Will trade wars make America great again?
Al-Ittihad, UAE, March 14
On Monday, March 10, US financial markets experienced significant losses due to President Donald Trump’s ongoing tariff war with Canada, Mexico, and China. In a television interview, Trump suggested that further turmoil could be expected before his vision of “building a great America” ultimately succeeded. The threat of tariffs against Canada had a profound impact on its domestic politics.
By 2024, Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s approval rating had hit an all-time low, with polls indicating that the opposition Conservative Party would win the upcoming general election by a landslide. In response, Trudeau agreed to step down and allow the Liberal Party to select a new leader. This was before Trump escalated his rhetoric against the prime minister, even threatening to make Canada the 51st US state. The effect of Trump’s insults was immediate, boosting both Trudeau’s and the Liberal Party’s approval ratings.
On March 9, the party selected Mark Carney, an internationally recognized banker with extensive experience managing financial crises, as its new leader and the country’s next prime minister. In his acceptance speech, Carney delivered a passionate condemnation of Trump, claiming that Canadians are “facing the greatest crisis of our lifetimes.” He vowed to impose similar tariffs on the US.
Provincial leaders in Canada, particularly in Ontario, also voiced their outrage over Trump’s threats. Ontario Premier Doug Ford enacted a 25% surcharge on electricity supplies to neighboring US states, including Michigan, New York, and Minnesota.
Meanwhile, Mexico’s and China’s responses were less dramatic but more economically strategic, as both countries imposed selective tariffs on key US exports. These tariffs targeted agricultural products like soybeans and pork, as well as luxury goods, including certain popular spirits. These measures are set to hit American workers the hardest, particularly in Trump-supporting, so-called red states.
At the same time, Elon Musk and his team of technocrats have been causing significant disruption with their erratic job cuts across federal agencies, including those that provide Medicare and Social Security to millions of Americans. Their approach has been so reckless that several of Trump’s recently appointed cabinet members have confronted Musk, demanding he defer to them when deciding which positions should be eliminated. This has led to a public backlash against Musk, with Tesla showrooms being targeted by protesters, and, more importantly, Tesla’s stock dropping by 50% since December.
Observers suggest that Trump may eventually tire of Musk’s behavior and either remove him or diminish his authority. For now, though, Musk serves as a convenient scapegoat, shielding Trump from mounting public criticism over the chaotic layoffs of experienced federal employees in crucial agencies like emergency services and the National Institutes of Health. However, the true issue lies in the state of the US economy.
If consumer confidence begins to decline and more Americans face financial hardship, it could lead to a recession later in the year. In that case, Trump will not be able to blame the Biden administration for the downturn. Instead, it would likely be considered a “Trump recession.”
History shows that voters rarely sympathize with those in power during times of crisis, particularly given Trump’s longstanding claims of financial success and his book The Art of the Deal.
Early signs of his administration have been discouraging, and it is not the weak Democrats but rather the financial markets that are sending a clear message. Markets despise uncertainty, and unless Trump can provide the American public with firm reassurance that his trade wars against allies, like Canada, will ultimately benefit them, he will face an uphill battle in his effort to make America great again. – Geoffrey Kemp
Sudan’s future: Shaped By militia battles?
Asharq Al-Awsat, London, March 16
There are multiple narratives surrounding the onset of the war in Sudan, each suggesting different actors with vested interests in sparking the conflict. The official government account claims that the Rapid Support Forces militia rebelled against state authority, attempting to seize power and forcing the army to confront them. However, even those who adhere to this version acknowledge that the RSF was initially formed during the era of the Islamist Salvation government, with the mission to carry out actions the army could not, particularly in the chaotic region of Darfur. The RSF Law, passed under the Salvation government, allowed the militia to grow in size and armament, eventually becoming a significant threat.
When Lt.-Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan came to power, he amended the RSF Law, granting the group even greater power and a level of autonomy from the Sudanese Armed Forces. If one were to assume good intentions in all these developments – an assumption that is difficult to sustain – one would think that lessons would be learned, and that efforts would be made to prevent such a scenario from unfolding again. Ideally, this would involve strengthening the official army, rehabilitating, arming, and training it to be the sole entity with the authority to wield weapons.
But, in a stark contradiction to this logical path, what followed was the opposite. The government declared a state of emergency and introduced the concept of accepting civilian volunteers to join the army. This initiative began in several states, but simultaneously, the Al-Bara’ ibn Malik Battalion, affiliated with the Islamic movement, emerged, recruiting young men under a new banner and slogan. Its literature drew heavily from the history of the Islamic movement and its armed factions of the past.
In parallel, Darfurian movements allied with the government abandoned their neutrality and integrated into the army, setting up recruitment and training camps both inside Sudan and in neighboring Eritrea. Around the same time, about five factions from eastern Sudan established camps in Eritrea and began graduating recruits. The defining characteristic of all these armed groups, including those from Darfur and eastern Sudan, was the tribal nature of their recruitment and mobilization.
The only noticeable difference appeared in the Butana region, east of Gezira, and in Sennar and Blue Nile states, where armed groups joined the RSF under leaders like Abu Aqla Kikal in Butana, Al-Bishi in Sennar, and al-Omda and Abu Shotal in Blue Nile. Naturally, the tribal composition of the RSF could not be hidden, as they relied primarily on Arab tribes from the Darfur states. Warnings were raised from many quarters – not only from civilian groups opposed to the war but also from within the government and armed forces.
Across the board, there was agreement that a militia rebellion could not be countered by simply forming 20 other militias that were not directly under the control of the armed forces but, rather, answered to tribal leaders. After Abu Aqla Kikal’s major coup in October 2024, and his subsequent integration into the armed forces with his Sudan Shield Forces, the RSF launched retaliatory campaigns against towns and villages in the Butana region and East Nile. These campaigns led to hundreds of civilian deaths, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, and the looting of homes and shops.
Despite widespread resentment against Kikal – who was seen as the mastermind behind the RSF’s takeover of Gezira State – he capitalized on tribal mobilization in the region, expanding his forces and scoring significant victories over the RSF. As the army made gains and scored victories, internal factional conflicts started to surface. These conflicts centered on the Joint Forces, primarily composed of Darfuri armed movements; the Sudan Shield Forces, which had grown to dominate the eastern and western parts of Gezira; and the Islamist battalions, which began to feel that their regional and tribal-based competition was hampering their expansion.
The rhetoric became increasingly hostile, with accusations of corruption, war crimes, and even treason, as factions blamed each other for their misfortunes. This coincided with Burhan and the government’s adoption of the so-called road map for the postwar phase, which was crafted by political and armed groups allied with Burhan but notably excluded the Islamist movement. This road map granted Burhan absolute power during the transitional period that followed, a move that many factions saw as an effort to sideline them from any future role in the country.
The growing concern in Sudan is that these cyberconflicts could escalate into full-blown militia battles on the ground, a development that is becoming increasingly likely. Sudan, now divided into fragmented cantons, is being drawn into a spiral the limits – and final destination – of which remain uncertain. – Faisal Saleh, minister of culture and information, Sudan
The day after Russian-Ukrainian War ends
Al-Ahram, Egypt, March 16
President Trump has begun paving the way for an end to the Russia-Ukraine war sooner than expected. He has already initiated early talks with Russia, which will be followed by further discussions with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. While it is clear that Trump is determined to end the war, there remains considerable uncertainty about how it will ultimately be resolved. Three key factors will determine the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
First, Russia already controls a significant portion of Ukrainian territory and is unlikely to relinquish it easily.
Second, Ukraine’s ability to reclaim this territory is diminishing, particularly with the reduction of American military, financial, and logistical support. European powers are not in a position to replace this support, nor can they defend the continuation of the war if a settlement between the US and Russia is reached. In such a scenario, Europe will be forced to pursue alternative approaches to protect its security in the face of Russian aggression.
The third factor is the nature of President Trump, who aligns with the far-Right realist school of thought, which emphasizes the central role of power – both military and economic – in international relations. Additionally, Trump is known for his preference for negotiating deals to manage American interests.
Regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Trump has identified three primary American interests: first, to end the economic burden the war has placed on the US, which has persisted for three years without resolution; second, to secure Ukrainian minerals through an anticipated agreement, contingent on a cessation of hostilities, so that these crucial investments for the American economy can proceed as part of the broader strategic competition with China; and third, to drive a wedge between Russia and China, the principal strategic rival of the US.
These three factors suggest that the resolution will be shaped primarily between Russia and the US, rather than between the two direct warring parties. This is evident in the direct and overt pressure the US has applied to Ukraine in recent weeks, most notably in Trump’s blunt statement to Zelenskyy that he holds no leverage in this war. This prompted the Ukrainian leader to test the European card during his recent meeting with Trump. However, despite any European solidarity with Zelenskyy, it is unlikely to reach its full extent or meet his expectations, nor will it reflect the European powers’ willingness to antagonize the US.
Ultimately, the settlement will likely involve a ceasefire, allowing Russia to retain some, if not all, of the Ukrainian territory under its control, while Ukraine will have to acknowledge that it will not join NATO – a concession Russia would demand in any agreement with the US of this magnitude.
A settlement of this nature would have significant repercussions in several directions. First, any settlement that results in the annexation of Ukrainian territory by Russia may bring short- and medium-term stability, but it does not necessarily guarantee long-term peace. A peace established on the basis of hegemony and force alone is unlikely to be sustainable. The post-World War I settlements, which collapsed rapidly and ultimately led to the outbreak of World War II, offer valuable lessons in this regard. These risks increase in the event of new developments within Russia, NATO, and European powers, such as further Russian territorial expansion or NATO taking additional steps to protect European security.
On the other hand, resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict in this manner could set a precedent for broader settlements based on major deals and the use of force. This is particularly true in light of existing global conflicts, especially in Asia, such as the Russian-Japanese dispute over the Kuril Islands, the Taiwan issue, the South China Sea disputes, the Sino-Japanese dispute over certain islands, the India-China border dispute, and tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
While these conflicts differ from the Russia-Ukraine situation, which stems from Russia’s territorial control over Ukraine, the adoption of force and deal-making as a basis for resolution could encourage other powers to follow suit, should the right conditions arise.
More dangerously, this type of settlement could pave the way for other deals that reshape the geopolitical landscape, particularly in light of President Trump’s remarks about American interests in annexing countries and waterways. Such developments could lead to widespread instability in the global order.
Additionally, this settlement would likely lead to new approaches within Europe for protecting its security, independent of its relationship with the US. This could include, for example, an increase in arms transfers across Europe and France’s declaration of its willingness to extend its nuclear umbrella to defend European partners – a move that Russia would view as a direct threat to its security. These actions could trigger a new wave of conflict between Russia and the European powers.
The anticipated resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war may not be confined to these three effects but could have even deeper repercussions within the global system. – Mohammed Fayez Farhat, director, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies
What Is Left of the March 14 Movement?
Nida Al Watan, Lebanon, March 16
Twenty years have passed since the assassination of prime minister Rafik Hariri, which sparked the March 14 uprising against Syria’s interference in Lebanon. The succession of events weighed heavily on those who lived through it, including those who survived the civil war, the Israeli, Assad, and Iranian occupations, and the series of assassinations and shifting allegiances. Two decades later, the steps forward have been few and far between, hindered by setbacks, disasters, and even the collapse of the nation’s core.
The most difficult aspect of these challenging years has been the entrenched racial segregation among Lebanon’s sectarian groups. There’s no need to sugarcoat the reality: what we’re experiencing in Lebanon is a severe form of apartheid. Any argument between instinctive sectarians exposes this racism, along with the isolation of each group from the others, even when they live in the same geographic area. At that point, hidden agendas take over, but only for a while, before they explode into violence and continue to harm the nation.
The irony is that this racism has its own tools for false and fake coexistence, as most groups possess the flexibility and skill to conceal the truth of what they truly harbor toward each other when forced to coexist. This inherent racism is the tool that power brokers invest in, as well as the projects that serve their personal gains and ideologies based on distorting and falsifying the essence of religions, relying on whoever opens the way for these brokers at the expense of citizenship.
The best indicator of this can be seen in the reactions of brokers and their audiences to what happened on the Syrian coast, where there have been reports of hundreds of civilians, mostly from the Alawite minority, being killed. These responses, which claim to be utopian and pure in their condemnation of the massacres, reek of hypocrisy. Their views are shaped by the contrast between the oppressor’s forgetfulness and the oppressed’s memory of years under the Assad regime, passed down from father to son.
The oppressors, along with all those who praised, participated in, or remained silent as Bashar Assad committed his crimes to suppress the revolution, have no right to object to or condemn the crimes and massacres that justified the shedding of innocent blood on the Syrian coast. The only right to do so belongs to those who have never deviated from the truth since before the Daraa massacre, which sparked the revolution. These are the people who rejected the slogan “Freedom, Sovereignty, Independence,” and with it “Syria out, out,” fighting it with malicious intentions while denouncing the shedding of blood – other than the blood they worked and continue to work to shed.
But it is the racism that no event of the magnitude of the March 14 uprising has been able to cure in the Lebanese people, who remain stubbornly attached to their sect and its leader. Some might argue that the absence of the state is why the Lebanese have turned to sectarian isolationism. However, such a statement can only be seen as a justification, and its logic is unsustainable.
The absence of the state should be an incentive to work toward its restoration, and the weakness of its institutions should drive efforts to strengthen them, not plunder them and then eliminate their components and foundations, or demand federalism to consolidate the foundations of apartheid. The Israeli occupation of Lebanese territory should have mobilized the Lebanese, particularly the people of the south, to create a state to protect and liberate them, not to be intoxicated by a religious group that monopolizes resistance in loyalty to a supreme leader who has never benefited them.
The Syrian tragedy and its impact on us may eventually end one way or another, and Israel may withdraw for various reasons. But Lebanon will not rise again, and the Lebanese will not regain a promising image based on unity around freedom, sovereignty, and independence, as long as the walls of racial separation between sects remain the gateway to corruption, influence, and bullying of partners in a lost citizenship, with no end in sight. – Sana Aljak
Translated by Asaf Zilberfarb. All assertions, opinions, facts, and information presented in these articles are the sole responsibility of their respective authors and are not necessarily those of The Media Line, which assumes no responsibility for their content.