Looking back over the past year, it’s impossible to ignore the sense that we’re witnessing two different Israels.
One Israel existed on October 7 – a nation caught off guard, unprepared as Hamas stormed its borders. It was an Israel slow to respond, missing crucial intelligence, paralyzed by the shock of an attack that would change the nation’s very fabric. The devastation still lingers today, as the scars of the massacre that day run deep, and the price continues to be paid by the 101 hostages who remain in Hamas captivity.
But then, there is the Israel of the past two weeks – the Israel that has reasserted its presence on the global stage with overwhelming force. In an extraordinary retaliation, it delivered the most precise military strike in history against Hezbollah, severing its communications and dismantling its infrastructure.
This Israel doesn’t just respond; it hunts. It finds every leader, even the elusive Hassan Nasrallah, and crushes Hezbollah’s missile capabilities. This is the Israel of power and precision, an Israel that reclaims its strength and strikes fear into its enemies.
People would be right to question – how do both of these Israels exist side by side? How is it possible that the same IDF and the same government can be responsible for both? How is it possible that the IDF can fail at something as basic as deploying troops to places like Be’eri for almost 10 hours but then do something amazing like plant explosives inside thousands of pagers?
How can the government that allowed for billions of dollars to be transferred to Hamas, enabling it to build up impressive capabilities that a year into the war have not all been destroyed, be capable of creating a strategy that seems able to take on Israel’s stronger enemy and the Iranians at the same time?
The answer has multiple layers. On one hand, there is the understanding that Lebanon is where the IDF had invested its efforts. It is in Lebanon where the IDF created target banks, focused its clandestine operations, and invested vast intelligence and operational resources that are now bearing fruit. If maybe half of this had been done in Gaza, October 7 could have been avoided.
The military undeniably has amazing capabilities, and what we have seen over the last two weeks is what happens when they are applied correctly.
This difference – between Gaza and Lebanon – actually underscores the government’s responsibility for what happened in Gaza last year. Had Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s policy vis-a-vis Hamas been different and not focused on containment alongside empowerment, the resources were potentially available to have been invested. It was a matter of focus, and just like Netanyahu can claim credit for the change now, he is also responsible for the failures that were until now.
The dichotomy in the Jewish state
The existence of these “two Israels” shows the dichotomy that has long existed here.
Israel stands as a hub of cutting-edge technology, yet a significant portion of its people still choose to live in tents in the desert like they did hundreds of years ago or in shtetls reminiscent of 15th-century Poland. It is a nation grappling with existential threats, and yet its political landscape is dominated by petty divisions, with leaders more focused on street disputes that only further fragment our society.
None of this means that what Israel faces on this Rosh Hashanah eve is in any way simple or easy. The war in Gaza is far from over, and the victory that Israel requires – which depends on the return of the hostages and the removal of Hamas as the governing entity – remains stubbornly elusive.
Simultaneously, Israel is only in the early stages of its ground offensive in Lebanon. The resistance the IDF encounters there will ultimately determine the duration and cost of this next phase of the conflict.
Israel’s decision to launch this offensive was not taken lightly, and it rests on three primary considerations. First and foremost, there is the pressing need to clear out Hezbollah forces and infrastructure near the Israeli border, securing a buffer zone several kilometers deep. This action is essential to ensure the safety of the Israeli communities that border Lebanon, enabling residents to return home with a sense of security.
Secondly, despite some claims to the contrary, not everything can be neutralized from the air. Hezbollah likely has hidden tunnels, weapons caches, and command centers that remain undetected. Only boots on the ground can uncover and eliminate these threats.
Lastly and symbolically, it is imperative that Hezbollah and its Iranian backers understand that Israel is not deterred by the prospect of a ground offensive. Prior to October 7, Hamas assumed Israel was reluctant to deploy ground troops in Gaza, and it miscalculated. Israel must now show Hezbollah that the IDF is willing and capable of changing the rules of engagement.
For the past 18 years, since the conclusion of the Second Lebanon War, Hezbollah operated under the assumption that Israel would avoid a ground invasion. Breaking that assumption now is vital – not just for deterrence but also to signal to Iran and the broader region that the status quo is no longer acceptable.
This is the change that we are seeing now in Lebanon. This is the Israel that is prepared, is focused, and is clear in its objectives.
The challenge that lies ahead for Israel, in the coming year and beyond, will be to develop a unified policy for managing the threats along its borders. The lesson from October 7 is clear: Containment strategies fail. The threats that fester along Israel’s borders do not stay quiet – they grow, and they must be addressed head-on.
As we enter the new year, the question is clear: Can the leadership that failed Israel last year lead it to the victory and security it so desperately needs now? Can the current leadership just brush off the failed policies of 20 years and pretend to have fixed everything because of a few decisions that now seem to be the right ones?
Rosh Hashanah is a time for introspection and renewal. It is not just a personal journey but a national imperative. Israel cannot afford to let the failures of the past linger under the same leadership that allowed them. The complacency that led to October 7 must give way to bold and decisive action. Israel needs leaders who will not only win battles but will also redefine what it means to defend this nation.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) and a former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post.