The collapse of Bashar Assad’s regime, Iran’s longstanding ally in Syria, has sparked debate among observers. Some argue that Iran’s loss of faith in Assad contributed to his downfall. Yet, this view ignores the strategic logic underpinning the Islamic Republic’s alliance with Assad and its involvement in Syria. For the Islamists in Iran, Syria was not merely an ally; it was the Islamic Republic’s “strategic depth,” its “golden ring of resistance,” and even considered “more valuable than Iran’s Khuzestan Province.” Abandoning Assad would have meant abandoning Iran’s broader ambition of dominating the Middle East, a project reliant on Assad’s continued rule in Syria.
After seizing power in 1979, the Khomeinists aimed to export their Islamic Revolution and dominate the Middle East, despite limited resources. They adopted the low-cost strategy of creating proxy groups in countries with significant Shiite populations. They created a network of 19 terrorist organizations, including Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as 16 other terror groups in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. They called this network, “the axis of resistance.”
Regime leaders recognized that sustaining the axis of resistance required incorporating Syria into the alliance as a vital conduit for transferring arms and resources to their proxies, particularly Hezbollah. They reached out to Hafez Assad, the Syrian dictator, father of Bashar, and he readily embraced the opportunity. Although Hafez Assad famously described Syria as the “beating heart of Arabism,” his economically struggling nation stood to benefit from alignment with the oil-rich regime in Tehran. Furthermore, as an Alawite leader – a minority sect within a predominantly Sunni population – Hafez Assad found it more pragmatic to collaborate with his unpopular Shiite neighbor.
Syria became central to Iran’s regional strategy, offering a land corridor to Beirut and safe havens for Hezbollah’s training and weapons. This land corridor enabled the movement of personnel, arms, and supplies to reach Hezbollah, significantly enhancing Iran’s capacity to project power and maintain influence across the Levant.
Syria was even regarded as Iran’s “35th province.” Hujjat al-Islam Mahdi Taeb, the head of the Ammar Strategic Base – an organization established to promote “soft war tools” – and an adviser to the supreme leader, declared that Syria’s strategic importance exceeds that of Khuzestan province in southern Iran.
Ali Akbar Velayati, Khamenei’s foreign policy aide, asserted that “Syria is a golden ring of resistance to Zionism. Iran supports it, because if Syria falls and its government collapses... the axis of resistance will collapse.”QASSEM SOLEIMANI, the former head of the IRGC-Quds Force, called Syria “Iran’s strategic depth.”
Syria’s importance for Iran became unmistakable when, in 2011, widespread protests against Bashar Assad erupted. The IRGC Quds Force acted swiftly to intervene and ensure his survival. On the advice of Qassem Suleimani, Assad responded with considerable violence. With so much at stake, the Quds Force increased its presence in Syria and supplied “coercive means” to Assad to help the Syrian police and paramilitary units disperse the protesters.
The IRGC leaders were confident that the Basij militia, which had crushed the Iranian Green Movement in 2009, would be able to put down the rebellion in Syria. Iran sent several Quds Force high-ranking commanders who, together with the feared Syrian Shabiha (“ghosts”), brutalized protestors. By 2012, there were reportedly 1,200-2,000 Quds Force personnel providing intellectual and advisory help, backed up by some 7,000-10,000 fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah stationed at Damascus Airport, Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia.
By 2015, despite Iran’s efforts, Assad was losing control. Suleimani convinced Putin to intervene while Iran formed Shia militias such as Zainebiyoun Brigade, Fatemiyoun Brigade, Kataib Hezbollah, and Liwa Zulfiqar, turning the war in Assad’s favor.
IRGC historically rescued Assad from total collapse
The IRGC ultimately rescued Assad and the axis of resistance from total collapse, but this intervention came at a significant cost. According to some estimates, Iran spent approximately $50 billion in military aid and financial support, including $11 billion worth of oil supplied between 2012 and 2021. The human cost has also been substantial. From January 2013 to March 2017, the IRGC reported significant casualties, including 418 ranking officers – some of them generals – over 2,100 soldiers, and 7,000 wounded.
The regime disregarded the high costs because the investment yielded substantial returns, including securing Quds Force military bases, land routes, airports, and port facilities – critical assets for sustaining operations against common adversaries, particularly Israel.
FOR NEARLY a decade, Israel has launched weekly strikes on IRGC Quds Force bases in Syria to limit Iran’s influence, disrupt Hezbollah’s supply lines, and weaken the axis of resistance, with limited success. While these strikes inflicted significant damage, the strategic advantages Iran derived from maintaining a foothold in Syria and keeping it firmly aligned with the axis consistently outweighed the costs. From the Iranian regime’s perspective, “disconnecting Syria from the axis represented a significant strategic threat to the Islamic Republic.”
A major turning point came on October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched a brutal assault on Israel, killing 1,200 civilians and taking over 250 Israelis and others hostage. When Israel responded to Hamas’s attack, Iran directed Hezbollah to join the conflict to support Hamas. However, Israel countered Hezbollah with overwhelming force, inflicting heavy losses on its political and military leadership and infrastructure, significantly degrading its operational capacity. Simultaneously, intensified Israeli military operations against Quds Force positions in Syria resulted in considerable losses to its leadership and infrastructure. The bombing of IRGC-Quds Force bases, coupled with the weakening of Hezbollah, has severely undermined Iran’s influence in Syria and across the region.
While Iran’s regional influence diminishes, the regime is also grappling with serious internal crises. Its economy is in a severe downturn, marked by high inflation, rising unemployment, and widespread poverty. Mismanagement and corruption have compounded these challenges, leading to a significant decline in the living standards of the Iranian people. Economic hardships have fueled social discontent, resulting in widespread protests and civil unrest. The regime’s repressive responses have only deepened public dissatisfaction, further undermining its legitimacy.
The Iranian people have repeatedly voiced their dissatisfaction with the regime’s regional policies, particularly its involvement in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria.
During protests, slogans such as “Forget about Syria, think about us” and “Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, I sacrifice my life for Iran” have echoed public frustration over the regime’s focus on regional ambitions instead of addressing pressing domestic issues. Widespread discontent with social restrictions, economic collapse, and environmental mismanagement has further eroded public trust, creating a crisis of legitimacy for the regime.
The domestic and regional setbacks have collectively weakened the regime’s power and influence, rendering it incapable of preventing the collapse of the golden ring of the axis. In other words, the regime’s failure to save Assad was not due to a loss of faith in him but rather its lack of capacity.
As Khamenei admitted in his recent speech, they sought to assist Assad, but their efforts were thwarted by Israel and the United States, both on the ground and in the air.
Assad’s fall, along with the destruction of Hamas and Hezbollah, would mark the end of Iran’s regional hegemony project, severely limiting its ability to project power, rebuild proxy groups, and supply them with arms.
The US and Israel should seize this opportunity to try to change the regime by supporting the Iranian people who seek change, a critical step toward achieving lasting peace and stability in the region.
The writer is a senior fellow at the Philos Project.