Could Mossad kill IRGC air force chief to open up striking Iran nuke program?

Sources: Simply destroying Iran’s Fordow nuke facility 'worthless,' diluting uranium gains limited time.

 The Iron Dome air defense missile systems is seen during operational trials conducted following the conclusion Operation Shield and Arrow on May 14, 2023 (photo credit: DEFENSE MINISTRY)
The Iron Dome air defense missile systems is seen during operational trials conducted following the conclusion Operation Shield and Arrow on May 14, 2023
(photo credit: DEFENSE MINISTRY)

With Israel concerned that the Trump administration may cut a weak new nuclear deal with Iran, one way out of such a scenario could be a theoretical Mossad operation that kills the key Iranian official who ordered 400 ballistic missiles fired on Israel in 2024, think-tank sources conjectured to The Jerusalem Post.

The purpose of this theoretical scenario would be to provoke the Islamic Republic into a new direct attack on the Jewish state, which could then be used as a basis for a wide strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities even after a new nuclear deal would have been cut with US President Donald Trump.

Brig.-Gen. Amir Ali Hajizadeh, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps air force chief, publicly declared his role in trying to harm Israel in multiple rounds of attacking it with around 400 ballistic missiles in 2024.

A number of Israeli and American officials even discussed assassinating him in last October as a potential response to Tehran’s second direct attack – though in the end, Jerusalem sufficed with destroying Iranian air defense and ballistic missile production capabilities.

Although Hajizadeh failed to kill Israelis, this was only due to a monumental air defense effort by the US, Israel, and many other allies.

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Of course, there is still hope that the Trump administration can be convinced to either demand a deal that truly cuts off the ayatollahs’ path to a nuclear bomb or to maintain the current maximum pressure campaign, Institute for Science and International Security President David Albright told the Post.

According to Albright, “For the first time in years, maximum pressure is working, and it can be ramped up further. Moreover, the military option is credible. The Iranian regime is facing the prospect of its collapse.

“Without concessions that go beyond JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), it is better to keep increasing pressure,” he said.

“If the regime refuses to make these concessions, then it makes sense to carry out targeted destruction of key nuclear assets and capabilities, and perhaps certain leaders – with a threat to destroy far more, such as economic targets and leadership – if the regime moves to rebuild its nuclear sites or starts to build a nuclear weapon,” Albright said.

Trump must secure Iranian concessions

Former National Security Council (NSC) chief Jacob Nagel echoed to the Post, saying that Trump should not get deep into negotiations with Iran, as it seems he is doing, unless he first secures most of the concessions needed to end its nuclear program.

Accordingly, both Nagel, who is currently a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Albright agreed that the key is framing the process as an Iranian surrender of its nuclear program, with the negotiated details being more about the timing of taking it apart and of Iran receiving sanctions relief following its compliance.

But what if Trump does go forward with a deal that he frames as better than the 2015 JCPOA Iran nuclear deal, and that does have some advantages, but still leaves far too many loopholes for a country already far closer to crossing the nuclear threshold than it has ever been?

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Nagel warned that Trump’s current direction seems to be the “less for less” model nuclear deal in which “they want to carry out the model of interim confidence-building measures.”

“Some of the 60% enriched uranium will be diluted for partial sanctions relief,” which, to the former NSC chief, smacks of giving away most of America’s leverage over Iran without even returning to a weak JCPOA-style deal.

He cautioned, “If this is how it plays out, Israel’s chance to attack will disappear, and then Iran will get stronger again.”

Nagel was pressed about specific theoretical concessions that Trump might seek from Iran, which would fall short of an end to the nuclear program, such as shutting down or destroying the underground nuclear facility at Fordow.

“Fordow is not relevant. Even if they destroyed it now, it would not be worth anything – and destroying Natanz [Iran’s largest nuclear facility] would not be worth anything,” he responded.

Explaining all the other ways that Iran could move toward a nuclear weapon even without Fordow and Natanz, Nagel stated, “They have around 275kg. of 60% enriched uranium; they have underground facilities; and they have advanced centrifuges which enrich at 10 times the rate of the older models.”

“All they need is 500 advanced centrifuges, their weapons group, some missiles, and for sure they will eventually get to a nuclear weapon,” he said.

Questioned about what interim concessions – short of ending the nuclear program, which is what Israel wants – would at least set Tehran back somewhat, he responded:

“At least if they dilute all 275kg. of 60% enriched uranium, we would get a buffer of a few months until they would be able to re-enrich the uranium back to high levels, but ultimately that would not be enough” of a concession for Israel and the West to remain safe from a potential Iranian nuclear threat.

According to Albright, the most critical concessions Trump needs to secure from Iran to make any real difference in its ability to acquire nuclear weapons would be: “destruction of excess centrifuges; blending down of all 20% and 60% enriched uranium; demonstration of cooperation with the IAEA; and progress on issues of undeclared nuclear material and activities before any sanctions relief.”

After those measures are achieved, Albright would also push hard for Trump to close the Fordow facility to return to the initial limits and monitoring of the JCPOA nuclear deal, but for 20 years, not 10 years.

Further, he would recommend that Trump demands “ratification of Additional Protocol and Code 3.1, and demonstration of cooperation, such as providing access to key people and information relevant to the Amad Plan.”

The Amad Plan was Iran’s code term for its clandestine nuclear weapons program from 1999-2003, prior to its discovery by the Mossad and the CIA.

Moreover, Albright said that not only should the limits on Iran’s nuclear program be extended for 20 years, but so should the threat of the global snapback sanctions mechanism.

Nagel’s formula for permanent nuclear disarmament of Iran is similar and requires wiping out all vestiges of uranium enrichment, weaponization activities, and the ballistic missile program (to the extent that it can in any way be adjusted to carry nuclear warheads.)

Former NSC chief Meir Ben-Shabbat also has a similar stance for eliminating the nuclear program completely.

After all of this, Nagel said the toughest scenario would be if “Israel will need to act – but what if Trump says ‘Don’t act?’” as opposed to not approving or nixing an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities.