Since Thursday, August 29, the rift within Israeli society appears to have taken a further shift for the worse.
At the end of a loud and acrimonious argument between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant at a meeting of the narrow cabinet that day, around the issue of the Philadelphi Corridor, Netanyahu put to the cabinet’s vote a resolution to the effect that Israel would not leave the corridor within the framework of a hostage deal with Hamas.
The resolution had not appeared on the meeting’s agenda, and was not preceded by an in-depth deliberation on the issue of the Philadelphi Corridor, or the faltering hostage deal.
One of Hamas’s preconditions for a new hostage deal is that the Gaza war come to a complete end, and that Israel withdraw from the whole of the Gaza Strip, including the Philadelphi Corridor. According to Israel, the corridor constitutes the main passageway for illicit weapons and munitions to Hamas, through dozens of tunnels extending from the Sinai Peninsula into Rafah.
Eight of the 10 members of the narrow cabinet voted in favor, Gallant voted against, and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir abstained.
Last Monday, Netanyahu gave a rare press conference to the Israeli media about the importance of Israel’s remaining in control of the Philadelphi Corridor, and presented a rather inaccurate history of Israel’s policy toward the corridor over the years. He didn’t explain why, if the corridor is so important for Israel’s security, Israel didn’t reconquer it at the beginning of the current war, and waited seven months before doing so. He also barely mentioned the hostages.
Hostage families have intensified their calls for a deal
As a result of Netanyahu’s current Philadelphi campaign – in addition to the execution of six Israeli hostages who were murdered by their captors in a tunnel in Rafah two to three days before the IDF found their bodies on August 31 – the hostages’ families have intensified their cries of despair. They argued that time was running out for the hostages, who might soon all perish if not released as soon as possible by means of a deal.
Though they pleaded with Netanyahu to reverse the cabinet’s resolution about Israel’s refusal to depart from the Philadelphi Corridor within the framework of the first stage of a deal with Hamas, he adamantly refused. This strengthened the belief of many of the hostages’ families, and sectors of the general public, that Netanyahu does not place the release of the hostages high on his list of priorities, if at all.
THIS TURN of events has once again increased the number of participants in the anti-government demonstrations in Tel Aviv and elsewhere, which for the first time since October 7 has reached six-digit figures.
Furthermore, the position of the hostages’ families, and large parts of the general public, on the Philadelphi Corridor is supported by Gallant and most of the security establishment, who do not deny the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor. They argue that the release of the hostages should be given top priority, and that the IDF can reconquer the corridor in 45 minutes if necessary.
They do not take seriously Netanyahu’s argument that the US and the international community will prevent Israel from reconquering the corridor should it leave it within the framework of a deal to free the hostages, even if Hamas once again starts smuggling arms into the Gaza Strip across the corridor.
Yet, as things look at the moment, Netanyahu is unlikely to change his position.
Besides, even though opinion polls suggest that a majority of the Israeli population believes that everything should be done to release the hostages by means of a deal as soon as possible, there is a significant minority that disagrees (an opinion poll aired by Channel 12 last Friday showed that 60% believe the hostages are more important than Philadelphi, while 28% believe the opposite).
A religious, right-wing acquaintance of mine recently said to me that while no one objects on principle to the hostages being released, the state has as much responsibility toward the IDF soldiers and officers, who might be killed in the process of releasing the hostages, and the Israelis who might be killed if part of the hundreds or thousands of Palestinian terrorists who will be released by Israel in return for the hostages will again engage in terrorism, as happened after previous releases by Israel of Palestinian prisoners.
I asked if he would feel the same way if most of the hostages were religious settlers from Judea and Samaria rather than secular liberals and kibbutzniks from the surroundings of Gaza and elsewhere in Israel, or, God forbid, his own relatives, but got a blank look in return.
Furthermore, I wondered whether Netanyahu would have objected to the rescue of the Israeli and Jewish hostages hijacked to Entebbe in 1976 by Palestinian and German terrorists, had he known in advance that his brother Yoni, who had led the operation, would be killed in the course of the operation. Even though the opposition in Israel is inclined to believe that Netanyahu is driven primarily by personal interests, I do not believe he would have gone that far.
WHAT CAN be done at this point to stop the growing rift in Israeli society over the hostage issue?
This past week, I have heard in panel discussions on several TV channels that the only way out of the current situation is the immediate entry of some of the centrist and center-right opposition parties into the government.
The idea behind this is that together with the haredi parties, who favor the return of the hostages for halachic reasons, and certain Likud MKs and ministers who believe in the immediate need to bring back the hostages on patriotic grounds, the centrist and center-right parties will help form a majority in the government and Knesset in favor of such a move.
Unfortunately, the chance for a true national-unity government being formed at this time – which would deal with the hostage issue and many other urgent issues on the national agenda (including judicial reform) that the current government seems unable to cope with – requires a change of attitude by the prime minister on the formation of an authentic national-unity government. Unfortunately, such a change does not appear to be in the cards.
The writer worked in the Knesset for many years as a researcher, and has published extensively both journalistic and academic articles on current affairs and Israeli politics. Her most recent book, Israel’s Knesset Members – A Comparative Study of an Undefined Job, was published by Routledge.