In the mid-1990s, during coffee breaks at the Vienna headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency, I had several conversations with an Iranian academic on nuclear deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD). We were participating in a short series of annual conferences on a “Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction” – an Egyptian initiative aimed at Israel, and related to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
Israel is not a signatory, and strategic policy was, and is still based on nuclear ambiguity (“we do not confirm nor deny…”). I was one of the few Israeli professors at the time who was writing and lecturing on these issues and had no governmental or military position, enabling me to participate “in my personal capacity” – the only capacity I had.
Unlike the others, I avoided repeating government political talking points. Instead, I gave a short version of my course lecture on the 1962 Cuban missile crisis between Washington and Moscow, nuclear deterrence and instability, and the “eyeball-to-eyeball” confrontation that almost led to total destruction.
The two superpowers had direct lines of communication, including ambassadors in each other’s countries, and these factors were crucial in ending the crisis peacefully. In contrast, there are no embassies and no direct links between Tehran and Jerusalem, greatly increasing the chances for miscalculation, particularly as Iran’s leaders seem unaware of Israel’s red lines in responding to enemies seeking its destruction.
As I spoke, I noticed that the Iranian participant sitting next to me around the oval conference table (as is standard, we were arranged alphabetically by country) paid close attention and even nodded a few times. This was unusual; in other events on the “nuclear circuit,” the Iranians went out of their way to demonstrate hostility, including walking out when I spoke.
It turned out that my Iranian counterpart had an academic background in international relations and strategy similar to mine – we read the same books and used the same vocabulary. During the break, we found an out-of-the way corner table and began an intense conversation on teaching the complexities of game theory and nuclear strategy to future military and political decision-makers in our respective countries.
I had not expected to find an Iranian academic who was willing to speak to me, even where we would not be seen or overheard. Perhaps, as in the case of the US and USSR following the 1962 crisis, Israel and Iran might begin arms limitation talks based on political realism and shared interests in avoiding the dangers of mutual destruction.
Roadblock
The IAEA conferences reached a predictable dead end, but shortly afterward, in an off-the-record meeting on regional security held in Europe, three other Iranians participated in a session in which I again discussed the lessons of the Cold War. This was during an era of greater openness, when Mohammed Khatami was president of Iran (1997 to 2005), and they responded to my talk directly, without the need for an out-of-sight corner table.
BUT, MY cautious optimism notwithstanding, nothing changed in the realm of strategic policy. After the 2003 US war to oust Saddam Hussien and his regime, Iran appeared to slow its program to develop nuclear weapons. But as the attempt to establish a stable democracy in its place failed, the Tehran regime resumed the drive for regional dominance, including strengthening its Hezbollah proxy forces in Lebanon.
In 2005, “hard-liner” Mahmoud Ahmadinejad replaced Khatami as president, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) emerged as the main power, and the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles accelerated.
In parallel, the window for my limited contacts with Iranians was closed. I later learned that one was barred from leaving the country; another, who voiced public criticism of the regime, was arrested (and later released), and others managed to escape to the US. Iran’s proxies in Lebanon became increasingly aggressive in launching attacks across the border with Israel.
In response, I published and circulated an analysis headlined: “Deterrence Instability: Hezbollah’s Fuse to Iran’s Bomb,” focusing on the issues that I had made directly in our meetings: “The isolation of Iran’s leaders, the fog that surrounds its decision-making structures, the absence of direct channels of communication [with Israel], and its radical, religious-based, revisionist objectives will make the development of stable deterrence extremely difficult.
“With many potential triggers for crisis and escalation between Tehran and Jerusalem, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, … the difficulty in managing these crises in a nuclear environment will pose a formidable challenge.”
WE ARE now 28 years since our out-of-sight conversations in Vienna, and dangers are immediate. Although the Iranian nuclear program has not yet crossed the threshold to possession of a deliverable weapon, the potential for strategic miscalculation and disaster is clear.
After 10 months of a deadly war of attrition waged by Iran’s proxies, the illusion that Tehran can remain immune from Israeli responses has collapsed.
The lives of millions of Iranian and Israeli citizens depend on ending blind policies based on hate and moving to direct communication with mutual understanding and accommodation based on realism, as a first step to survival.
The writer is the founder and president of NGO Monitor and professor emeritus at Bar-Ilan University, where he founded the Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation.