As readers will hopefully remember, I have begun to examine the topic of women’s obligation in mitzvot, which I will be continuing over the next few columns.
One of the major distinctions between the genders is women’s exemption from positive time-bound mitzvot. In the Orthodox world, it is often presented definitively as the seminal proof that men and women are intended by God to fulfill different roles.
In this column, we will look at how time-bound mitzvot are defined.
A Mishna in Kiddushin states that women are obligated in all mitzvot except for positive time-bound mitzvot from which they are exempted. There is no reason or explanation given in the Mishna either regarding the definition of time-bound mitzvot or the reason for the exemption.
In the ensuing lengthy Talmudic discussion that continues for several pages, there is an attempt to break down the classification of this category of mitzvot from which women are exempted. Several examples are given, including the following: sukkah, lulav, shofar, tzitzit and tefillin.
The mitzvot can be grouped into two categories, although it is hard to come up with a unifying thread between the two.
1. Sukkah, lulav and shofar are time-bound because they can be fulfilled only on specific days of the year. No one disagrees with the time-bound nature of these mitzvot. They have no meaning once the holiday passes. Accordingly, this exemption status should apply to all positive commandments on holy days that are calendar dependent, including Shabbat and Passover. But ultimately it does not.
2. Tefillin and tzitzit. Both of these are ritual objects which are to be worn all day, every day, which raises the question of their time-bound nature. Furthermore, neither of these examples are uniformly accepted as exemptions. There are early rabbinic sages who state outright that women are obligated in both of these mitzvot because they are, in fact, not time-bound.
An excellent example of the tension found in the discourse is the attempt to analyze women’s exemption from sitting in a sukkah. Although it is clear from the outset that women will be exempted, since this is an explicit example brought in a beraita, the Talmud offers an equally valid argument in which women could have been included in this mitzva. There are some compelling methodological reasons to do so, as well as practical ones.
The Talmudic sage Abaye notes that if the mitzva on Sukkot is to “dwell” in the sukkah, it should include women. Otherwise, men will be obligated to eat their meals and sleep inside the sukkah while their wives and daughters eat and sleep inside the home. Yet, Sukkot is a holiday in which families are commanded to rejoice together, as explicitly stated in Deuteronomy!
In a different vein, his contemporary and colleague Rava argues that sukkah could be equated to Passover, as they both fall on the 15th of the month. Since women are obligated in the Passover offering and eating matzah on Passover although both are time-bound mitzvot, this could serve as a precedent to obligate women in sukkah, which falls on the same date of a different month.
In the end, the Talmud concludes that the article “the,” which in Hebrew is one extra letter, is inserted in the text to clarify that women are exempt despite legitimate arguments that could determine otherwise.
In a similar manner, the Talmud presents logical arguments to obligate women in the mitzva of tefillin and even in the mitzva of studying Torah.
With each example, complicated methodological principles are asserted to support inclusion but ultimately used to defend their exemption from each and every one of the examples cited.
The Talmud acknowledges the difficulty in justifying the exemptions, but no one questions or contradicts the precedent dictated by the Mishna.
Read through a modern lens, it feels as if a parallel universe is being laid out in which the reader can see “the road not taken,” toward greater gender equality in mitzva obligation. At the end, this road is blocked and the path toward differentiation is the only one left open.
WHILE THE Mishna establishes a principle in which women are exempted from time-bound mitzvot that take place at a specific time or on a specific day of the year, at the same time, the text states unequivocally that women are obligated in all non-time-bound mitzvot. Yet, the Talmud brings several significant examples in which women are obligated in positive time-bound commandments and exempted from a number of non-time-bound positive ones.
Thus, we are taught that women are obligated in eating matzah, rejoicing on the holidays and gathering to hear the king read the Torah every seven years. At the same time, it acknowledges that women are exempted from several key non-time-bound positive mitzvot, notably Torah study, procreation and redeeming the firstborn son.
In short, the classification of women’s exemption from such mitzvot (or alternatively, automatic inclusion in the positive non-time-bound category) is by no means clear-cut, since there are many exceptions.
The great sage Rabbi Yohanan is quoted at this point as stating that we do not learn from general principles. Maimonides, in his commentary to the Mishna in Kiddushin, writes: “but there is no general rule regarding the positive commandments in which women are obligated or exempted; rather, they are passed on orally and they are accepted by tradition.”
He concludes that the classifications of mitzvot from which women are exempted do not follow any legal reasoning or logic, but, rather, are passed on by tradition.
Nonetheless, both medieval and contemporary commentaries have attempted to interpret the rule as the Torah’s response to something ingrained in female “nature,” sometimes suggesting that women are deficient and other times suggesting they are superior in nature. Some of these explanations will be examined in future columns.
The writer teaches contemporary Halacha at the Matan Advanced Talmud Institute. She also teaches Talmud at the Pardes Institute of Jewish Studies along with courses on sexuality and sanctity in the Jewish tradition.