In a series of masterstrokes, Israel upended Hezbollah’s plans. Removing Hassan Nasrallah and senior commanders of the Iranian-backed group has temporarily deprived it of its ability to coordinate attacks, while the IDF’s use of airstrikes has affected Hezbollah’s arsenal. The group has not been able to carry out the kind of attack that was envisioned in any kind of assessment of what a major war with Hezbollah would look like. This could change, but if the trend continues, it means Hezbollah will suffer major losses. With Hezbollah weakened, it could unlock Israel’s challenges in Gaza.
Israel has been fighting Hamas for almost a year since October 7 and the campaign in Gaza unfolded in stages. The first was two weeks of heavy airstrikes while the IDF prepared for a ground operation, which began on October 27. The IDF swiftly took over the Netzarim corridor south of Gaza City, effectively cutting off Gaza City from the rest of central and southern Gaza. The IDF then sought to defeat a dozen Hamas battalions in northern Gaza. With those mostly defeated, the IDF then moved south in December and January. A hostage deal in late November saw some hostages released, but 101 remain in Gaza.
By the end of January, most of Khan Yunis had been subdued and the IDF’s operations became less intense. By March, a de facto ceasefire had taken place in Gaza due to Ramadan. In April, the IDF left Khan Yunis, and in May, Israeli forces entered Rafah after months of US and Western objections. The Rafah campaign lasted until August when the Rafah Hamas brigade was declared defeated.
This is where the Gaza campaign basically ended, while Israel prepared to confront Hezbollah. Hezbollah’s daily attacks kept 60,000 Israeli residents from returning home. Israel asked its friends in the West to convey to Iran and Hezbollah that the group must stop its attacks and stop tying itself to Hamas, to stop being a front in this war.
Hezbollah was always seen as the larger threat to Israel, one which Israel didn’t want a major war with. However, Hezbollah wouldn’t stop its attacks. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant called to add the return of the hostages to the goals of the war, which meant that the northern front became an official priority in the first two weeks of September.
After Israel tried one last time to pressure Hezbollah using diplomacy, the gloves came off. Hezbollah pagers exploded and its commanders were killed on September 20; Nasrallah was next on Friday. The IDF launched 1,600 airstrikes on September 23.
Switching focus from Hamas to Hezbollah
Now, Hezbollah is weakened, which unlocks opportunities in Gaza. Hamas has been stubborn because it has backers abroad who have been telling it to be steadfast and hold on to central Gaza. The IDF has never gone into central Gaza and removed Hamas from Nuseirat, El-Bureij, Maghazi, and Deir al-Balah. This is the Hamas stronghold today, along with some elements in northern Gaza and Khan Yunis, where Hamas returned despite numerous IDF raids.
If Hamas feels that Hezbollah can no longer threaten Israel with a multi-front war, might Hamas become more flexible? Might Hamas’s backers in Iran, Ankara, Doha, Moscow, or Beijing urge Hamas to come to an agreement?
Israel's options
There are several options now for Israel in Gaza. Israel can keep doing what it’s doing, keeping one division in southern Gaza’s Philadelphi corridor and one in Netzarim, which will keep Hamas weakened but not completely defeated. Hamas will continue to hold 101 hostages.
On the other hand, Israel could also go back into Gaza with forces and fully defeat Hamas. The question then is whether there is a plan to replace Hamas, or merely defeat it “militarily.” Israel could also agree to a deal and get the hostages released. This would allow Hamas to stay in power and enable Hamas to celebrate and claim that it achieved something. That would not be something the Israeli government likely wants to see. The government also is wary of conducting large-scale operations in central Gaza that might endanger the hostages. This leaves the worst of both worlds, where the hostages remain in Gaza and there is no closure to the war.
It is possible the defeat of Hezbollah could unlock a new page in Gaza. This will require some decisions about what the best path forward is in Gaza. Israel has been wary of replacing Hamas. However, recent reports are questioning whether Yahya Sinwar is still in control of Hamas, or may have been killed. If Sinwar is not in control or if Hamas is defeated, then it stands to reason that it does not resemble a military organization, meaning that freeing the hostages is possible. Israel would never let 101 hostages be held in Jenin or Ramallah, so why let them remain in Gaza under a weakened or leaderless Hamas? Now that the Hezbollah bogeyman has been weakened, it might be time to ask questions about seizing the initiative in Gaza.