It was the end of November 1981 when Prime Minister Menachem Begin slipped at home and broke his hip. It was a painful ordeal, and came shortly after his wife, Aliza, had passed away while he was on a state visit to the United States.
Begin spent some time in the hospital, and when discharged remained confined to a wheelchair. His health was already deteriorating, and now he had to deal not only with the emotional loss of his wife of 43 years, but also the pain from his fall. Despite everything, Begin’s mind was clear. Back at home in December, the prime minister and Likud leader identified what he said was a unique window of opportunity for a historic step.
Like today, the world was in the midst of great unrest. In Poland, martial law had been instituted in mid-December in an attempt to suppress political opposition – the Soviets were concerned that the Poles would overthrow communism and ally instead with the West, a loss they were not prepared to sustain. In Egypt, Anwar Sadat, the man with whom Begin had made peace, had been assassinated two months earlier, and the final Israeli settlements in the Sinai Peninsula were scheduled to be evacuated the following Spring. Peace talks with the Palestinians were going nowhere, and Syria was busy fortifying its positions in Lebanon. Finally, Christmas was around the corner and the world was gearing up for a long winter break.
On December 13, Begin called Arye Naor, his cabinet secretary, and ordered him to summon the head of the Mossad, the justice minister and the attorney general for an emergency meeting. When the three arrived, the prime minister dropped a bombshell: I want us to apply Israeli law to the Golan Heights he told them.
The group was taken aback. The Golan had been conquered by Israel in the Six Day War in 1967. Shortly afterward, then-prime minister Levi Eshkol decided to annex east Jerusalem. But not the Golan. That was territory whose fate Israel was supposed to be prepared to negotiate with Syria.
Begin was told at the meeting that if he wanted to move ahead and apply Israeli sovereignty to the Golan, he would have to pass it through the Knesset – a decree in the cabinet like Eshkol had delivered in 1967 would not suffice. According to Israel law, the cabinet can apply law to “part of the Land of Israel” that had that status during the British Mandate. This of course applied to Jerusalem but was not applicable to the Golan Heights, which at the time of Israel’s establishment belonged to Syria.
While Naor and the rest of the group was surprised, the issue of Israeli annexation of the Golan had been in the headlines. Geula Cohen, from the right-wing Tehiyya Party that had split from Begin’s Likud, submitted a private bill calling for annexation. Nevertheless, Begin had not really spoken before about annexation, and everyone present knew that if he went ahead with it, Israel could face severe consequences from the United States, the Soviet Union and Europe. But Begin was determined. He asked the group to prepare legislation to be ready to bring to the Knesset.
The next day it happened. Naor convened the cabinet at Begin’s home in the morning. After a 90-minute meeting, the cabinet approved the bill with only one minister abstaining. Minutes later, Begin was on his way to the Knesset. There, he pushed the three-sentence piece of law through two committees and three readings, with a final majority of 63-21 approving the legislation. In a single day and without anyone in the world knowing ahead of time, Begin made history.
What Begin did in 1981 is important to keep in mind as Israel appears on the verge of applying its laws to 30% of the West Bank sometime after July 1. When I spoke to Naor this week, he recalled Begin’s sense of urgency and his desire for speed, which were motivated by a need to present the world with a fait accompli before anyone could stop him. Ultimately, it worked.
The difference though between then and now, Naor pointed out, is that in 1981 Begin did not speak a word about it beforehand. Today, Netanyahu can’t stop talking annexation.
“Tactically, it is not good to hold public discussions months ahead and raise opposition among the people that are hostile to us,” said Naor, today a professor at Hadassah Academic College in Jerusalem.
There is something else that is relevant. In 1981, Begin did not ask for approval from the US. He also didn’t think about it. His whole point was to take advantage of a window of opportunity he identified – between events in Poland, Egypt and the upcoming holiday – that would allow him to apply Israel law without paying too high a price.
Netanyahu has acted completely differently. As prime minister for 13 years, he has never really outlined a vision for what he would like to see happen in the West Bank or between Israel and the Palestinians. In 1996, after his election as prime minister following the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, Netanyahu was dragged into continuing the process initiated by Rabin’s Oslo Accords.
The same happened when he returned to office in 2009. Then, with Barack Obama in the White House, Netanyahu was forced into making the famous Bar-Ilan speech, endorsing a Palestinian state and freezing settlement construction in the West Bank.
Besides the Bar-Ilan speech that seemed coerced, did Israelis ever hear him outline a vision? Do we really know what his true vision is for the future of the two peoples who live in this land? Sadly, no.
When Donald Trump took office in 2017, it was clear that a change had come to the White House and to the US-Israel relationship. The moving of the embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, the withdrawal from the Iran deal, and the announcement that settlements were not illegal were more than enough to know that things were different.
Then in January came the unveiling of the so-called “Deal of the Century,” which took Israel from an administration that had wanted it to withdraw to pre-1967 borders to one that was now allowing the Jewish state to hold on to all of its settlements in the West Bank. Not a single one would need to be evacuated.
As pro-Israel as this plan might be, it is still a vision being laid out for Israel by another country. This is not Netanyahu outlining his plan but him entering into a process with a plan presented by a third party – the United States.
I asked Naor what he made of the contrast between Begin, who implemented his plan without coordination, and Netanyahu, who is following a plan someone else put on the table.
“Are we a state or a banana republic?” Naor asked. “This is an issue at the core of our existence. We can say that the land is ours, and we can say that if we do it [annexation], we will endanger Israel due to demographic results. What does it all mean?”
The point is that ultimately Israel has to be the one to decide what it wants and how it wants to do it. If that is so, then why doesn’t Netanyahu do something like Begin did in 1981? Why not decide on a course of action with recognition that there may be a price? Of course, it is helpful to have an ally like the US on your side from the outset, but ultimately, the decision rests in Israel’s hands.
That might work when politics are not a consideration, but when they are – as seems to be the case now – everything is different.
Netanyahu, for example, needed the January rollout of the plan to shore up his base’s support ahead of his third election within a year. He needed to continue talking about annexation after the March election to retain his right-wing bloc, and alongside coronavirus, to corral Blue and White into a unity government. Now he needs to keep talking about annexation – even at the risk of upsetting the Jordanians, the Saudis and US Democrats – because of his trial that renews on July 19, around the same time he plans to bring an annexation vote to the cabinet.
There is no question that Israel faces a unique opening similar to the window of opportunity that Begin identified while confined to a wheelchair in the winter of 1981. Trump’s reelection is in November. If annexation is going to happen, it is better for Israel that it take place when there is an administration that can provide the support and defense it will need after the move, whether in the United Nations or to rebuff sanctions from the European Union.
But most important, it is for Israel to decide what it wants and what it plans to do in the future. We don’t need a country – no matter how friendly – to plan our destiny. We can do it on our own.