Proving Iran was behind past drone attacks has been difficult - analysis

Israel and its allies need to find the drone's smoking gun in order to prove beyond doubt that Iran was behind the attack. This may prove difficult.

A drone is launched during a large-scale drone combat exercise of Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Semnan, Iran January 6, 2021 (photo credit: IRANIAN ARMY/WANA/REUTERS)
A drone is launched during a large-scale drone combat exercise of Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Semnan, Iran January 6, 2021
(photo credit: IRANIAN ARMY/WANA/REUTERS)
Proving claims that Iran used drones to attack a ship off the coast of Oman, which killed two people, may be a challenge, but it is worth the effort.
Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has said Iran is absolutely behind the attack on the ship and that intelligence exists to prove it. The Foreign Ministry and diplomats are making a full-court press to hold Tehran accountable for the attack.
The larger context of the attack is that Iran has been increasingly waging a drone battle across the region that targets US forces in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Tehran has not been held accountable to date.
Let’s look at what we know. Since 2016, the Houthis in Yemen have been increasing the range, destructive power and precision of their Iranian-backed Qasef drones. These kamikaze drones have GPS guidance and can fly autonomously with a preprogrammed path for some 150 km. They can carry up to 40 kg. of a warhead in their body, which is shaped like a tube.
The drones’ components are smuggled to Iran via the sea or even via Oman, according to a report by the Missile Defense Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The Houthis “retained access to the critical components, such as engines and guidance systems, from abroad,” said a UN report in 2019.
Engines, gyroscopes and other pieces are key to proving Iran’s role in the drone program. Components found in drones around the region link Iran to drones used in at least eight countries, including Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon.
Iran now says its armed drones can fly some 7,000 km., likely a nonsensical boast. However a 2,000-km. range might be possible. Iran used long-range drones in September 2019 to attack Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq oil-processing facility. The attacks were carried out by Samad-style drones, according to reports.
Meanwhile, the Kataib Hezbollah Basir-1 drone in Iraq is similar to an Iranian Ababil-3. The pro-Iran militias in Iraq also use a drone called Sahab, which is similar to a Houthi Samad-1.
What often links these drones to Iran may be something as simple as a V10 gyroscope, which is key for getting the drone to the target. The Samad-3 may have a range of 1,800 km., meaning it can reach Israel from Yemen.
Iran sent drones from the T-4 base in Syria into Israeli airspace in February 2018 and this May, perhaps from Iraq, which shows extended range. In those incidents, fragments fell in Israeli territory after they were shot down. Hezbollah drones have also flown into Israeli airspace and have been shot down.

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Meanwhile, the pro-Iran militias in Iraq have begun to target US forces using drones. This means there is now a plethora of evidence of Iranian drones being used all over the region, including copies of the drones and components supplied by Iran to various groups, such as the Houthis.
Hamas has even developed its own Shehab kamikaze drone, which is also based on Iranian and Houthi designs. The Shehab is a bit smaller than the Iranian Ababil-T. Clearly, Iran’s imprint can be seen in designs across the region.
To prove that Iran was behind the drone attacks, the fragments must be analyzed, whether it is evidence that the US gathered from a drone strike on a CIA hangar in Erbil in the Kurdish Region of northern Iraq, drone parts found at Abqaiq or other pieces found all over the region.
Iran often provides the drones or know-how to locals so that it can have plausible deniability. In that case, the ground-control station for the drone or its preprogramming may be done by proxies. Finding a gyroscope that is linked directly to Iran can be one way of showing that Iran is behind the drone.
The US has compiled an assortment of pieces of Iranian drones at what is called the “petting zoo” in Washington. The “zoo” is actually a building at the Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling military installation.
In 2018, for instance, you could see photos or even request to visit the drones on display. One label reads: “Remains of an Iranian Shahed-123 unmanned aerial vehicle are seen at the Iranian Materiel Display at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, DC., Nov. 26, 2018.
“The Department of Defense established the Iranian Materiel Display in December 2017 to present evidence that Iran is arming dangerous groups with advanced weapons, spreading instability and conflict in the region. The IMD contains materiel associated with Iranian proliferation into Yemen, Afghanistan and Bahrain.”
This means countries around the region, including the US and Saudi, have access to pieces of Iranian drones. They can be compared to drones that were shot down in February 2018 and this May near Beit She’an, as well as to components of Hamas drones downed this May. Pieces from the recent attack on the ship off Oman can also be used, depending on how much of the drones were destroyed at impact.
Drones also may leave behind other evidence, such as flight paths recorded on radar or on other sensors. Modern counter-UAV systems often use a combination of radar, optics and other methods, such as jammers, to detect and stop drones. In a complex area like the Gulf of Oman, with naval warships in the vicinity, someone may have information about the drones’ flight path.
However, this will leave other sensitive questions. Were the drones guided or preprogrammed? If they were preprogrammed, how did they find the exact area to strike a ship when the ship is moving on water? Ships tend to move. Drones need coordinates, unless a pilot is sitting in a container guiding them in.
Could Iran have guided them by other methods, such as an IRGC “mother ship” of the type Iran is thought to use? Iran has put drones on many ships in recent years. Could Iran or its proxies in Yemen have been responsible for the guidance or programming of the drones’ flight path?
These are key questions. Combined with the physical evidence, indications of where the drones came from is key.
This may involve signal intercepts or signal intelligence collected by local or Western militaries and other types of classified and sensitive intelligence. For instance, Iran was blamed for the attack on Abqaiq in Saudi Arabia, but aspects about it, such as the flight path, remain shrouded in mystery.
In addition, in the past, the US has not showcased evidence from Iraq regarding drone strikes by pro-Iran groups. This information may help.
Finally, Iran mined boats in the Gulf of Oman in 2019. But the attacks went unpunished, and few details emerged, except for what the US released.
It remains to be seen whether Israel, working with the US, UK or others, can find the drones’ smoking gun.