Ukraine and Israel, morality and realpolitik - opinion

Israel’s government should consider a foreign policy that aligns with real political interests, but no less with its basic values.

 US President Joe Biden hosts Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House in September (photo credit: KEVIN LAMARQUE/REUTERS)
US President Joe Biden hosts Ukraine's President Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House in September
(photo credit: KEVIN LAMARQUE/REUTERS)

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, there was an intense debate concerning the manner in which Israel should respond. On the one hand, there were calls for Israel to be on the right side of history, the US, and the West, particularly in the face of Putin’s authoritarian regime, and his aggressive European imperialism. Alternatively, there were calls to consider realpolitik and security concerns, requiring a more nuanced response.

This comes at a historic backdrop of Israel’s prevailing negative attitude toward Ukraine, dating back to the Holocaust and beyond, and a perception that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s relationship with Russian Jews is believed to be generally positive. Additionally, the existence of an ex-Russian community is still seen as an important political constituency in Israel.

With Hamas’s terrorist October 7 attack, and Russia’s response, this equation needs to be reassessed. Israel’s government should consider a foreign policy that aligns with real political interests, but no less with its basic values. Tactical military considerations in Syria are important, but geopolitical positioning may be critical in the long haul.

On that basis, we ought to see a much stronger strategic, military, and diplomatic alignment between Jerusalem and Kyiv. In addition to more aligned and cooperative diplomacy, Israel should consider real military cooperation with other Western allies. With a new session of the US Congress upon us, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Volodymyr Zelensky must cooperate, encouraging bipartisan support for both of their countries.

Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a meeting at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, China, October 18, 2023.  (credit: Sputnik/Sergei Guneev/Pool via REUTERS)
Russian President Vladimir Putin shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping during a meeting at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing, China, October 18, 2023. (credit: Sputnik/Sergei Guneev/Pool via REUTERS)

Mr. Bennett or Dr. Lapid

Naftali Bennett was prime minister, and Yair Lapid, foreign minister, when Russia invaded Ukraine in early 2022. Their response was ambivalent, to say the least. Lapid condemned Russia directly, but Bennett referred more obliquely to the “difficult, tragic times.” Agreeing to assist Ukraine with humanitarian aid, and receiving Jewish and non-Jewish refugees from the country, Israel nevertheless stopped short of providing military aid.

The source of this ambivalence is the delicate relationship Israel has with Russia, due to its presence in Syria. From 2015, Israel and Russia have cooperated on deconfliction measures. In basic terms, a red phone, allowing for a certain level of military coordination regarding Syria, existed between these two countries. 

For Israel, this was crucial in order to maintain freedom of action against Iranian threats emanating from Syria, without directly encountering Russian military assets.

Since invading Ukraine, Russia’s military ties with Iran have deepened. Moreover, following the Hamas’s terrorist attacks on southern Israel, Moscow has hosted its leadership as part of its pro-Hamas stance. 

Many of the Russian leadership’s media proxies, even more critically, have taken a hard line against Israel, with increasingly antisemitic undertones. Lt.-Col. Daniel Rakov, an expert on Russian policies in the Middle East, shared a thread on X (formally Twitter) highlighting the Russian state media’s coverage as being “in line with the principles of modern antisemitism: blurring the difference between Israel and the Jewish people and comparing both to Nazis.”

Israel-Hamas, US-China

Israel is rightly focused on its own conflict. Nevertheless, it’s crucial to remember the wider context. According to historian Niall Ferguson, we are well into “Cold War II” – the US vs China, with proxies in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. In his view, oil remains a key geopolitical factor, and as such, the Middle East remains a critical geopolitical theater.


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In Ferguson’s analysis, Russia-Ukraine is the “Cold War II’s” first actual war. Hence, its outcome is not only important for Ukraine and Russia, but for the global balance of power between China and the US. 

The second hot conflict is Israel and Hamas. America is lining up with diplomatic and unprecedented military backup on one side, whereas Iran, Russia, and in the background, China, are forming ranks on the other. The US president has been unusually explicit, issuing warnings to other regional players not to get involved with Israel post-October 7.

Relations between Israel and Russia relating to the airspace in Syria’s and Iran’s proxy in Lebanon would seem to pale into insignificance, relative to the importance of the West’s resolve to support Ukraine and Israel as key hot zones in a global cold war. Ultimately, US interests will inform its foreign policy, which to date, has aligned strongly with Israel’s.

American partisan politics are a threat

US President Joe Biden has led the coalition supporting Ukraine in its war with Russia. The West has staked much on Ukraine’s ability to remain a sovereign country, but it will need to stay the course for this to be successful. 

Ironically, Biden’s Ukraine strategy is most challenged at home, with increasing antipathy toward massive support for Ukraine originating from the isolationist side of America’s politics. This is largely represented by former president Donald Trump, and his proxies in Congress.

As of now, Biden would like to approve a massive joint aid bill that would supply both Israel and Ukraine with the military aid they require. Indeed, Biden’s October 20 speech tied the support of Israel and Ukraine tightly together:

“So let me share with you why making sure Israel and Ukraine succeed is vital for America’s national security. You know, history has taught us that when terrorists don’t pay a price for their terror, when dictators don’t pay a price for their aggression, they cause more chaos, and death, and more destruction.”

Partisan politics are getting in the way. Although there remains broad bipartisan support for Israel, it is proving more difficult to get the same bipartisan support for an aid package for Ukraine.

Why though does this matter to Israel?

What happens if Ukraine falls?

If Ferguson is right, and we are deep in cold war territory, then the loss of Ukraine to Russia’s aggression will only whet the China-Russia-Iran axis’s appetite for further gains. The same of course applies if Israel fails against Hamas or Hezbollah.

Or, put another way, it is in Israel’s strategic interest that the US remains successfully engaged globally. The Saudi-Israel-US deal is as much about securing the Middle East for a Western alliance, as it is for the cause of Israel-Arab peace. 

If the US is weakened by Ukraine’s loss, this may have negative effects in other theaters, like the Middle East, Asia, and Taiwan.

One could make the case that not only is bipartisan support of Israel crucial for Israel’s security, but further, that US bipartisan support of Ukraine is no less so for Israel’s security. It is in Israel’s interest that Ukraine continues to successfully meet the challenge of Russian aggression.

Two theaters tied together by the same global cold conflict.

Zelensky and Netanyahu

Since October 7, Zelensky made plans twice to visit Israel in solidarity, and was rejected. What seems clear is that Zelensky understands that there is a close alignment of interests between the two countries. Israel, however, is maintaining its ambivalent stance.

In a mirror image of Putin’s interest shifting from Ukraine to the Middle East, Zelensky’s interest is just the opposite. He clearly understands that there are brewing political issues within the US, and so that there is risk of war fatigue among his Western partners.

Netanyahu has rightly made the case that Israel defending itself against Hamas terror extends beyond local matters. Rather this is akin to the fight for the destruction of ISIS, which captured the imagination of the West. 

By embracing Ukraine more wholeheartedly, Netanyahu would strengthen that case with a much broader alliance-building exercise, with the forces of democracy and freedom battling it out with the forces of authoritarianism, terror, and radical Islam.

Netanyahu and Zelensky together should be nurturing a bipartisan approach to both conflicts, backing each other up.

Seeing Netanyahu and Zelensky together, first in Jerusalem and Kyiv, then in Washington, would be in the interest of both countries, and would highlight their right to self-defense against Russian and Hamas aggression, leveraging the critical realpolitik of the moment, for the West needs to strengthen its resolve within “Cold War II.”

This may risk the deconfliction cooperation with Russia, but the risk of a weakening Western, or US resolve over Israel would be far more damaging.

The writer is a founding partner of Goldrock Capital and the founder of The Institute for Jewish and Zionist Research. He is a former chair of Gesher, World Bnei Akiva, and the Coalition for Haredi Employment.