With a flurry of speculation about why the Iran-US-world powers nuclear talks have been stalled now for several months, one issue that has not received enough attention is the extent to which recent attacks (attributed by many to the Mossad) on Iran’s nuclear program have transformed all sides’ perspectives.
Put simply, all sides are questioning – for the first time in years – whether a return to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, as the Iran nuclear deal is known, is their best and only policy.
As a candidate and US president, Joe Biden’s central policy for confronting issues with Iran has been a return to the JCPOA.
America has also said it would try to add on a longer and stronger deal afterward, but the lynchpin was the JCPOA itself. Washington’s premise for rejoining the deal without prior fixes of loopholes was that there was no way to stop the Islamic Republic from obtaining a nuclear weapon besides that specific diplomatic solution.
One of the reasons this was Biden’s strategy was another premise: Any military action to set back Tehran’s nuclear program would either be too costly in terms of Iranian responses, would flat out fail or would only slow – not stop – the ayatollahs.
But the four (known) attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities and officials have hobbled the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program far more than most of the general public realizes. These covert actions have succeeded without a major cost to either Israel or the US. And if there was doubt that more than one attack could succeed, the series of attacks have shown how deeply vulnerable Iran is to sabotage and assassination.
The general public does not know all of this, but the US, Iran and Israel all do.
Biden administration officials are starting to consider whether it might be possible to keep Iran’s nuclear program “in a box” for a very extended period even without the JCPOA.
Israel is making it clear it is still ready to hit Iran more. Might the US even give a green light or at least up the sanctions game if Iran continues to hold out on a return to the JCPOA?
Meanwhile, Iran is immensely embarrassed by the attacks and feels it is negotiating from a far weaker position than it believed it would be in. Without a real imminent threat to hold over the West, why would the West give in to Tehran on any new concessions that it wants?
So playing for time is a new strategy; at some point, the ayatollahs realize the US might lose interest in the JCPOA, so they are also preparing new strategies and approaches.
Iranian President-elect Ebrahim Raisi’s camp thinks it can get a better deal than current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani: The attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities that have busted many premises about fallout from such attacks are only one major reason the picture has changed. Going into April and May, the Rouhani administration was sending all of the signals that a deal was close, and it would be wrapped up, at the latest, with the ascension of Raisi to the presidency.
Most Israeli and US intelligence and academic experts also predicted a deal was inevitable by or before August. Raisi takes power over the coming weeks and in many ways has already taken over the country’s messaging.
But now all of the messaging suggests Raisi thinks he can get a better deal than Rouhani by being more aggressive and appearing more threatening. Despite criticism in Israel of the Biden administration as being soft on Iran, Raisi’s optimism here is likely misplaced.
As much as the Biden team’s discipline in seeking a return to the JCPOA – no matter the new developments – disappointed many in Israel, his team has shown equal discipline is deflecting any attempts by Iran to alter the JCPOA to its own advantage.
The danger here is if Raisi creates unjustified optimism for more concessions from the West and this makes it harder for the Islamic Republic to climb down from its tree. In the better scenario, Raisi will figure out some kind of face-saving public declaration to make while agreeing behind closed doors to rolling back Tehran’s nuclear program later in 2021.
Iran is happy to drag out talks to learn about enriching at the 60% level. It is learning a lot of valuable information about enriching uranium at the 60% level. This is two jumps up from the 5% level it was limited to under the JCPOA and only one jump from the 90% weaponized level for a nuclear bomb.
Nuclear experts had been skeptical about whether Iran could get to this point given its history of failures any time it has tried to jump forward. Whatever it is learning during these months is invaluable experience the West cannot take away, even if there is a later return to the JCPOA’s technical restrictions. This is another reason for the ayatollahs to drag out negotiations.
TEHRAN ALSO does not want to undermine the US withdrawal from Iraq. With the ascension of Raisi to the presidency, Iran might be expected to be even more aggressive than it has been using direct and proxy force against American interests.
It seems that Raisi is holding back for fear that Washington might delay its further withdrawal of military forces from Iraq. The truth is the US only has around 2,500 troops remaining in Iraq, and many of them may remain. But those troops, when combined with air power, pack a punch.
The big anticipated change is that those troops and US air power will no longer be proactively used and will have a smaller military and public footprint. If they only or mostly function in an advisory capacity, Iran may finally have the military upper hand in Iraq. It has shown patience since 2003 to outlast the US. A few more months of patience cannot hurt if the Islamic Republic succeeds at ousting its main rival for influence.
International Atomic Energy Agency inspections are also stuck big time, but they are less relevant, for now. It is shocking that no one – not the US, the EU or even Israel – is threatening Iran with any deadline for restoring IAEA inspections. The inspections expired on May 21.
When confronted by The Jerusalem Post with reports that Tehran is finally even denying the IAEA access to aspects of the Natanz nuclear facility, the IAEA’s clarifications did not address the issue head on.
Being that this started on May 21, responsibility cannot be put on Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. Rather, former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu also did not get extra alarmed. Going back to the first point above, the answer appears to be that Iran’s nuclear program is currently so hobbled that – for now – there is less concern about IAEA inspections.