As early as 2021, at the beginning of his term, US President Joe Biden declared in his administration’s National Security Strategy that the world is currently engaged in a “strategic competition to shape the global order.”
Due to the rising tension between the two superpowers, the US and China, there was deemed to be a need to establish a de-escalation mechanism that would primarily focus on military channels, similar to the Moscow-Washington hotline that was established after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 by US president John F. Kennedy and Soviet general secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Although US-Chinese tensions have already existed, and even peaked after then-speaker of the US House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in 2022, they had not reached the necessary levels necessitating sophisticated crisis management until the 2023 spy balloon affair.
The detection and interception of a Chinese spy balloon over US sovereign territory, where it roamed for several days, brought the relations between the two superpowers to their lowest point in decades. The two superpowers, from opposite sides of the globe, viewed this low point as a real danger despite similar official statements from the leaders of both nations who tried to downplay the crisis, claiming it was not a spy balloon and that the Chinese government did not know it had entered the sovereign territory of another country.
However, both US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and China’s top diplomat, Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission Wang Yi, were less convinced by these attempts of mutual reassurance and decided to start a round of talks to calm tensions. These talks took place over many months and in various locations around the world – Austria, Malta, and Thailand, among others.
Despite their sensitive nature, these were not discussions based on personal ties but rather formal diplomatic talks, with each senior official bringing negotiating teams to the table. For dinners and less formal events, smaller groups attended, allowing for intimate and sincere dialogue.
The topics discussed during these talks reflect what both sides see as the greatest potential crises in their bilateral relations. While the Chinese raised the issue of Taiwan – the US framing the relationship as a “competition” and addressing US technological sanctions and restrictions on China – the Americans focused on China’s support for Russia, the cessation of military dialogue between the two countries, and the fentanyl flowing from China into the US.
From the issues raised by both delegations, it is clear that security concerns are the most troubling for both sides, with a particular emphasis on tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, the war in Ukraine, and the military dialogue between the nations that was intended to bridge precisely over these gaps and that Beijing halted following Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.
Superpowers have tried to reduce tensions
While the covert back channel between Wang and Sullivan is significant, it is not the only way that the two superpowers have tried to reduce tensions since the beginning of Biden’s term. As early as June 2023, US cabinet members began visiting China one after another to mitigate the collateral damage caused by the competition between the nations. While military leaders and security officials were not part of these frequent visits, the administration’s trade and economic officials were.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, and Trade Representative Katherine Tai all visited China, demonstrating that despite military and technological tensions, the countries still want and need to trade with one another. Additionally, John Kerry, former secretary of state and presidential candidate and the current special envoy for climate issues, visited China, underscoring cooperation between the nations on global matters.
Tensions between the two superpowers escalated following what the US government perceived as critical Chinese assistance to Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. While the Biden administration imposed severe sanctions on Russian entities, China sided with Moscow, providing dual-use technology that circumvented sanctions, which, in the eyes of the Americans, was critical to Russia’s war effort.
China’s denials did not convince the US, which decided to impose sanctions not only on Russian entities but also on Chinese entities that the US claims assist Russia’s military industry.
Given that both the majority of the Democratic and Republican parties see eye-to-eye that China is the US’s most important geopolitical problem, regardless of who is elected president and which strategy is implemented, a rapid de-escalation mechanism between Washington and Beijing will be required.
A Beijing-Washington hotline is crucial not only for calming tensions after crises break out, but also for preventing them from occurring. In recent years, the superpowers have been testing each other’s patience, and such a mechanism could serve as a forum for communicating redlines in real-time.
The areas of tension raised by the parties are not only ideological issues but also matters of daily concern. For instance, rapid communication and escalation provide the avenue that could help stop Chinese forces from crossing the midpoint of the Taiwan Strait, which has become routine, and the smuggling of fentanyl into the US.
Nonetheless, American politicians disagree on how to do this, both strategically and operationally. On the one hand, proponents of an “Asia First” outlook, primarily among conservatives in the Republican Party, argue that Washington’s current strategic outlook, which includes supporting Ukraine and its significant presence in Europe, endangers US national security and reduces its ability to deal with the Chinese challenge in East Asia.
Another viewpoint sees the Chinese threat through the prism of the wider international system believing that a Russian defeat of Ukraine could raise the chance of a potential conflict between China and Taiwan. Supporters of this approach view linkage between the arenas, with the potential for significant global economic consequences as well as the impact on the defense of Washington’s allies in Europe and the Middle East.
Until Washington decides on its direction, the talks held in recent months demonstrate the approach best expressed by Graham Allison, one of the leading scholars on superpower competition and a professor at Harvard: “They know we’re serious about cooperating where we can, but at the same time competing vigorously in almost every dimension.”
In other words, reducing tensions and cooperating on issues of shared interest, like climate and de-escalation channels, while competing in all other areas.
The writers are researchers at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).