Since the October 7 massacre by Hamas, Israeli threat perception has fundamentally shifted, impacting how it views national security. Israel is now reverting to a pre-1967 stance where borders require active defense and the capabilities of its neighbors are paramount, regardless of intent.
With IDF forces operating in southern Lebanon and recent Israeli airstrikes targeting Iran, Syria, and Iraq, Israel has entered a new phase of conflict, triggered by the unprecedented ballistic missile attack on October 1. As Churchill remarked after the Battle of El-Alamein in World War II: “It is not the end, it is not the beginning of the end, but it is the end of the beginning.”
Now, as Israel enters the second year of this war, it is critical for Israeli policymakers and strategists to recognize emerging threats that may not be immediately obvious. Often, it’s the unexpected “knife in the back” that proves most deadly. Looking at the broader picture, it is the eastern Mediterranean – Israel’s own backyard – that may hold the gravest threats on the horizon.
In fighting for its very survival, Israel is awakening to the reality that while it may have many friends, some make for unreliable partners. After Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu resisted international pressure and entered Rafah – where tunnels from Gaza into Egypt revealed one of the largest smuggling conduits in the world – the “cold peace” with Egypt appears far more tenuous than Israel imagined.
By providing vital supply routes that Hamas used to strengthen its terror infrastructure, Egypt exposed itself as a compromised ally, leaving a supposed ally vulnerable to genocidal jihadi attacks.
Turkey becoming an overtly hostile state
To Israel’s north, Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s leadership for over two decades, has shifted from being a strategic ally to an overtly hostile state. Despite brief diplomatic warming in 2022 and early 2023, Erdogan has since defended Hamas and continues to provide a safe harbor for its leadership.
In September, Erdogan intensified his rhetoric by calling for an alliance of Islamic nations to counter Israel, accusing it of “expansionist threats” and “state terrorism.” Recently, Turkey submitted a UN letter with backing from 52 states, supporting an arms embargo on Israel.
Israel cannot ignore Erdogan’s hostility, his diplomatic maneuvers aimed at weakening Israel, or Turkey’s significant military advancements. This is especially true given the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, which claims Turkish rights over large areas of the eastern Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Sea. Israeli leaders need to develop an effective strategy to deter future Turkish provocations.
The complexity deepens with Erdogan’s potential interest in aligning with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi against Israel. Both leaders have mended ties through high-level talks since 2021, and this diplomatic rapprochement necessitates an Israeli strategy focused on maintaining a balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean to prevent a unified front. Israel cannot ignore that these two neighboring states boast the largest naval fleets in the Mediterranean, posing a tangible threat in the post-October 7 landscape.
HISTORICALLY, BRITAIN – an island reliant on vulnerable sea lanes and a high degree of trade – faced similar strategic challenges as Israel. From the 18th century to World War I, Britain crafted a balance-of-power strategy to prevent any two dominant military forces on the European continent from aligning. For Israel, a similarly nuanced policy may be essential to address the shifting dynamics in the eastern Mediterranean.
If Israel were to adopt a balance of power strategy to counter a potential Egypt-Turkey alliance, it could draw on similar principles to Britain’s approach, adapting them to the modern Middle East’s unique context. There are a number of fronts that Israel can simultaneously engage to implement such a strategy.
A balanced force strategy in the Mediterranean begins at home. Like Britain, Israel must strengthen its naval power. True deterrence requires not just advanced technology but the capacity to project power consistently, especially given Israel’s small nation status. As Stalin aptly remarked, “Quantity has a quality all its own.”
Israel should prioritize three key areas to expanding a sea denial capability: developing USV (unmanned surface vessels) and UUV (unmanned underwater vehicles) armada, significantly expanding its submarine fleet, and investing heavy in advanced and mobile mine warfare.
The second layer of this strategy would involve reinforcing alliances with other regional players in the eastern Mediterranean to balance security dynamics and deter Turkish-Egyptian adventurism. Israel’s alliance with Cyprus and Greece, strengthened over the past decade, should translate into even greater military cooperation.
For example, while Israel supports Greece’s air force modernization, it could seek to secure leasing rights for naval bases on Greek islands. Additionally, Israel could support and train the Cypriot armed forces to better resist Turkish intimidation and secure agreements to allow Israeli naval resupply.
Thirdly, Israel should leverage soft power to shape alliances and counterbalance a potential Turkish-Egyptian axis. Providing limited support to the Libyan National Army (LNA) could be strategic. Egypt backs the LNA, while Turkey supports its rivals. By aiding the LNA, Israel could gain influence over a pivotal issue between Egypt and Turkey. If Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s LNA were to gain power, Israel would benefit from a friendly government within the eastern Mediterranean sphere.
An important component of any Israeli balance-of-power strategy must involve soft power. Turkey’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood poses a significant threat to al-Sisi, who deposed the Brotherhood-led government of Mohamed Morsi to secure power in Cairo. By highlighting Turkey’s historical and continuing support of Islamist factions, Israel can emphasize the ideological rifts that could complicate any deepening Egyptian-Turkish relations.
It is crucial for Israeli diplomats to underscore Turkey’s growing aggression in the eastern Mediterranean, particularly over maritime boundaries and resources. Israel should also focus on expanding the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and building on Egypt-Israel gas partnerships. Such collaborations, which enable both countries to supply Europe with natural gas, could serve as a strong counterweight to Turkish influence.
LASTLY, GIVEN the antisemitic rhetoric of Erdogan’s government and his alignment with the Iranian axis, it is high time for Israel to formally recognize the Armenian genocide. Beyond being a moral obligation, this move would be a pointed response to Erdogan’s accusations against Israel and could serve to highlight his own regime’s contradictions and historical denials.
Such a recognition would reinforce Israel’s commitment to human rights and remind Ankara that those in glass houses should not be lobbing blood libels.
As Israel faces ongoing threats from Iran and restructures its defense posture post-October 7, it must not overlook the growing risks in the eastern Mediterranean. Israel’s approach to countering an Egyptian-Turkish rapprochement should include a fortified navy, strengthened alliances with regional partners, and diplomatic measures to highlight Turkey’s destabilizing influence.
This multi-pronged strategy, centered on cooperative deterrence rather than direct confrontation, could help stabilize the region and prevent a unified front against Israel in its own backyard.
The writer is a co-founder of the Jewish National Initiative and a hi-tech executive.