Lack of response was due to low expectations and more urgent priorities.
By BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMANA Gaza man reads a newspaper, featuring the Israeli election on its front page, in Khan Younis, March 18.(photo credit: IBRAHEEM ABU MUSTAFA / REUTERS)
FOR ALL practical purposes, Benjamin Netanyahu’s reelection to the prime ministership was a non-event in the Arab world. The reasons for the widespread indifference are diverse, and require elaboration.To appreciate the depth of the Arab silence, one may go back to May 1996, when Netanyahu was elected to the post for the first time, defeating Shimon Peres, who had assumed office following Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination six months earlier. Netanyahu was openly opposed to the 1993 Oslo Accords and subsequent implementation agreements, and his victory came as a shock to Arab leaders who had committed themselves to the American-sponsored diplomatic efforts and feared the domestic and regional consequences of the ascent of a right-wing nationalist leader in Israel.The reasons for the overall lack of Arab response this time can be divided into two categories: low expectations, and more urgent priorities.Regarding the former, Arab states and publics (like much of the Israeli public) have simply stopped believing that a negotiated settlement is possible. Moreover, Netanyahu has zero credibility in the Arab world. The US is generally seen as being beholden to Israeli-Zionist-Jewish interests and hence unwilling to apply brute pressure on Israel to change its policies.To be sure, Netanyahu’s open confrontation with the Obama administration is being watched keenly in the Arab world for any sign of a weakening of traditional US support for Israel, but Arab elites are also well aware of the support that Netanyahu has in the US Congress.Isaac Herzog, Netanyahu’s prime opponent in the election, was an unknown quantity in the Arab world, and in any event his campaign did not focus on the diplomatic process. Moreover, as a centrist Labor Party leader, his official positions on issues related to the conflict, opposing the division of Jerusalem, keeping the Jordan River as Israel’s security boundary, and his criticism of Netanyahu’s conduct of the Gaza war of summer 2014 were far from the minimum accepted positions of the Arab states.As for priorities, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while still resonating emotionally, has clearly been pushed off the center of the regional agenda. The horrendous bloodletting in Syria and resulting refugee crisis (felt acutely in Jordan and Lebanon, as well as Turkey), the rise of Islamic State and the manifestations of radical Islamist terror throughout the region, the extension of Iranian power to Iraq and projection of power into Syria, Lebanon and Yemen, the civil war in Libya, the breakdown of the always fragile Yemeni state, and finally the intensive Iranian-Western negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program (whose likely results are considered to be a “bad deal” not only by Netanyahu but by Saudi Arabia) are all more pressing matters than the Israeli-Palestinian impasse and Netanyahu’s reelection.The regularly scheduled Arab summit conference at the end of March in Sharm el-Sheikh will undoubtedly confirm the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and call on the international community to take practical measures to compel Israel to respond favorably. But host Egypt’s focus is elsewhere. Coming on the heels of a successful economic summit conference to attract foreign investors, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi will use the summit to try and show the world that Egypt is “back” as the undisputed leader of the Arab world. The enhanced security cooperation between Egypt and Israel against jihadis in Sinai and Egypt’s branding of Hamas as a “terrorist” organization constitutes a new wrinkle in Egyptian- Israeli relations, one with which Netanyahu can take satisfaction.From the Palestinian perspective, Netanyahu’s reelection put paid to any remaining hopes that the Israeli public was ready for a change, which would affect them favorably. A number of commentators viewed the election results with satisfaction, believing that it cleared the way for the Palestinian strategy of internationalizing the conflict.Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is keenly aware of the possible consequences, particularly the likelihood of harsh Israeli countermeasures. At the same time, the pressure from below to cease security cooperation with Israeli is considerable.
One voice in the wilderness was Imad Fallouj, a former Hamas member, adviser to Yasser Arafat and PA cabinet minister. Israeli democracy, he declared, was a model of governance that the Palestinians should emulate, for Israel managed to use its multiple divisions and disagreements as a source of strength, while in Palestinian society, anarchy rules the day, politically, economically, socially and even conceptually. Unlike in Israel, he said, Palestinian leaders only rarely attempt to improve the lives of their citizens. ■ The author is a Principal Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University
