Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi is destroying the IDF, with Defense Minister Yoav Gallant blindly backing his decisions, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu conducting the operation.
Listed below are brief descriptions of how during Halevi's term, the situation of the army has continued to deteriorate - not to mention how Halevi is failing to prepare it for future wars, the main task of any Chief of Staff.
1. Halevi did not demand the preparation of Air Force bases and runways for the use of defensive aircraft against precise missiles and drones launched at the bases, which could impair the aircraft's ability to take off for their missions or land.
2. Halevi did not ensure the protection of Air Force bases against extremists, who could easily infiltrate them, steal ammunition and weapons, and in times of war, sabotage planes, tanks, and other weapons.
3. Halevi did not address the ground forces or plan to expand it after the reduction of six divisions over the past twenty years. The lack of such an order of battle will not enable victory in Gaza. What will happen in a regional war where ground forces will have to fight in six areas simultaneously? The next pogrom awaits us in Judea and Samaria, where there will inevitably be a spillover into Israel.
4. Halevi neglected the preparation of the home front for a regional war, including the destruction of our settlements on the northern border. The IDF has no solution for Hezbollah's daily launch of dozens of missiles, rockets, and drones towards the North. Imagine what will happen in a regional war when the Islamic regime of Iran and their proxies launch thousands of munitions at Israel daily?
5. In his multi-year plan, Halevi invested all American foreign aid for the next ten years, over $18 billion. He has used the money to buy more planes that will not be relevant in future wars in the next decade. However, he invested almost nothing in other areas, such as establishing a missile force (tactical ballistic missiles), which is a dozen times more effective against enemy missiles than any aircraft.
6. He did not increase ground forces and did not take invest in more effective and cheaper means of defense, such as developing a laser, which would be a more effective and cheaper defense against rockets, missiles and mortar bombs at short and long ranges and against aircraft, including hovercraft, unmanned aircraft and drones. Compared to the laser, the cost of the "arrow", "David's slingshot", and the "Iron Dome" is enormous and it is impossible to keep them in stock for only a few days.
Halevi did not understand until Hamas's attack that the characteristics of the war that have changed completely from the wars of thee past, and therefore he did not purchase thousands of attack drones that are manufactured in Israel and sold abroad.
At the price of one F-35 aircraft that costs $80 million, it is possible to purchase 4,000 attack drones. The cost of one drone is only $20,000.
He also did not purchase multi-barreled firearms against aircraft that fire at a rate of thousands of bullets per minute, and their effectiveness against drones is very high. He invested in planes instead and caused the IDF to lose its ability to fight in multi-armed cooperation.
Although Halevi received all this chaos from his predecessors, he did nothing to improve the situation. The opposite is true, during his time the situation of the army continued to deteriorate.
7. Halevi received a terrible legacy. All the logistics and maintenance of the IDF were transferred into civilian hands which would not be able to respond to the forces when they crossed the borders. He had the responsibility to take care of the matter but did nothing. Instead, Halevi continued to ignore the situation. He allowed ground forces to fight across borders and fight in the enemy's territories for long periods of time without fuel, ammunition, food, spare parts, etc.
8. Halevi brought the IDF into the most serious manpower crisis in its history. This included the disintegration of the quality and quantity of IDF personnel. This difficult situation in manpower shortage was also inherited by Halevi from his predecessors, but instead of addressing the problem, he deepened it.
9. Halevi deepened the gaps in the army's broken organizational culture (lack of discipline, failure to verify orders, lack of control and monitoring, failure to apply lessons learned, and unreliability in investigations). The culture of lying within the army, the non-existence of orders and procedures, lack of proper routine in the units, and no continuity in passing the baton from commander to commander expanded greatly during his tenure.
10. During the years of Halevi's tenure, there have been no defense plans along all of Israel's borders, and in some of them, there were no attack plans either - as was the case in Gaza.
11. Arrogance, egotism, and non-acceptance of responsibility characterized the high command of the IDF under the command of Halevi before the war. This led to the worst failure in the history of the State of Israel: the Hamas attack on southern Israel on October 7. It is a miracle that Hezbollah did not go to war against us in the North at the same time as Hamas. If Hezbollah had attacked us then, our situation would have been hundreds of times worse than our situation now. We would have experienced intense destruction and heavy losses throughout the length and breadth of the country. Only the Americans would have been able to save us.
12. It is true that we have wonderful warriors and heroes in the regular and reserve service, but without strategic vision in the conduct of the war, even the best of our warriors will not be able to bridge the grave mistakes of Halevi.
13. Halevi accepted a false responsibility and he has no intention of fulfilling it. He is a bad example to his subordinates, contrary to what he expects from his soldiers in the "spirit of the IDF". He also violates the basic values and norms upon which generations of commanders grew up, and today the IDF commanders have lost trust in him.
14. Halevi appoints his friends as champions and commanders. He led the army and the people of Israel to depreciation. He receives unlimited support from his friend who is in the same boat as him and chooses to drown, Gallant himself.
Conclusion
Herzi Halevi is a bad example of a Chief of Staff and has completely lost his self-respect in order to maintain his career. He tried to delay the inevitable, and in doing so, he accelerated the decline of the army's resilience. Despite all this, it doesn't affect him; he disrespects us and clings to his position with all his strength.
The topics mentioned above are just headlines without much detail. In my many articles in newspapers, podcasts, and television interviews, I have elaborated on each topic I wrote about in this article in great detail.
I want to add that Herzi Halevi, as Chief of Staff, received an army in a very difficult situation from his predecessors, which has been deteriorating over the past twenty years, and was not prepared for a regional war. Unfortunately, he not only failed to stop the continued deterioration of the army, but added fuel to the fire. His partners in the impending disaster are Netanyahu, who has done everything to sabotage each proposed hostage deal to survive in power for a few more months, and Gallant, who blindly follows Halevi's decisions and guidance.