Must one have kavana – deliberate intent – to fulfill one of God’s commandments, or can a mitzvah be considered to be performed even when the act is done without the intent to fulfill a mitzvah?
This key issue has been debated since Talmudic times, and is known in Hebrew parlance as the matter of mitzvot tzerichot kavana – [do] commandments require intent?
The question is central to Jewish life and more generally to religious experience: What is the relationship between a result-oriented attitude to mitzvot and a process-focused outlook on religious observance?
If we are result-oriented, then perhaps the notion of intent is of secondary importance: the completion of the act is the goal. Whereas if we are process-oriented, then the journey is more important than the destination, and an act performed without intent can hardly be considered to have been done.
One classic case is a Torah reader who, as part of the public, communal reading, chants the Shema prayer (Brachot 13a). The Torah reader has no intent to discharge the requirement to read Shema every morning and every evening, though that text has just been read. Has the Torah reader fulfilled the Shema requirement even without intent?
This example refers to a particular ritual, yet the issue of intent has broad implications. Indeed, the question of whether intent is required touches on facets of Jewish religious life throughout the year. The conundrum is relevant to all who seek to do mitzvot, and it is applicable at all times. It is difficult to find an issue that has comparable scope.
Unsurprisingly, iterations of this question have continued to reverberate over the ages, and this is a commonly discussed topic in every beit midrash.
Even the premier code of Jewish law – the Shulhan Aruch of Rabbi Yosef Karo (1488-1575) – acknowledges that the matter is disputed: “There are those who say that mitzvot do not require intent, and there are those who say that mitzvot require intent to discharge [the obligation] with the performance of that mitzvah, and thus is the law” (Shulhan Aruch, Orah Hayim 60:4).
To be sure, Karo occasionally cites more than one opinion in this famous work, even though codes of law normally present one, clear, final ruling. In this case, he did rule, but he felt it important to acknowledge the alternative position.
Soon after Karo wrote those words, another codifier – Rabbi Mordechai Yoffe (1530-1612) – concurred that mitzvot do indeed require intent, noting that this was derived from a biblical verse (Levush 60:4).
Yoffe did not identify the verse, sending readers to a passage later in his work. Alas, turning to the reference later in his work does not provide an answer: no biblical verse is cited. The identity of the biblical verse that underpins the intent requirement is a mystery!
The quest for a biblical proof text did not seem to occupy the thought of most scholars. Indeed, if there was a source in the Bible, how could there be a dispute as to whether commandments require intent? Moreover, if there was a verse, why was it not cited in the original Talmudic discussions, or the debates that have arisen since?
IT COULD very well be that the first scholar to identify a biblical source for the intent requirement came from the hassidic milieu.
Rabbi Tzvi Elimelech Spira of Dynów (1783-1841) was generally known by the title of his famous hassidic work, Bnei Yissaschar (Zolkiew 1850). He also wrote a work on the 613 mitzvot titled Derech Pikudecha (Lemberg 1851). This volume set out to explain how each mitzvah could be fulfilled in action, speech and thought. This fascinating work is incomplete: only 58 of the 613 commandments are discussed.
The lengthy introduction to Derech Pikudecha is a work unto itself, and there the Bnei Yissaschar discussed the classic issue of intent while fulfilling mitzvot.
“And to my mind there are a number of verses in the Torah that indicate this,” wrote the Bnei Yissaschar. His first suggestion was the verse “The Lord your God commands you this day to observe these laws and rules; observe them faithfully with all your heart and soul” (Deuteronomy 26:16). Rabbi Tzvi Elimelech offered a pithy interpretation: “Behold ‘heart and soul’ is the intent of the mind.”
He offered a second biblical proof text, sourced in the passage that summarizes the building of the Tabernacle in the desert: “Thus was completed all the work of the Tabernacle of the Tent of Meeting. The Israelites did so; just as the Lord had commanded Moses, so they did” (Exodus 29:32).
Bnei Yissaschar pointed out that the last words of the verse – “so they did” – are superfluous; the meaning of the verse is understood without this appendage.
These extra words, explained the Bnei Yissaschar, teach us something additional: Not only was all the work completed, and not only was it done as per the divine instructions, but it was done with specific and focused intent. The Tabernacle structure was raised and the vessels were fashioned, and these acts were completed with the intent to fulfill God’s command.
After offering two suggestions, Bnei Yissaschar concluded: “And we have a number of other verses that indicate this,” suggesting that this principle could be identified elsewhere in the Bible.
Rabbi Tzvi Elimelech was convinced that the intent requirement was rooted in the Bible, but it seems that he was unable to pinpoint which verse was the singular source.
It was, perhaps, the vibe of Jewish tradition as rooted in the Bible that demanded intent when fulfilling mitzvot. He saw this as an overarching idea that cropped out in different contexts, and could be seen in different verses.
Thus in the eyes of Rabbi Zvi Elimelech Spira of Dynów, truly fulfilling the Almighty’s precepts is possible only when one acts with a commitment of heart and soul to the task – that is, with focused intent.
The writer is on the faculty of Pardes Institute of Jewish Studies and is a rabbi in Tzur Hadassah.