With Iran traditionally seen as the principal patron of Hezbollah and Hamas, can Israeli successes against terror point to Russia’s influence running deeper than previously assumed?
Israel’s intelligence capabilities are renowned, often credited with infiltrating and monitoring hostile entities with remarkable efficacy. This prowess is evident in its operations against Iran and Hezbollah. The precision strikes on Iranian targets, including factories, oil fields, and notably, S-300 air defense systems are all indicative of a deep penetration of Israeli intelligence into Iran’s defense infrastructure. Targeting mobile air defense installations necessitates real-time intelligence, suggesting either highly advanced surveillance technology or, more plausibly, inside information from sources within Iran.
Similarly, Israel’s operations in Lebanon against Hezbollah have showcased extraordinary intelligence capabilities. The explosion of communication devices implies not just technological intervention but also human intelligence – individuals within, persuading Hezbollah members to use compromised equipment. The targeted assassinations of key Hezbollah figures, including Hassan Nasrallah and his successor, further underscore Israel’s deep infiltration into the organization. Such precision is unlikely without significant internal cooperation, whether through double agents or informants.
Other operations, such as the targeted killing of Hamas operatives Ahmed Fawzi Nasser, Muhammad Wadiyya, and Mohammad Abu Itiwi, illustrate Israeli efforts to dismantle lower-ranking figures linked to the October 7 attack. Meanwhile, operations against high-ranking Hezbollah members in Lebanon, such as Fatah Sharif, Saleh al-Arouri, and a list of others, demonstrate a pattern of consistent eliminations among Hezbollah ranks, further underscoring a robust intelligence network in Lebanon.
In stark contrast, Israel’s intelligence operations against Hamas appear less effective. The elimination of Ismail Haniyeh occurred under unique circumstances – he was in Iran, ostensibly under the protection of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which, ironically, may have contributed to his vulnerability. The killing of Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader, seems to have been more fortuitous than strategic. Reports suggest that his death was a chance encounter during an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) mission, with his identity confirmed only through subsequent DNA testing.
Exceptions within Gaza, such as the killings of Marwan Issa and Mohammed Deif, suggest that while some intelligence exists, it lacks the same reach Israel seems to hold over Hezbollah and Iran. This disparity raises a critical question: Does Israel, with its celebrated intelligence apparatus, struggle to penetrate Hamas as effectively as it does Hezbollah and Iranian networks?
The answer may lie in the evolving relationship between Hamas and Russia.
Hamas-Russia cooperation
SINCE 2022, Hamas officials have undertaken several high-profile visits to Moscow, engaging in discussions with Russian officials. These meetings continued into 2023. Following the October 7 attack, Russia tried to position itself as a mediator. Russia’s engagement with Hamas could provide the group with enhanced intelligence capabilities and counterintelligence training, making it more challenging for Israeli intelligence to infiltrate or monitor the organization effectively.
Russia’s influence in the Middle East extends well beyond diplomatic channels and into a consistent, visible military presence in Syria. This is not a mere foothold; it is a deep-seated alliance that Moscow has nurtured with Damascus since the Syrian Civil War began.
Russian airbases, naval facilities, and an array of sophisticated defense systems entrenched across Syria exemplify its commitment to the region, establishing Moscow as a formidable stakeholder. This presence enables Russia to project power across the eastern Mediterranean and directly influence regional affairs, further solidifying its high-stakes role in Middle Eastern geopolitics. The country’s entrenched foothold serves not only as a deterrent but as an operational vantage point for extending its strategic aims in regional and global theaters alike.
Before the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack, significant moves were made towards normalizing Israel-Saudi Arabia relations, including a proposed pipeline connecting Saudi oil to the Mediterranean via Israel, bypassing chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal. This would reduce Europe’s reliance on Russian energy. However, the violence disrupted negotiations, and Saudi Arabia paused normalization efforts.
This development inadvertently benefits Russia, which stands to gain from any hindrance to Europe’s diversification away from Russian energy exports. Europe’s heavy dependence on Russian energy exports persists despite efforts to reduce this reliance. By maintaining this dependency, Russia retains significant leverage over European nations, both economically and politically.
THE EUROPEAN Union (EU) has been actively seeking alternatives to Russian gas, notably increasing imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar. However, Qatar’s position in regional politics adds complexity. Qatar has been accused of maintaining links with Hamas, providing financial and political support, and hosting its leaders. If Qatar is indeed collaborating with Hamas, and by extension with Russia, Europe may find itself in a precarious position of potentially funding actors undermining its strategic interests.
Qatar’s role is significant. As a major LNG supplier to Europe, Qatar is essential to the EU’s strategy to reduce dependence on Russian gas. The potential collusion between Qatar, Hamas, and Russia suggests a coordinated effort to influence regional dynamics and global energy markets. This raises serious questions for Europe about the sources of its energy imports and the broader implications for its foreign policy and security objectives.
Given these dynamics, it’s plausible to consider that Russia may have a closer relationship with Hamas than Iran does.
If Hamas is receiving support, intelligence, or resources from Russia, and potentially from Qatar, this could explain Israel’s difficulty in infiltrating the organization. This scenario might also elucidate the discrepancy between Israel’s successes against Iranian and Hezbollah targets versus its challenges with Hamas. The robust intelligence networks Israel has established in Iran and Lebanon may not be as effective against an organization bolstered by Russian support.
The potential collaboration between Russia, Qatar, and Hamas has significant implications for regional security and international diplomacy. It suggests that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is being influenced by global powers seeking to advance their own strategic interests, often at the expense of regional stability.
In Gaza, Israel is engaged in a tactical campaign with a challenging strategic aim: the total elimination of Hamas. This objective, pursued through military operations, has created a vacuum of sorts, and one that outside actors may seek to fill to shape the regional agenda. Chief among these actors is Qatar, who, as the de facto local CEO of this vacuum, leverages its influence to consolidate relationships with groups like Hamas. This dynamic not only complicates Israel’s security objectives but also invites new alliances and interventions that further entrench the region’s volatility.
THE INTERNATIONAL community must see the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as part of a larger geopolitical game involving major powers. While financial links and terror logistics have been damaged by Israelis trikes, with the support of Russia and Qatar it would not be short of funds for long. If Hamas receives significant external support, policies and perceptions need reassessment. Israel must understand the extent of Hamas’s backing to formulate effective countermeasures, and recognizing potential involvement from global powers is essential for crafting comprehensive diplomatic solutions.
The intertwining of energy politics with regional conflicts underscores the complexity of the situation. For Europe, the situation presents a complex challenge. The EU’s efforts to reduce energy dependence on Russia by turning to suppliers like Qatar may inadvertently entangle it in the very conflicts and geopolitical games it seeks to avoid. Europe’s energy policies must therefore be carefully calibrated to consider not just economic factors but also the geopolitical ramifications of its choices.
If Russia’s influence within Hamas is indeed more substantial than widely recognized, this necessitates a reassessment of existing policies and perceptions. For Israel, understanding the depth and nature of Hamas’s external support is crucial for formulating effective countermeasures.
For the international community, acknowledging Russia’s potential involvement is essential for crafting comprehensive diplomatic solutions.
Catherine Perez-Shakdam contributed to this article.
Dr Stepan Stepanenko is a co-founder and director of research at the Forum for Foreign Relations, former British Conservative Party activist, ex-Belarusian opposition member, Kyiv Post correspondent, and media commentator on defense, Ukraine, and national security.
Maj. Gen. (retired) John Holmes DSO OBE MC is a retired SAS officer, former special forces liaison in Washington; was awarded for service in Northern Ireland and Iraq; and advises UK companies on counter-terrorism and security.
Catherine Perez-Shakdam is a co-founder and executive director of the Forum for Foreign Relations, an ex-UN Security Council consultant, a Middle East policy expert, and an investigative journalist renowned for exposing corruption within the Iranian regime.