Well before the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) militia found itself victorious in its struggle against the Assad regime, Abu Mohammed al-Julani, its head, told CNN: “The goal of the revolution remains the overthrow of this regime.”But Julani omitted to say what he wished to replace it with.
Despite all his softly spoken reassurances about his liberal intentions, all the evidence points to a political takeover of the country by the leader of the military coup – in fact, a Sunni jihadist replacement of Assad. Despite talk of inclusivity, there is little sign of the political presence of the many other Syrian groups and organizations scattered across the country.
The interim prime minister that Julani has appointed, Mohammed al-Bashir, was plucked from administering an HTS-held area in northwest Syria. In recent years, HTS has attempted to gain local legitimacy by governing in a less extreme manner than the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Through the Salvation Government, an HTS-influenced civilian administrative body, it has – on the lines of ISIS in its heyday – established bureaucratic institutions for education, healthcare, and public services, funded by taxes, tolls, and fees.
HTS is rooted in a Salafi-jihadist ideology, and although Julani has renounced his former connection with al-Qaeda and is presenting himself in a more moderate light, his organization is essentially Islamist. What is likely to emerge in Syria is a Sunni Islamist state, governed according to its own interpretation of Islamic Sharia law.
With HTS in the ascendant, it is worth remembering that the Syrian armed conflict began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the dictatorial government of President Bashar al-Assad, with the establishment of democracy as its key demand.
Crackdown by Syrian's security forces
IN MARCH 2011, a few teenagers – fired with the revolutionary fervor sweeping the Middle East at the time – daubed some inflammatory slogans on a school wall in the southern Syrian city of Dara’a. Unfortunately for them, the Syria that Assad had inherited in 2000 from his autocratic father was a tightly controlled police state, in which a powerful and all-encompassing security machine ensured that the slightest hint of opposition to the regime was ruthlessly crushed.
The youngsters were hunted down, arrested, tortured in unspeakable ways, and killed. When details of their ordeal became known, protesters took to the streets. The security forces, unable to break up the demonstration, eventually fired into the crowd. That was enough to spark widespread rebellion. Groups antagonistic to Assad’s government began nationwide protests. Gradually, popular dissent developed into an armed revolt.
After months of crackdown by the government’s security forces, various armed groups, such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA), began forming across the country, marking the beginning of the Syrian insurgency. By mid-2012, the uprising had escalated into a full-blown civil war with the aim of overthrowing the despotic Assad regime and substituting a democratic form of government.
Had assistance of any sort been forthcoming from the US or other Western governments at that early stage, Assad could have been defeated. But president Barack Obama hesitated, and then continued vacillating, even after it was clear in August 2013 that Assad had used chemical weapons against his opponents, utterly indifferent to the extensive civilian casualties.
Obama hesitated because he was intent on forging links with Iran that would lead to a nuclear deal. Iran regarded Syria as a vital component in what was known at the time as its “Shia Crescent.”Meanwhile, the shining sword of democracy, the weapon the rebels in 2011 hoped would bring down Assad’s dictatorial regime, had become heavily tarnished. Those who are now labeled “Syrian rebels” are not fighting for democracy.
The original FSA, once dedicated simply to establishing democracy in Syria, has over the nine years of civil conflict lost its cohesion and been transformed into an amalgamation of different groups. For many of them, establishing an open democratic form of government is far from their aim.
Kurdish hopes of autonomy
WILL A SECOND democratic casualty of the civil war be Kurdish hopes of autonomy in the area they have established in northeastern Syria? The Kurdish-occupied territory, which is about 25-30% of the old Syria, is currently a semi-autonomous region formally designated the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria, or more simply Rojava.
It is, however, in the sights of Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has said he will never accept a Kurdish quasi-state ruled by the Democratic Union Party, which he considers a terrorist organization, along the Turkish border.
On December 6, Erdogan endorsed and supported the HTS advance into Syria. “Our wish,” he said, “is that this march in Syria continues without accidents or disasters”– another voice with little or no interest in ensuring a democratic future for Syria. Erdogan is wedded to the Muslim Brotherhood and has every sympathy with HTS’s objectives.
Even as Assad was fleeing the country, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) began offensive operations against the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), who are mostly ethnic Kurds.
The SDF had stormed Deir Ezzor city, situated on the Euphrates River, and part of Iran’s supply corridor connecting to Lebanon – a facility the regime has now lost. They were ousted by the HTS on December 10, and a mini-civil war was only prevented on December 11, when the US intervened to mediate a deal between the SNA and the SDF.
So what has happened to the original democratic Syrian opposition of 2011, made up of activists, intellectuals, and defectors pressing for a transition to democracy and an end to Assad’s authoritarian rule? It consisted of the Syrian National Council, which later became part of the Syrian National Coalition, Local Coordination Committees, which organized protests and civil resistance, and the Free Syrian Army, an informal group of defected soldiers and armed civilians.
It was a loosely allied group, and struggled with ideological, political, and ethnic divisions, resulting in a lack of unified leadership and goals. Elements like ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra (now HTS) capitalized on the chaos and perverted their cause.
As a result, the original democratic opposition has largely been sidelined, while efforts to achieve a political resolution through UN-mediated peace talks, such as the Geneva process, made little progress and have now been overtaken by recent events.
Clearly, the original Syrian democratic opposition has been overshadowed by the militarization of the conflict, the rise of extremist groups, and the intervention of foreign powers. It still exists in a fragmented form, but can it reorganize into some sort of cohesive entity in time to claim a seat at the table, should an opportunity actually arise to negotiate Syria’s future? Is it realistic to hope for a democratic state of Syria emerging from the military coup? The more probable outcome is that Syria’s future will be some sort of autocracy headed by HTS leader Julani.
The writer is the Middle East correspondent for Eurasia Review. His latest book is Trump and the Holy Land: 2016-2020. Follow him at: www.a-mid-east-journal.blogspot.com.