The other day I decided to reread the three chapters in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s book: Bibi – My Story, that deal with the period in which he served as finance minister in Arik Sharon’s Government in the years 2003-2005.
When Netanyahu’s ultimate biography will be written, these years will undoubtedly be considered one of the peaks of his career, in terms of impressive practical achievements in the Israeli economy, but also one that cost him a painful term in opposition, at the head of the Likud that had shrunk from 38 seats in the elections to the 16th Knesset to 12 Knesset seats in the 17th. One of the reasons for this was Netanyahu’s economic policy as finance minister. His economic policy, which inter alia consisted of moving Israel a few steps forward on the path to a free market, at least partially at the expense of the welfare state, had ruinous economic consequences for large sections of the Likud’s electoral base, even though in purely economic terms, was considered an impressive achievement.
In the relevant chapters in his book, Netanyahu mentioned the following principles that were among those that had led him to success: surrounding himself with a high-quality, hard-working team, drastically reducing social welfare expenditures, in order to reverse the paradigm of “the thin man having to carry the fat man on his back,” and fighting “big government” – one of the basic policy goals of the American Republican Party.
How has Netanyahu changed?
Today Netanyahu seems to be acting in the exact opposite manner on all these issues. He has surrounded himself with ministers and personal assistants, who appear to serve only one purpose, which is to enable him to survive politically, rather than to promote the policies he believes in.
The fact that Netanyahu has announced that he plans to personally head special committees that will try to deal with two major problems that bedevil the Israeli society – the problem of the cost of living, and the problem of murders in the Israeli Arab community – rather than demand that the two ministers responsible for dealing with these issues: Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir roll up their sleeves, and get going, suggests that he realizes that they are incapable of performing the job.
The question I would ask Netanyahu on this issue is whether this situation causes him to lose sleep at night, or whether it actually serves some ulterior purpose, such as a gradual deliberate amassment of tasks and power in his own hands, towards progressively turning into a more authoritarian leader. It is a fascinating question, but not one he is likely to share the answer to with anyone, except perhaps his wife.
As to the fat-man thin-man paradigm, here too Netanyahu has followed a policy which is the exact opposite of what he advocated in the past, especially when it comes to the ultra-Orthodox community, which is being allowed to continue to live in the style that its leaders in Israel chose for it, at a growing expense to the thin-man. I would be curious to hear what Netanyahu has to say on this question, and whether if asked for the rationale of this policy, he would admit that when the choice is between principles and political survival, the latter will invariably win.
I would also like to hear how Netanyahu explains the head-on clash between the free-market principles he believes in, and the extreme socialistic principles on which the relationship between the state and the ultra-Orthodox community is based, and this even before the issue of military service is addressed. In his book, Netanyahu wrote (p. 354) “Israelis had not grown up in a culture of competing lemonade stands. Our one shared experience was service in the army.” He said this against the background of his desire to encourage competitiveness in the economy. However, in the case of his ultra-Orthodox partners, neither competitiveness nor service in the army apply.
As to fighting “big government,” how does this tally with the appointment of 33 ministers to his sixth government, many of them to head totally superfluous contrived ministries? In comparison, in Netanyahu’s first government, there were only 18 ministers. Many of today’s ministers are also about to swap places with other ministers around halfway through the government’s term. However, the largest problem is that quite a few of the ministers are quite unsuitable for their jobs, and cause the government frequent embarrassments. How does Netanyahu feel about this situation?
The next issue on which I would like to ask Netanyahu a few questions is about his government’s “legal reform”. Since I do not believe that the legal reform is dead, his thoughts and intentions on this issue are of the greatest importance.
First of all. In the past Netanyahu was a great supporter of the Supreme Court, and of Israel’s stable legal system, of which he used to speak very highly. What changed his mind? His experiences around his own trial? Pressure from large parts of the society, that do not believe that the legal system represents them, and does not reflect their basic beliefs?
And how does Netanyahu feel about the various elements in the reform, and the speed with which Justice Minister Yariv Levin has sought to get them approved? Is that secondary to the reactions to the reform/revolution from liberal and progressive forces within Israel, including those of many groups and individuals within the legal system itself, many, if not most of the country’s economists, hi-techies, bankers, and former heads of the military establishment?
Or is the critical fact here criticism by the US Administration, the governments of most of the Western democratic states, and foreign financial institutions? Furthermore, does Netanyahu actually believe that it is the Israeli opposition that is largely responsible for the foreign criticism, and that the foreign critics do not really know and/or understand what the legal reform is all about? And, does he believe – as he frequently states - that the reform does not threaten the Israeli democracy in its human rights and liberties aspects?
In addition, in light of the fact that it has been suggested that Netanyahu is considering not prolonging Professor Amir Yaron’s tenure as Governor of the Bank of Israel for a second term, is his policy to stifle any criticism of the reform from within the government system? We know that in the case of Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, such an attempt backfired.
Finally, how serious is Netanyahu about reaching a compromise with the opposition about changes in Israel’s legal system? Does he really believe in compromise, or is his support of the negotiations under the auspices of President Isaac Herzog merely a ploy to convince US President Joe Biden to invite him to the White House, at long last?
It is true that Netanyahu is playing this game with his hands tied behind his back, since Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara has banned him from dealing directly with the legal reform, due to an alleged conflict of interest. However, the most serious drawback to his ensuring success in the negotiations, is the fact that the opposition doesn’t trust him, due to his proven reputation of being a chronic agreement breaker.
Is Netanyahu aware of this fact, and if he is, is he planning to do anything to deal with the problem?
The writer worked in the Knesset for many years as a researcher, and has published extensively both journalistic and academic articles on current affairs and Israeli politics. Her most recent book, Israel’s Knesset Members - A Comparative Study of an Undefined Job, was published by Routledge last year.