The drums of war have sounded louder in the past few weeks on the Israeli-Lebanese border. While Hezbollah, an Iranian-sponsored terror organization, had officially joined the war against Israel as soon as October 8, the last few months introduced a worrying dynamic of escalation.
According to the Alma Research and Education Centre, May and June were characterized by a significant increase in the number of attacks on Israel (320 and 288, as opposed to 229 in April, for example); each may include numerous rockets or drones.
Several countries have warned their citizens against traveling to Lebanon, among them the US, Russia, and Kuwait, while others even called on their citizens to leave the country, including Germany and Canada. There have been constant threats, launched directly by Hassan Nasrallah, secretary-general of Hezbollah. One was delivered in his June 19 speech.
The arch-terrorist’s remarks revealed nothing new. He threatened Israel yet again and stated Hezbollah’s readiness for war on both land, air, and sea. Israel, in reply, had stressed its preparedness and obligation, according to Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, “to ensure the safe return of our citizens to their homes.”
THERE’S ONE thing Nasrallah did find essential to highlight in that speech, which reveals a less-talked about aspect in this endless saga: the Lebanese population. It’s a critical component that should be considered when trying to assess the likelihood, incentives, and inhibitors of a full-scale war between Israel and Lebanon.
This broad group of people, over five million, supports the continuation of Hezbollah’s fight with Israel, according to Nasrallah, for the sake of Gaza. The question is, why was it so crucial for him to stress this point?
There’s one thing such a statement reveals. It is not that Nasrallah necessarily describes reality as it is, but that Hezbollah, also a political party, craves internal legitimacy. The Lebanese people are a genuine concern for Hezbollah and represent one reason it refrains from thoroughly exhausting its military power, which will undoubtedly drag Lebanon into a complete disaster.
Contrary to Hezbollah’s parades and pompous statements that claim to convey uniformity in Lebanon, what used to be a broad support base for the Shi’ite terror organization today looks more like a common presidential debate: divided and full of disputes.
Lebanese population object to war
Why? More and more Lebanese understand the outcomes of subordinating their future to Iran’s radical aspirations. That does not imply that the Lebanese people support Israel but it does mean they know the reality of war.
Take, for example, the words of former Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad al-Seniora in Al-Arabia on June 29: “Lebanon will not be able to bear the consequences. It is true that if the war expands, Hezbollah will cause Israel many losses, but no one is asking what will happen to Lebanon. Anyone who has anything to do with this matter must address these matters.” In the same interview, responding to a report that the Arab League has removed Hezbollah from a terror list (which was later denied), he said, “We must stop giving [them] free gifts.”
Another interesting statement was recently given by Walid Jumblatt, a Lebanese-Druze political leader, following Nasrallah’s threats on Cyprus, should it assist Israel in the event of war with Lebanon. Jumblatt pointed out that Cyprus served as a haven for the Lebanese during the Cold War (and for decades later) and publicly objected to Nasrallah’s threats on the EU country.
Similar criticism, condemning Nasrallah’s audacity to threaten not just Israel but the EU, NATO, and the US – while solely relying on Iran for protection – was openly made by Lebanese journalists.
Such criticism – either direct or implicit – does not come in a vacuum and represents a growing call on Nasrallah to avoid war with Israel. This, in turn, indicates not only the understanding there that Israel can destroy southern Lebanon but also the low political support that Nasrallah has in the country now.
Some of those disputes even infiltrated the alleged “home base” of Shi’ite people, who understand that in the eyes of Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s blood is redder than the blood of other Shi’ites, such as Amal. Take, for example, a comment on X by Dr. Ali Khalife, a founder of Tahrir, a Shi’ite opposition movement on X: “...the reckless and miscalculated behavior of Hezbollah, Iran’s military arm in Lebanon, undoubtedly multiplies the tragedy of Lebanon and the losses of the Lebanese.”
These examples do not necessarily indicate that Hezbollah is about to face an inner Lebanese rebellion tomorrow morning. And, of course, the Lebanese people are not becoming pro-Israel suddenly (far from it). But they are symptomatic of something more profound and indicate that a substantial portion of the population, on unprecedented scales these days, understands the consequences of a war, and objects to it. This, despite Nasrallah’s claims that they stand behind him.
When geopolitically analyzing this fragile region and its complex circumstances, not only rockets, missiles, and drones should be taken into the equation of deterrence, but also the inner Lebanese front and the political calculations it forces Nasrallah to take.
Indeed, this is the tragedy of the Middle East. Just like with Iran, also in Lebanon, it seems that Israel finds itself in a clash not against the people necessarily but with a bloodthirsty leadership. And the people themselves? While they don’t necessarily dream of having hummus in Tel Aviv, they are certainly not keen on war.
The writer is a former director of the Israel National Public Diplomacy Unit, in the Prime Minister’s Office, and author of 11 Days in Gaza (Yedioth Books, Hebrew).