A year has elapsed since Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel, which ignited a war not only against the terrorist organization but also against the entire so-called Axis of Resistance led by the Islamic Republic of Iran.
This axis includes Hezbollah, Shi’a militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, and, to a certain extent, Syria.
The anniversary serves as a reminder, first and foremost, of the political, military, and intelligence failures that demand investigation by a state commission of inquiry.
It also offers an opportunity for reflection on the consequences and significance of what we have been through in the past year.
October 7 has caused a national trauma, marking yet another disaster in the long chain of tragedies experienced by the Jewish people.
Addressing this trauma is one of the most pressing tasks confronting Israeli society and its leadership.
It has led to a loss of trust among many Israelis in the government; and while the war has diverted attention from the government’s judicial revolution, those plans do not appear to have been shelved.
The brutality of Hamas’s terrorist acts has also led to a process of dehumanization and delegitimization of Palestinians within Israeli society. While this may be a natural reaction to the events of October 7, it is likely to raise serious obstacles to renewing dialogue after the guns fall silent. Surveys indicate that a similar process has occurred among Palestinians toward Jews.
From a regional perspective, Israel has succeeded in rebuilding its deterrence, although only time will reveal the extent of this recovery.
The importance of Israel’s military and intelligence achievements lies not only in the outcomes but also in the way they are achieved – through ingenious military, technological, and intelligence-based subterfuges.
A heavy cost for deterrence
The restoration of Israel’s deterrence has come at a heavy cost to Gaza’s civilian population. While it is hard to determine the exact number of casualties, estimates suggest a staggering toll, with figures around 40,000 deaths [of which Hamas recently admitted internally that 80% were combatants or their family members].
The primary challenge regarding deterrence lies in the nature of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, which are ideologically driven and therefore conventional deterrence is less effective against them.
Regionally, the Axis of Resistance has faced significant setbacks. Iran’s proxy doctrine has faltered, partly due to the lack of coordinated action, especially on October 7.
While Hamas’s attack marked a notable success for the organization, it ultimately led to the destruction of its forces and capabilities, signaling the end of its rule in Gaza.
Hezbollah, for its part, was able to initially claim a significant achievement, having launched thousands of missiles and rockets at northern Israel for an entire year, resulting in substantial economic damage and the evacuation of tens of thousands of Israelis.
However, this came at a high cost, including the elimination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and a chain of top commanders, alongside a severe blow to its operational capabilities.
Israel’s current operation in southern Lebanon is likely to inflict further damage on Hezbollah’s military capabilities, potentially forcing it to withdraw beyond the Litani River [as stated in the United Nations Resolution 1701].
While it is still too early to predict the war’s impact on Hezbollah’s domestic position in Lebanon, it is evident that the devastating consequences will lead to significant repercussions.
Tehran’s April 14 direct attack on Israel was a failure, with most of the missiles and drones launched intercepted by Israeli forces (or their allies) or landing in unpopulated areas.
The second Islamic Republic attack, on October 1, executed in retaliation for Nasrallah’s assassination, was larger and relatively more successful, but also resulted in no Israeli casualties, causing minor damage to property. This highlighted Israel’s significant technological advantage.
THE COALITION of moderate Middle Eastern states has remained stable. While Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel and Arab public opinion generally supports the Palestinian cause, the leaders of Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia have maintained their relations with Israel – some covertly, others openly.
Certain countries even played an active role in countering the Iranian missile attack on Israel, as part of the cooperation in air defense systems that developed following the Abraham Accords and Israel’s integration into the US Central Command.
In its conflict with Iran and Hezbollah, Israel finds more allies in the Arab world due to the fierce rivalry rooted in the Sunni-Shi’a religious divide.
All the Sunni states perceive Shi’ite Iran and Hezbollah as a significant threat to their interests and therefore support Israel.
Conversely, Israel’s war with Hamas – a Sunni Palestinian organization – brings the issue of Palestinian independence to the forefront, which is widely supported by the Arab public. To maintain their fragile legitimacy, the Arab leaders publicly express pro-Palestinian rhetoric.
The United States remains the sole global power actively engaged in the region, though its involvement has so far been limited to defensive assistance, supplying weapons to Israel, and mediating between conflicting parties.
Additionally, the US has conducted limited operations against the Houthis in the Red Sea, constrained by a desire to avoid a regional war, especially given domestic pressures related to the upcoming presidential elections. Furthermore, recent failures in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria have diminished US enthusiasm for ground interventions.
Meanwhile, Russia’s focus has shifted to its war with Ukraine, though it continues to maintain its stronghold in Syria. China’s involvement in diplomatic efforts has been minimal.
As a result, Middle Eastern states have largely been left to their own devices, a situation that has inadvertently bolstered Israel’s standing and role in the area.
One year later
A year after October 7, the Palestinian issue has once again taken center stage. The Abraham Accords and the normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia may have pushed it to the sidelines, as Netanyahu intended, but Hamas’s attack redirected attention toward the urgent need for a solution.
The moderate states in the region advocate for a two-state solution and have even formed a coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, to promote it. Just as October 7 provided an opportunity to confront Hamas and Hezbollah – two significant threats to Israel’s borders that previous governments had neglected – it also created a renewed opportunity to settle the Palestinian issue.
Seemingly, the prospects for a solution have improved, as there is growing international acceptance of the idea that, given the presence of approximately seven million Jews and seven million Palestinians between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, separation is the only viable option.
On the other hand, neither side of the conflict currently has capable leadership willing to pursue this direction. In addition, various polls indicate that the war has fueled increased extremism among both the Jewish and Palestinian populations.
However, a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, signed within a broader regional settlement, may serve as the most promising path toward resolving the Palestinian issue.
The political, military, and intelligence failures of October 7 are now compounded, a year later, by a moral failure – the failure to secure the release of the hostages.
While it remains uncertain whether Yahya Sinwar would have ultimately agreed to a deal, the real failure lies in the Netanyahu government’s apparent lack of effort to exhaust every possible means for reaching a deal.
There is currently no end in sight to the war across its various fronts. Its continuation will have significant costs for Israel, both diplomatically – with increasing international and regional isolation – and economically, resulting in a substantial budget deficit, further downgrades of Israel’s credit rating, a decline in foreign investment, and more.
Given that Israel does not desire war with Iran and cannot eradicate Hezbollah, it should focus on militarily achievable goals leading to a political settlement in Lebanon and Gaza.
The notion of “victory” is elusive, as all parties involved will likely frame the conflict as a success for themselves. Significant objectives could include inflicting substantial damage on Iran, pushing Hezbollah away from Israel’s northern border, dismantling its military capabilities, restoring a reformed Palestinian Authority (PA) in demilitarized Gaza, and securing the return of hostages. Achieving these goals would provide justifiable grounds for concluding the war.
The writer teaches in the Department of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and is a board member of Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies.