The part of this war between Israel and Hezbollah has just about come to an end, with Israel managing to alter its narrative since mid-September – from a tie to close to a knockout.
And yet, the terms of the ceasefire and the status of Hezbollah maintaining many of the sources of its power make it clear that another Lebanon war may be closer than many would like to hope.
How did we get here?
From October 8, 2023, when Hezbollah attacked border villages with rockets and anti-tank missiles, until August 25 of this year, the war was mostly a tie.
From October-December 2023, it truly was a tie.
From December 2023 until August 2024, Israel started to kill far more Hezbollah fighters than the Iranian proxy terrorist group was managing to kill on the Israeli side.
Temporary victory with future war risks
At most points, Israeli deaths were in the dozens, and Hezbollah deaths were in the several-hundred range.Compared to the 60,000 Israelis who evacuated from the northern border in October 2023 – which retroactively many defense officials, though not all, consider a mistake – hundreds of thousands and eventually more than a million Lebanese had to evacuate their homes.
Yet, even this stage served as a relative tie, because Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah was prepared to tolerate the level of limited IDF attacks, and Israel was unhappy with the constant rocket fire to the North.On August 25, Hezbollah tried to launch over 1,000 rockets, including at 11 IDF bases, Mossad, and military intelligence headquarters.
The IDF struck preemptively and defanged the Hezbollah attack so thoroughly, that the military and political echelon decided to roll the dice in a much bigger way.
From September 17 until one week into October, the IDF and Mossad decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership (including Nasrallah himself), most of its more powerful rockets and missiles, and invaded southern Lebanon, clearing it of much of Hezbollah’s invasion threat capability.
For all of these reasons, Israel had a basis to seek better ceasefire terms than it did after the Second Lebanon War (2006), where it tied with Hezbollah in a lot of ways. This might also help prevent a war in the near future.
So when reports say that Israel secured a side deal from the US that would allow it to attack Hezbollah forces south of the Litani River – without needing UNIFIL permission – that element comes from this position of strength. When Israel will also continue to act against cross-border Syria-Lebanon weapons smuggling and will be able to appeal to an international body run by the US – not the UN – against Hezbollah weapons buildups even beyond southern Lebanon, that also comes from this position of strength.
But, for the last six weeks, there have been very few strategic achievements.
Israel certainly killed more commanders, blew up rockets, and destroyed more weapons. But, Hezbollah managed to keep heavy and constant rocket fire not only on the close border villages but has extended its threat to around one-third of the country, including Haifa, at times even to central Israel.
What’s more, Hezbollah still has tens of thousands of rockets and could keep up its rocket fire for an indefinite period.
So, for all of the bragging by certain political and defense officials a few weeks ago that Hezbollah was about to run out and would not be able to fire 100 rockets another day, earlier this week it fired over 250.
The IDF may have killed a couple of thousand Hezbollah fighters and most of the commanders, but tens of thousands of rank-and-file Hezbollah fighters remain, and an even larger group of Lebanese Shi’ites are ready to help the group fight in a variety of ways.
Both because of those reasons and because Israel’s attempt to install a friendly government in Lebanon in the 1980s and to hold onto a security zone is viewed as failing miserably, Jerusalem’s negotiating position has been weaker than some might think.
Put bluntly, Israel had very little else it could threaten to do to Hezbollah and was nowhere near threatening to topple it from power as it did with Hamas.
Under those circumstances, while the IDF got close to a knockout, it definitely was not one, and the difference there – for framing the post-war reality – is massive.
This is why Israel has no security zone in Lebanon and no right in the deal with Hezbollah to attack when it violates the deal (though, again, it does have a separate side approval from the US).
Valid questions have been raised about how the IDF will know that a farmer in flip flops, say, is really a Hezbollah fighter, when he returns to his southern Lebanese village.
Also, the side letter with the US sets up a systematic point of friction with the Americans, especially four years from now in the post-Trump era, but even more likely sometimes with the incoming Trump administration.
At the end of the day, Israel will only preserve its security interests if its air and land forces stay focused on Hezbollah movements and are ready to “rock the boat” post-ceasefire by attacking when there is a violation.
It is hard to see that Israelis will stay this focused for more than several months, let alone several years. In that case, Hezbollah requires only patience to make its comeback. And then, in three or five years, it can attack again.
Or perhaps, it will counterstrike the first time Israel tries to attack Hezbollah forces entering southern Lebanon, triggering another war even sooner.
There is no question that this is a better deal and that Israel has better leverage than in 2006; there is also no question that the formula for the next war is present in today’s ceasefire.