Israel’s current crisis highlights the traditional failings of the country’s longstanding approach to public affairs (popularly known as hasbara). And it is happening in the worst time in our modern history.
What’s wrong with hasbara? First, a personal story:
More than 20 years ago, in Paramus, New Jersey, I had a moment of professional epiphany that dramatically changed my career. I was standing behind a glass window, observing one of several focus groups that were designed to identify the underlying attitudes towards Israel in a post-9/11 US.
The sessions were designed by Dr. Boaz Mourad, a student of the late Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman at Princeton University. Mourad was part of a group I convened a couple of years earlier, the Brand Israel Group, that consisted of top media, marketing, and branding executives. They volunteered to help shape Israel’s brand strategy.
At the time, I was serving as Israel’s consul for media and public affairs in New York (2001-2005). This early effort, meant to identify the fundamental failures of Israel’s public affairs, targeted non-Jews who had at least one university degree and an above-average income. None of the participants was aware of the real purpose of the discussion. They were told they were invited to discuss “America and the world post-9/11,” and that the findings would serve a travel-related project.
At the start of sessions, the instructor asked participants to share a “top of mind” country, meaning the first name of any country that comes to mind. She then collected the names, ensuring Israel was mentioned (that was the point.) She then asked the group to play the “house party” exercise. Participants were told they had been invited to visit imaginary homes representing each of the countries from the list they had just created. They were encouraged to share images, emotions, sensations, experiences, and so on in describing these homes. The response to Italy’s house party, for example, was overwhelmingly positive. Participants reported a friendly and welcoming environment. They were having a lot of fun – drinking vino, eating pasta, playing cards – and when it was time to move on to the next party, they reported sadness.
The house party research model was designed to allow people to speak freely and share associations. We were less interested in “what people think” (about governmental policies), but rather “how people feel.” We wanted to know what place these countries occupy in the participants’ emotional landscape and psyche. The rationale: in decision-making, as psychologists Amos Tversky and Kahneman proved, emotions and feelings play a much greater role than rational thinking.
Deploying this exercise throughout North America, the Brand Israel Group was able to collect valuable information about tens of countries, so we could compare.
Israel stood out dramatically.
First, the body language. Israel’s house was usually the fourth or fifth house on the list. When the instructor announced: “And now to Israel’s house,” we could detect an immediate change. Participants froze. The room became silent. Respondents retreated to their seats and were hesitant to participate in the discussion. The cheerfulness and laughter that were part of the conversations about India, Japan, Italy, or Mexico were replaced with severe looks and seriousness. As if they were saying “Israel is a serious matter.” No fun in Israel.
As we discovered later, in studies conducted by BAV (BrandAsset Valuator – thanks to the help of advertising executive David Sable), this reflects a wider phenomenon. Throughout the Western world, people feel they have all the information they need about Israel. Of course, their knowledge is based on news coverage, which is usually about the Middle East conflict. As a result, people in the West think they know Israel, while the opposite is the case. As the late Ed Lebar, CEO of BAV, put it: “Israel is better known than liked.” Not a good place to be in as a country brand.
Second, Israel’s house was the only house where participants were unable to provide any descriptions of the interior. The imagery provided referred only to the exterior. Participants used words such as “cement,” “concrete,” “mud,” “dust,” or “barbed wire.” Israel’s house was lifeless. Moreover, participants were unable to describe Israel in color. No red, green, yellow, or blue.
Third, there are no women in Israel. Participants were unable to provide even one single description of an Israeli woman. Nor were they able to describe children. Only men. The men are armed, sitting outside the house, and not interested in letting you in.
In short, Israel’s house was unwelcoming and unfriendly as can be. Israel equals conflict (and some orthodoxy too). Participants were describing a military bunker, not a house with normal people. Israel’s house was extremely unattractive, bleak, and unfriendly. This was depressing for an Israeli official to witness.
Mourad tried to console me. I shouldn’t be surprised, he said. Participants were describing what they had seen on TV for decades. Across all demographics, Israel is primarily linked to conflict and military.
In other words, the result of Israel’s longstanding focus on its geopolitical hardships is that people see Israel primarily through one very narrow prism: the conflict. From a reputational perspective, it’s a disaster and a disservice to the country: Israel is associated with war, bloodshed, strife, tension, and fighting. In the minds of Americans post-9/11 – Israel equals conflict. The events of October 7 are having the same impact on Israel’s reputation.
BUT HERE comes the twist. After asking about Israel’s house, the instructor asked the group a question to satisfy her curiosity (remember, participants still do not know the real agenda): “In the conflict between Israel and its neighbors who do you support?”
I was stunned to learn that the very same people who just described my country as the most unattractive and bleakest place on Earth tend to support Israel at a ratio of eight to one. Similar levels of political support (65%-80%) were later verified through a series of quantitative studies, including as recently as March, April, and May of 2024. The level of political support for Israel is still very high in the US. According to some surveys, over 80% of Americans put the blame squarely on Hamas, despite what is being communicated to the Israeli public and Jewish communities.
I was trying to understand this peculiar phenomenon: Participants claimed that they support Israeli policies but, obviously, based on their description of Israel, they will never spend their hard-earned dollars on buying a travel package to Israel or invest their savings in an Israeli company traded on NASDAQ, or seek-out an Israeli movie or music production.
And then it dawned on me. Levels of political support cannot accurately predict consumer behavior. People have no problem embodying this disconnect between the rational and the emotional. They can support Israel but dislike its “persona.” And vice versa, people can disagree with Israeli policies, but be tremendously attracted to what it represents and has to offer. Hasbara never considered these options.
So, the answer to the question, “What’s wrong with hasbara?” begins with its failure to address this counter-intuitive insight. If the only measurement is always the level of political support, then all is well. Most Americans, certainly post-9/11, express fear and concern about radical Islam. Israel is viewed as an ally, at the forefront of an inter-civilizational struggle.
But when one examines how these people feel about Israel, the picture is dramatically different. Americans may support Israeli policies but report no attraction. Their knowledge centers around the political entity called Israel, not around the Israeli people, their spirit, aspirations, and contributions. Israel desperately needs a human face.
This revelation profoundly impacted my understanding of diplomacy. I was not alone. These focus groups had a great impact on many Israeli civil servants and Jewish organizations and served as a cornerstone of Israel’s eventual overall strategy: to engage in a proactive effort to broaden the scope through which Israel is perceived and celebrate the creative spirit of its people. Creativity inspires.
How did hasbara contribute to this monumental failure to address the uninterested and uninformed?
First, historically, hasbara was designed to address the conflict and the myriad crises it created. Focusing solely on political issues, is also reinforces the “twinning” between Israel and the Palestinians/Arabs.
Twinning is a marketing and international relations phenomenon wherein two brands fight for the same turf, thus appearing to be tightly linked. Famous twinnings in consumer goods induce Coca-Cola vs Pepsi or iPhone vs Samsung. But twinning can also exist in geopolitics, such as India vs Pakistan, Turkey vs Greece, and, of course, Israel vs Palestine. So, the first failure of hasbara was prioritizing policy over human-interest stories. No wonder hasbara is widely viewed as Israel’s official propaganda and is binary by nature: media consumers are being labeled as “pro” or “anti.” You can either be with us or against us.
Second, hasbara is cold and clinical, exactly the opposite of what countries deploy to create attraction. Joseph Nye coined the term “soft power” to describe what nations should do to generate attraction. Israel’s hasbara is all about facts, heavily relying on historical, rational, and legal arguments. The assumption is that “if only people knew the facts,” it would be enough to convert their opinions. Hasbara ignores the emotional aspect of marketing, focusing solely on those who disagree with Israel’s policies and failing to provide adequate reasons for the silent majority to connect.
Third, hasbara is a crisis management mechanism. But what Israel needs is a long-term strategic effort to boost its brand stature globally by massively celebrating the creative spirit of its people. The rationale: while it’s important for Israel to be “right,” it is more important for Israel to be attractive. Attractive places have an easier time. A robust reputation shortens recovery time from a crisis. Reputation is part of Israel’s national security, and it requires a strategic outlook. The hasbara approach is short-term by definition; that which is urgent will always override that which is important. If you may, hasbara is a form of litigation on a national scale, rather than an attempt at attractive storytelling.
Fourth, because the hasbara approach is based on facts, historical detail, and legal arguments – all of which are largely irrelevant to most of the people we would like to engage – we find ourselves preaching to our own choir. Aided by an algorithm that provides media participants with content they are pre-dispositioned to consume, we are busy feeding our echo chamber with very little impact. Hasbara is predominantly for self-consumption.
Fifth, hasbara is based on the deployment of our messengers (oddly, mostly men in uniform). Very little attention is given to the need to have “third-party endorsements.” Israel should invest in cultivating brand ambassadors who are not part of the government-led, official apparatus. Army and government officials are effective only with the Israeli audience and its existing allies. Third-party endorsers, such as Nick Cave, Clarence B. Jones, and Ritchie Torres, speak to the uninformed and uninterested. They are so effective exactly because they are outsiders.
And lastly, Israel’s hasbara ignores the built-in disadvantage of Israel’s positioning in the conflict. In June 1982, Israel launched the Lebanon War, unknowingly reversing its positioning in the region from David to Goliath. Israel failed to address this change. We keep on transmitting conflicting messages. Israel’s third prime minister, Levi Eshkol, amusingly described Israel’s messaging as “Samson the nebbish,” meaning a victorious entity that sees itself as an eternal victim. It’s a self-centered and ethnocentric view of the world. My good friend David Sable frequently talks about the confusion these two conflicting narratives create among well-meaning people. Is Israel a victor or a victim? Can Israel be both? Is Israel indeed a fragile and defenseless victim? This was surely the case in 1948 when Israel was fighting against all odds with an empty arsenal. But this is not 1948. Israel of 2024 is a regional power.
How to fix Israeli hasbara
WHAT NEEDS to be done?
The solutions are well known. On a conceptual level, the collective task of those who care about Israel is to diligently broaden the scope through which Israel is being perceived. This is needed today more than ever. Since October 7, we have witnessed daily the meaning of “Israel=conflict” in media coverage. For The New York Times, for example, Israel doesn’t exist outside the context of the conflict. Our inability to break the twinning effect could have dire implications for the future of Israel’s economy.
Rock band Radiohead experienced Israel firsthand, even before they became famous. This intimate experience connected them to their Israeli audience on an emotional level. They know Israelis and, as a result, “get” Israel with all its complexity, uniqueness, diversity, and pluralism. They are attracted to the people of Israel, but not necessarily to their government’s policies. Celebrated filmmaker Quentin Tarantino, who spent significant time in Israel, speaks about his personal daily experiences as a father, adding to the perception of Israel as a normal place. Israel may be in an abnormal and tough situation, in an abnormal neighborhood – but it is filled with real people and stories.
How would a broader lens help Israel today? Media consumers would have a better ability to relate to Israelis and their values and motives. Currently, Israel’s actions are perceived solely through military goals: Israel is fighting the neighbors who attack it. With a wider lens, people could also relate to the human motives behind it: Israel is scared, they feel they are fighting for their survival, Israelis are like us and we, too, would not put up with it, and so on.
A deeper understanding of the people and their motivations could provide more resilience to public support for Israel. The support that Israel received on October 7 continues to be strained by pictures of Palestinian suffering that are swamping the news. The perception of Israel as a military monster would be moderated with a better understanding of Israeli society and values.
A real-life example: The US relationship with Ukraine has no depth and hence Republicans are willing to dump support for Ukraine to save some money. If they cared more about Ukraine and its people, they may not simplistically see them as a country somewhere on a map whose geographic lines can be moved. Israel should learn from the Ukraine experience.
In 2004, the publisher and editor of Talkers Magazine, Michael Harrison, visited Israel. Tourism was in bad shape. He concluded his article about the visit with the following statement: “If only given a chance – Israel could sell itself.” The story of Israel has always been its incredible people and their creative spirit. Let’s let them tell our collective story.
The writer is a Global Distinguished Professor of Business at Touro University and a lecturer at the Coller School of Management at Tel Aviv University. He served as Israel’s consul-general in New York from 2010-2016.