Strategic pause: Israel’s Lebanon ceasefire and preparations for regional threats – opinion

Although a number of considerations were taken into account when deciding on the ceasefire, it seems that there were two main vectors which ultimately led to the Israeli government’s decision.

 Sayeret Haruv troops during a lightening 80 hour operation, in back to back nights in Jenin and South Lebanon, December 2, 2024. (photo credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON UNIT)
Sayeret Haruv troops during a lightening 80 hour operation, in back to back nights in Jenin and South Lebanon, December 2, 2024.
(photo credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON UNIT)

Numerous reasons and much speculation have been given as to why Israel opted now for a ceasefire in Lebanon – when, among many other achievements, Israeli forces had been operating on the banks of the Litani River, and offensive momentum was increasing even further. Although a number of considerations were taken into account when deciding on the ceasefire, it seems that there were two main vectors which ultimately led to the Israeli government’s decision.

The first vector being the Iranian front. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated as such in his public announcement on the ceasefire on the eve of it going into effect. He also clarified two other priorities which led to the ceasefire decision – resting and refreshing Israel’s military forces and disconnecting the Lebanese front from the Gaza one, in the seven-front war Israel has been fighting.

Focusing efforts on Iran and its atomic-imperial ambitions, is what will remove the overarching existential threat to Israel. Given the proxy nature and relationship of Hezbollah to Iran, taking the fight against Iran to the next level will directly impact Hezbollah and the Lebanese front in any case.

Israel neutralizing Iran’s nuclear program and destroying key military-industrial and security apparatus targets of the regime will destabilize the Islamic Republic, and severely disrupt its ability and appetite to materially support its proxies.

In terms of the Lebanese front itself, Israel has already hollowed out much of Hezbollah and destroyed a large part of the infrastructure used to produce and transport weapons and equipment from the group’s rear lines in Syria to Lebanon.

 IDF soldiers operate in southern Lebanon, November 29, 2024.  (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON UNIT)
IDF soldiers operate in southern Lebanon, November 29, 2024. (credit: IDF SPOKESPERSON UNIT)

Neutralizing Iran

With a wide-scale direct campaign against Iran – Jerusalem’s counter-strikes in the spring and October of 2024 were just a glimpse of what it can execute against Iran – Israel would further starve Hezbollah, which is already a mere shadow of its former self, of the fundamental resources it would need to reconstitute.

Hezbollah, as a strategic expeditionary force of a neo-Persian empire in the making, would wither and continue to weaken. The organization would return to being a lightly armed terror group, and no longer be the unchallenged masters of Lebanon.

Another scenario that could develop with the expansion of direct Israeli action against Iran proper, would be an order from Tehran for what remains of Hezbollah to act against Israel in response – meaning an end to the ceasefire on Israel’s northern front. Which in turn would allow Israel to take advantage of the enemy’s re-initiation of hostilities, to return to military engagement, and sideline hypocritical international criticism of Israel’s actions.

In such a turn of events, Israel would have cause and renewed opportunity to act with overwhelming and fatal force in Lebanon. Including moving forces deeper into the country – and, it would be advisable, surrounding key points in the Bekaa Valley and Beirut’s southern Shi’ite districts. This would all be part of a wide scale targeted land, air, and sea blockade of what remains of Hezbollah and Iran’s assets in the country.

It is important to note that, from what has been reported, the ceasefire does not include Syria and strikes by Israel there continue, further eliminating Hezbollah, Iranian, and other Shi’ite militia targets in the country, along with Syrian regime assets utilized by those forces. In recent days, Syrian rebel groups have capitalized on Israel’s highly effective campaign in the country and, after years, are once again making major territorial gains against President Bashar Assad and the foreign forces that aid him.


Stay updated with the latest news!

Subscribe to The Jerusalem Post Newsletter


So, a primary focus directly on Iran and continued action in Syria therefore present a continuity of opportunities for the Lebanese front. The end game in Lebanon is for the Hezbollah state within a state, an imperial vassal of Iran, to cease to exist; for the other ethno-theological groups in Lebanon not to be dominated by the Shi’ite terror army; and for the State of Israel not to be under threat from a massive and strategic Iranian controlled forward-operating base on its northern border.

Whether the circumstances have ripened internally in Lebanon for the sidelining of Hezbollah with Israel’s offensive to this point, or if more Israeli military action will be required is not clear as of yet.

What is certain is that further dismantling Hezbollah, relegating them to Kalashnikovs, a random small drone, or an RPG here and there – instead of heavy ballistic missiles and strategic underground facilities, among other sophisticated capabilities – will facilitate that end game.

The second vector underlying the ceasefire, more theoretical, and of secondary importance, is a diplomatic/geo-political one: namely, a potential ambush by the Biden administration at the United Nations. 

Echoing his former boss Barack Obama in the final days of his presidency, Biden could have abstained from a par-for-the-course anti-Israel UN Security Council vote. His administration could have even concocted such a resolution behind the scenes, and had a different UNSC member propose it.

This would have been an attempt at a parting shot at Israel, to endear Joe Biden to the liberal progressive base of the US Democratic Party and like-minded elements in American media and academia. Among other things, this would prevent his presidential legacy from being derided and degraded.

The move would also have placated members of his own administration, other US government officials, and many old hands from the Obama administration, who have a particular ideological, as well as deeper “dislike” for the State of Israel.

A successful UN Security Council resolution against Israel would also have added weight to the grotesque display of hypocrisy and antisemitism put on by the so called International Criminal Court at The Hague. Such a UN resolution coupled with the ICC ruling would have heightened the risk that more Israeli leaders, military officials, and simple soldiers, would be libeled and falsely accused by international bodies controlled by actors hostile to Israel’s very existence.

AS THE Biden administration comes to a close, it has, instead of a parting shot, been provided the face-saving accomplishment of a brokered, albeit very tenuous, Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire. This comes after numerous US sponsored /brokered attempts at ceasefires and the “cooling of tensions” on multiple fronts fell apart time after time for over a year since the war began.

A statement by the French Foreign Ministry after the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah went into effect, provides another window into these diplomatic games.

According to the statement, the French would not act on the arrest warrants issued by the ICC for Prime Minister Netanyahu and former defense minister Gallant, as they have immunity given Israel is not a party to the ICC. This comes after Israel allowed France to have a role in brokering the ceasefire and observing its implementation and sustainment.

Israel has only engaged in this diplomatic intrigue and strategically leveraging it because roughly 75% of Hezbollah’s strength and capabilities have already been destroyed. Jerusalem would not have acted on potential diplomatic machinations if the threat level from Lebanon would have still been high. Instead, like throughout the previous 13 months, the Jewish state would have focused on fighting and destroying the enemy regardless of the diplomatic fallout. Rafah and the continued targeting of Beirut before the ceasefire are cases in point.

Given the fragility of the actual ceasefire and the interconnectedness of Hezbollah’s fate with the Iranian front and developments in Syria, the end game for the Lebanese front is still coalescing. But one thing is certain: Even a Hezbollah with only 20% or 25% of its original power cannot be left to fester, and eventually attempt to regenerate itself. So, the war continues.

The writer is an Israeli hi-tech entrepreneur and a member of the Israel Leadership Forum. He is involved with various Israel advocacy causes, including working with Christian Zionists as well as pro-Israel Noahide groups.