One of the questions that turned out to be the most consequential in the debate between Vice President Kamala Harris and former president Donald Trump last month revolved around the policy of the United States in Ukraine.
In this context, Trump was asked whether he thought it was “in the US’s best interests for Ukraine to win this war” and replied that it was “in the US’s best interest to get this war finished. Negotiate a deal […] you have millions of people dead, and it could lead to World War III.” Exactly one week later, a pro-Ukrainian American activist attempted to assassinate him.
It is not unreasonable to propose that Trump’s remarks in the debate were interpreted as a betrayal and may have directly triggered the assassination attempt. Despite the catastrophic consequences of the war in Ukraine, the significant toll on human life, and the potential dangers of its escalation, the call for its conclusion is viewed by many as a concession on Ukraine’s democratic principles and sovereignty, as well as a surrender in the fight to defend the values of the free world.
It is widely recognized that Trump’s position on the conflict contrasts sharply with that of President Joe Biden, who asserts that Ukraine must be supported “to win this war and preserve its freedom,” as stated in his speech at the United Nations General Assembly.
There is seemingly a distinct contradiction between idealism (win the war) and pragmatism (end the war); between the victory and defeat of an aggressor who invaded a peaceful neighboring country and a diplomatic compromise that may require a concession of certain principles – yet would end the violence and devastation, the ongoing suffering of those displaced, and the jeopardy of the war spreading to other regions.
This is precisely what the US administration has been striving to accomplish through significant effort over the past year in addressing the war between Israel and the terrorist entities Hamas and Hezbollah and more recently the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The other ally
A comparison with the Biden administration’s approach to its other ally caught in a brutal war may reveal ideological inconsistencies.
In relation to the war in the Middle East, the concept of Israel’s victory does not feature as a declared objective of US foreign policy, with the term notably missing from the administration’s public statements – possibly due to its overuse by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
In this context, it is interesting to reflect on a possible answer to a parallel question that the vice president was not asked during the debate: “Is it in the US’s best interests for Israel to win the war?”
If Harris had been asked this question, she would likely have responded that American interests dictate that “this war must end and it must end immediately,” advocating for a ceasefire agreement, a stance she has previously expressed, echoed by Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Biden.
An analysis of the current administration’s stance on the two active conflicts, despite the numerous distinctions and unique circumstances surrounding each, may yield valuable insights. It could potentially uncover ineffective strategies in both situations concerning the objectives of achieving victory, concluding the wars, reducing human suffering, and pursuing diplomatic resolutions.
This situation is evident, particularly concerning the military strategies of the two leaders.
Netanyahu is justifiably criticized for “yielding to his religious extremist allies” and persisting in combat without a clear strategy for the “day after,” aside from the notion of “total victory.” However, it is essential to pause and ask what President Volodymyr Zelensky’s plan is for the “day after” in Ukraine. Furthermore, is the “victory plan” that Zelensky has proposed to Biden – defeating a nuclear superpower – more realistic, calculated, or prudent than Israel’s plan, which seeks to neutralize a local terrorist organization and deter its regional allies? One might question this.
Moreover, how should one interpret the perspective that posits that the sole barrier between a full-scale war and a new, peaceful Middle East is Israel’s unwillingness to conclude the war? Is this comparable to the staunch resistance to ending the war in Ukraine?
Many assert that should Israel agree to a deal with Hamas, assuming that this would immediately clear the path for the release of all hostages, enable the Palestinian Authority (PA) to assume governance over Gaza, allow Gulf forces to secure the Rafah crossing, suppress Hezbollah, foster normalization with Saudi Arabia, establish a Palestinian state coexisting peacefully with Israel, and lead to a nuclear accord with Iran.
However, upon examining the present circumstances, and despite the optimism surrounding the transformation of a crisis into an opportunity, it is difficult to overlook the notion that those who subscribe to this belief may also possess a tendency towards delusional extremism.
Considering the lack of success that the Biden administration has experienced in achieving its objectives during both conflicts, neither securing a victory for Ukraine nor negotiating a ceasefire for Israel (or preventing a multi-front war ), it may be an opportune moment to reconsider and possibly reassess the somewhat idealistic strategy that seeks a victory over Russia, a nation with an arsenal exceeding 5,000 nuclear missiles, as well as a reformed peaceful Middle East. A more pragmatic policy could focus on achieving more modest goals, such as alleviating human suffering.
This would involve endorsing a compromise based on lessons learned, admitting that the prospect of victory in Ukraine may be less attainable at this stage, and supporting a victory in Israel where it could lead to a rapid resolution of the war.
The writer is a political adviser and a member of the researchers forum of the Elyashar Center at the Ben-Zvi Institute in Jerusalem.