The last time an IDF chief of staff resigned midterm was when Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz quit following the military’s failures during the Second Lebanon War in 2006.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi’s announcement that he will resign on March 6 after the military probes of the October 7 massacre are issued and with the Hamas hostage deal moving forward was expected.
But this is still a game changer.
His resignation, along with that of OC Southern Command Maj-Gen. Yaron Finkelman, leaves only Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) Director Ronen Bar in their positions out of the dozen or so major officials who are generally viewed as bearing responsibility for the October 7 massacre.
In some ways, these resignations will help the IDF close one of its most painful chapters ever as it moves forward.
What will that future look like?
First of all, Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz – but mainly Netanyahu, given that Katz has not shown any independence to date – are expected to choose as the next chief of staff either current or former IDF high-command major-generals Eyal Zamir, Amir Baram, or Tamir Yadai, possibly as early as next week.
Zamir is the favored candidate. He is known for his aggressive approach regarding the use of military force and the readiness to go after Iran, which fits well with the post-October 7 massacre universe in which the military is expected to take more preemptive actions to avoid having to spend as much time on the defensive.
Still, extraordinary challenges lie ahead regardless of who leads the IDF.
Israeli and US officials have recently echoed the drumroll in the form of threatening Iran with a climactic attack on its nuclear sites or striking a much more restrictive nuclear deal than the one agreed upon in 2015.
Planning for this will not just mean planning an attack but also substantial planning with the US and regional Sunni allies to defend against an expected Iranian counterattack, which could see double the number of ballistic missiles fired on Israel compared with 2024.
Former National Security Council adviser Gen. (res.) Jacob Nagel’s committee emphasized the need to both increase Israel’s independence from other countries in weapons production for offensive operations and boost its defensive operations.
Other than a general 70% attack efforts and 30% defense efforts model, however, the Nagel Committee did not prioritize what items should be purchased first as Israel tries to realize this vision of greater independence in weapons production in a concrete way.
If there is only a budget this year for more advanced aircraft versus more land-to-land long-range missiles, versus much-needed additional Arrow interceptors to shoot down ballistic missiles, versus finding better solutions to stopping drone attacks, what will go first?
Some of these decisions will be made by Netanyahu and Katz, but most of them will be based on recommendations by the new IDF chief.
As the findings from the October 7 massacre investigations emerge and tear into all of the systemic issues that led to the failures that played out on that day, the new IDF chief will need to examine how much progress has been made since, and what is still needed to fix these issues.
For example, the Military Intelligence Directorate has increased the size and influence of a unit designed to second-guess the main, conventional recommendations of the whole intelligence branch.
Is this change working to diversify views about how to handle potential threats?
For much of the war, the IDF had vast numbers of soldiers on every border to contend with ongoing invasions.
But with ceasefires on all fronts, will the military and the government still have the ability to maintain a much larger military presence at Israel’s borders as they currently do?
Could this continue even if there is no major attack over the next few months or years? Or will talk of a “smaller, smarter army” come back into style, given humanity’s short attention span and general disregard for history?
Moreover, will a much stronger second line of defense be maintained on all fronts in case an enemy does achieve initial surprise so as to mitigate any initial losses and quickly retake any compromised border positions in minutes or hours as opposed to the days it took in late 2023?
Are the right personnel in place, given that many of them, including OC Military Intelligence Directorate Maj.-Gen. Shlomi Binder, who assumed his position last August, were appointed by Halevi when no one was sure about what had led to the October 7 massacre.
On the one hand, Halevi went on to lead a very militarily successful invasion of both Gaza and Lebanon, as well as bring Iran to its knees and significantly reduce the existing threats in Syria.Binder was at the forefront of the victories over Hezbollah, destroying weapon threats in Syria and Iran’s air defenses on October 26.
All of that would suggest that Binder and those more recently appointed by Halevi to top positions are worthy of leading the military into the future.
Alternatively, as Yediot Aharonot wrote on Wednesday, Binder was cleared of any major failing related to the October 7 massacre in a probe run by Brig.-Gen. (res.) Rali Margalit.
Notably, though, Margalit served in the past under Maj.-Gen. Oded Basiuk, who was Binder’s most recent commanding officer, helping recommend Binder for the promotion of leading the IDF’s intelligence branch.
Suspicions arise
Questions have been raised about whether a complex triangle of assisting one another took place between Margalit, Basiuk, and Binder that paved the way to clearing the new IDF intelligence chief.
Some other military officers who were less a part of the triangle might have seen matters differently.
The Jerusalem Post understands that Binder and Margalit were not friends and did not know each other prior to the Israel-Hamas War. Having Margalit, a reservist who was no longer a career officer in the general chain of command, conduct the probe in relation to Binder was viewed as a careful move aimed at obtaining an unbiased outsider’s perspective.
Furthermore, the Post understands that the IDF would contend that any criticism about Basiuk and Margalit being too close does not reflect on Binder poorly in any way.
Moreover, the Post has learned that the IDF would bristle at suggestions that it should have had someone even further distanced from the IDF to probe Binder.
This is because on January 4, 2024, when it was leaked that the IDF was going to establish parallel internal and external mechanisms to probe itself and national security failures, Netanyahu and his supporters went into overdrive to block the external mechanism.
Accordingly, the IDF would say that if critics are upset there was not even more distance between those probing and being probed in the IDF, it is Netanyahu who is to blame and not the military.
For his part, though an external mechanism would have received more public faith for its probe, Netanyahu was worried that parts of its investigation might point the finger at him.
Regarding the absence of a state commission of inquiry, national security questions and problems that even the next IDF chief will not be able to fully address will remain if such an inquiry is not established to go beyond errors made by the IDF.
In any event, this debate about Binder is only one example, but it is emblematic of the difficult questions that the next IDF chief will need to sort through in terms of personnel.
These are the longer-term challenges, but the next IDF chief will also need to handle the aftermath of the current Hezbollah and Hamas ceasefires.
Military altercations could break out on either or both borders between now and March 6, and even if this does not happen, it could happen in the near future.
Any new near-term military altercations will require recalibrating all of the above issues in favor of a more challenging balance of continuing to try to perform long-term planning while in the midst of a new crisis.
The new IDF chief will likely need to figure out how and when the army should withdraw from the buffer zone in Syria, and what new arrangements are needed to secure that border from potential additional Sunni jihadist threats.
Currently, the IDF is 7,000 soldiers short, owing to soldiers who have died or have been wounded in war. There is no sign that the government, as it now stands, is going to help provide any imminent relief by drafting large numbers of haredim in the near future.
Balancing these issues with the political aspect of it all will likely feel like maneuvering through a field of land mines for the next chief.
The IDF just started a large operation in Jenin, with the West Bank still on fire for nearly three years running, dating back to March 2022.
At this point, no one probably expects the IDF to fully extinguish that fire without some new diplomatic developments. But the new IDF chief will still need to confront that ongoing explosive issue, including the complexities of dealing with the Palestinian Authority at a time when Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich retains certain building and bulldozing authorities in the West Bank.
Finally, the next IDF chief may have little backing from Katz versus Netanyahu when there are professional military interests that do not coincide with the prime minister’s political ones.
Halevi has felt the brunt of this since Katz took over for Yoav Gallant two months ago.
As of March 6, Halevi’s replacement will learn that sitting in the chair is a lot harder than peering at it from the side.