After the Houthi UAV attack on Tel Aviv on July 18, Israel responded with an airstrike on targets in Yemen. The operation involved a high number of planes and was very complex. It is essential to establish a solid capacity to prevent and respond to attacks of this kind.
In the “Outstretched Arm” operation carried out on July 20, 2024, the Israeli Air Force targeted Houthi warehouses, oil depots, power plants, and other military facilities in the port city of Hodeida in Yemen. The attack was in retaliation for an unmanned aerial vehicle launched from Yemen that exploded in Tel Aviv, killing one person and injuring 10. The attack was highly complex and included fighter jets and reconnaissance planes, accompanied by an aerial refueling plane. Carried out 1,800 km. from Israel, it was designed to deter the Houthis – with a heavy economic cost.
After the attack, Iran quickly announced that it would provide the Houthis with advanced defense systems to defend against similar attacks. Given the complexity and risks involved in such operations, it is worth considering why Israel has not yet developed a “standoff weapon” like the American Tomahawk cruise missile or the Russian Kalibr. Such a weapon would allow Israel to strike distant targets without the need for a large fleet of aircraft or risking pilots’ lives, especially in a multi-arena campaign scenario.
It’s important to note that various Israeli political figures raised this question. For instance, in the late 1990s, then-defense minister Moshe Arens sought to investigate the development of a “simple and affordable missile.” Additionally, former cabinet minister Yuval Steinitz stated in 2005 that the IDF needed to form a missile force that could operate from both land and sea in response to the threat from Iran.
Yisrael Beytenu Party leader Avigdor Liberman suggested this past April that, rather than spending approximately NIS 35 billion on F-35 aircraft, it would be possible to allocate NIS 20 billion to acquire fighter jets and earmark NIS 10 billion to establish a powerful missile force capable of addressing Israel’s operational requirements. The introduction of missiles of this type into the operational array would be expected to reduce the number of weapons needed to attack protected targets.
The US took one of its initial steps to align itself with Israel at the start of the Iron Swords War by sending the US Navy Ohio-class guided missile submarine (SSGN) to the eastern Mediterranean. This submarine is equipped with 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles.
Difficulty hitting its target
Opponents of standoff weapons argue that these weapons may have difficulty destroying hardened or underground targets, unlike airplanes, which can carry heavy and powerful offensive weapons designed for that purpose. They also argue that cruise missiles may struggle to penetrate advanced defense systems due to their aerodynamic performance, radar cross-section signature, and subsonic speed. Opponents also claim that advanced defense systems can intercept standoff ballistic missiles. Recent advancements have led to the development of Hypersonic Cruise Missiles, which possess high speed and maneuverability, enabling them to evade aerial detection and interception systems effectively.
Internal politics within the Israeli security system, present in all security establishments in the Western world, can link to the decision not to develop and deploy various types of missiles. For instance, researcher Gregory Engel explored this issue in an article titled “The Politics of Naval Innovation: Cruise Missiles and the Tomahawk.” Engel analyzed the origins and development of modern cruise missiles, focusing on the American Tomahawk cruise missile. He focused his research on the politics of cruise missile development and the implications related to the revolution in military affairs.
Engel notes that air-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles (ALCM/SLCM) began differently but neither would have reached full production and operation without intervention from the highest civilian levels. Engel points out that military activity is filled with political maneuvering, just like any other organizational effort. In this case, parts of the US military were not interested in developing cruise missiles because they threatened their missions and doctrine and competed for the limited funding allocated for their development.
The Israel Navy and Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI) have been developing sea-to-sea missiles, including the latest Gabriel 5 type, designed to target naval threats. The Navy has stated that these advanced missiles ensure their relative advantage and help maintain the IDF’s naval superiority. However, Houthi rebels, who are imposing a blockade in the southern Red Sea on the movement of merchant ships to and from Israel, are not seeking to engage in battles in the open sea with the Israeli or American Navy.
IN MY OPINION, former defense ministers Arens and Liberman, as well as former minister Steinitz, contributed to the understanding of modern warfare and the need to develop and equip a long-range missile system that is accurate and capable of penetrating and destroying strategic military targets. The technology for this purpose is currently advanced and progressing towards hypersonic and ballistic missiles with excellent stealth capabilities. This enables them to be launched from both land and Navy platforms. This capability also addresses the issue of air force base survivability, which is now crucial for Israel’s response to these types of scenarios.
The writer, a retired rear admiral, is the director of the Institute for Maritime Policy and Strategy in the Israeli National Center of Blue Economy and Innovation.