Many historical examples demonstrate that terror groups with specific ideological foundations undergo life cycles, often marked by critical turning points or crises. Examples include the disintegration of al-Qaeda and Daesh, which fractured into decentralized networks across multiple regions without unified command structures, though they retain their original names for various purposes.
A shared factor in the fragmentation of such groups is exposure to severe military setbacks or the loss of key leaders. This raises questions about the potential disintegration of the Hamas terror group following the ongoing war in Gaza.
Speculation about Hamas’s collapse intensified with the absence of unified leadership after the death of Yahya Sinwar and the movement’s reliance on a joint leadership council.
The war’s end is likely to trigger extensive reevaluation, as it may be difficult for Hamas to continue, either due to the destruction of its military and organizational infrastructure or due to regional and international plans to completely exclude it from governing Gaza.
While some reports suggest Hamas has resumed activities in northern Gaza under local backing, this does not guarantee the movement’s sustainability. The current situation is developing and complex. With no viable governance alternative, Hamas’s presence may act as a refuge for residents – driven by fear or inability to resist.
Hamas needs an alternative to remain in power
The lack of a unified post-war governance framework could facilitate Hamas’s gradual reemergence. Ultimately, the movement’s survival hinges on the availability of an institutional alternative to manage Gaza, particularly to ensure law and order amid utter disorder.
Hamas’s cohesion or collapse will depend on how the current conflict with Israel concludes. If Israel does not deliver a decisive defeat, Hamas could remain cohesive, interpreting its survival as a symbolic victory, even from a propaganda angle.
Another important factor will be the stance of other Palestinian factions, particularly with pressures on the Palestinian Authority for reforms and anti-corruption measures. The Palestinian Authority’s persistence in its current state encourages the formation of parallel power structures or the emergence of new, extremist movements under different names.
Furthermore, local perspectives on recent events may not favor Hamas, given the widespread destruction across Gaza, which the movement cannot adequately address. Regional or international bodies are unlikely to engage in reconstruction efforts while Hamas holds power, either as the main ruler or a partner in governance.
Internal pressures could push toward the movement’s fragmentation or an attempt to avoid accountability, potentially giving rise to splinter groups with similar ideologies.
The situation could mirror the Afghan Taliban’s resilience against US forces, where the Taliban maintained cohesion due to the US military’s inability to secure a decisive defeat.
This contrasts with Daesh and al-Qaeda, which, following clear military defeats, dispersed across various regions. Unlike Osama bin Laden’s death, which had a profound impact on al-Qaeda, the loss of Sinwar – a figure in a chain of leaders targeted by Israel – has not led to Hamas’s collapse.
Hamas’s future appears tied to two critical factors: first, the outcomes of military operations and the movement’s human and material losses; and second, the nature of post-war governance and the existence of a competent alternative.
This replacement must manage security, discipline, and daily life in Gaza more effectively than Hamas, potentially forcing the group into retreat and possibly exposing internal conflicts previously overshadowed by the ongoing military crisis.
The writer is a United Arab Emirates political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.