbollah when it commits violations; side guarantees from the US; and the deal itself.
The official acknowledged that unarmed Hezbollah fighters could return to villages in southern Lebanon like Kafr Kila and that there may be complex circumstances where it might be harder to evaluate whether they were acting militarily or not.
But generally, the source appeared confident that Israeli defense and intelligence activities would be able to manage such challenges.
The source posited that Hamas’s general refusal to cut a deal with Israel is what is holding back a return of hostages – not Jerusalem’s refusal to withdraw from the Philadelphi corridor, withdraw from a Gaza security perimeter, or lack of agreement on a day-after plan.
The official was adamant that Israel hold onto a security perimeter in Gaza for an extended period even after any ceasefire – unlike what is being discussed with the North – where the IDF is expected to make a full withdrawal.The source was evasive on withdrawal from Philadelphi to secure the return of hostages, but opined that the issue would not ultimately hold up a deal.
Most of the defense establishment – including recently fired defense minister Yoav Gallant – have partially blamed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for holding up a hostage deal since May or July, given his opposition to even a temporary withdrawal, which they say would not undermine Israeli security because the IDF could easily return.
The defense official rejected these characterizations, saying that Hamas has continued to fight with Israel over other issues, like how many and which Palestinian security prisoners would be released in a deal.
However, The Jerusalem Post understands from other security sources that the prisoner issue likely could have been finessed in July if Netanyahu had compromised on Philadelphi.
Regarding the day-after issue, the source said that the government’s current strategy is to split Hamas from controlling food and other humanitarian aid by introducing private US contractors into Gaza to transport the supplies. These contractors would be armed and would be charged with protecting themselves, as some have done in places like Iraq and Afghanistan for the US.
The source emphasized that Israel would make sure not to take legal or financial responsibility for Gaza through these actions.
The official was also highly optimistic that ongoing pressure on Hamas, including in northern Gaza, was starting to bring more flexibility from the group. The official, however, could not name a new leader of Hamas and was vague when asked how the group could cut a deal with Israel if its leadership was still disorganized after its leaders were assassinated.