China’s Middle East strategy requires thoughtful reassessment and strategic adjustment in its ties with key regional countries, especially considering the evolving regional landscape.
Recent shifts in Middle Eastern power dynamics, particularly following the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023, have highlighted a decline in Russian and Chinese influence, with the US gaining prominence.
This transformation is evident across global, regional, and domestic levels, significantly impacting China’s Middle East strategy. The balance of power between the US, China, and Russia has shifted, with Washington increasing its military presence and collaboration with Israel, while China’s influence – despite its economic engagements – faces challenges due to geopolitical uncertainties and rivalry with the US.
The core conflict between Iran and Israel has evolved, with Tehran losing regional influence as Israel’s military power grows. Meanwhile, Turkey has emerged as a dominant player, expanding its reach at Iran’s expense. These new geopolitical complexities and the intensifying US-China rivalry present significant hurdles for China’s ability to assert broader influence in the Middle East.
Over the past two decades, China has rapidly emerged as an economic, political, and security actor in the Middle East. As the largest consumer of Middle Eastern oil, China’s trade with the region has more than tripled during this period, reflecting its deepening ties across economic, security, and diplomatic domains.
In 2023, about 36% of China’s crude oil imports came from the Middle East, ranking several Middle Eastern nations among China’s top energy suppliers. China’s dependence on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons has two key implications: First, it must ensure stable energy production in the region, and second, it must safeguard the safe transportation of energy from the region to China. These priorities mean any conflict disrupting oil production or transportation in the Middle East directly threatens China’s national interests.
Moreover, China’s economic engagement with the Middle East has expanded significantly beyond the energy sector. By 2023, trade between China and the region reached nearly $444 billion, underscoring the Middle East’s growing importance as a key market for Chinese goods and services.
Beyond traditional trade, China has deepened its involvement in infrastructure development, renewable and clean energy projects, the digital economy, and artificial intelligence across the region. This diversification aligns with China’s broader strategic plans, such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which complements local development plans like Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. This alignment underscores China’s intention to strengthen economic ties and foster deeper regional partnerships.
Challenges to China’s Mideast strategy
The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, now lasting over a year, has posed a significant challenge to China’s traditional approach of balancing and neutrality in regional diplomacy. Until 2023, China successfully maintained relationships with all key actors, including Saudi Arabia and Iran – as well as the Arab world and Israel – largely due to its relatively detached stance and lack of deep entanglements with regional conflicts.
Nevertheless, the Israel-Hamas War has exposed the limitations of this approach, forcing China to reassess its Middle East strategy. The shifting and uncertain regional power dynamics underscore the need for China to adapt its policies and strategically adjust its position in the region.Although the Israel-Hamas War temporarily disrupted the reconciliation process between Israel and Arab countries, the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia remains likely. This development, however, could challenge China’s strategy in the Middle East.
A US-Saudi security pact, a key precondition for Israel-Saudi normalization, would undermine China’s efforts to promote a new regional security architecture with less US influence. Furthermore, such an agreement may include clauses that limit security and technological cooperation between China and Saudi Arabia, complicating China’s broader ambitions in the region.
Additionally, China is likely to play a strategic role in supporting Iran’s efforts to regain its strength and regional prestige, especially after Israel’s actions have weakened Iran’s proxies, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. China views a balanced regional security architecture as essential, with Iran serving as a key pillar and a partner in countering US dominance in the Middle East.
To this end, China may prioritize bolstering Tehran’s position by increasing imports of its crude oil, investing in Iranian infrastructure, and supporting its regional policies. However, due to the potential repercussions of US sanctions, such support could be discreet, potentially taking the form of illicit trade, development aid, or diplomatic backing.
The Israel-Hamas War has also notably strained China’s relationship with Israel. Its refusal to designate Hamas as a terrorist organization and its strong criticism of Israel, particularly over the “humanitarian disaster” in Gaza, have underscored rising tensions.
China’s pro-Palestinian stance aligns with its broader anti-US position, viewing Israel as Washington’s closest ally in the region. This dynamic influenced China’s approach to the Gaza crisis, reflecting its overarching global approach to counter US influence rather than a shift in its traditional strategy.
Without Israel’s close ties to the US, China’s response to the conflict might have been more neutral, consistent with its historical efforts to balance regional relationships.
Thus, the challenge for China lies in how it will manage its relationship with Israel moving forward. The trajectory of China-Israel ties will be crucial in shaping China’s Middle East strategy. While China does not face a fundamental conflict of national interests with Israel, the deterioration of their relations is largely a result of the Israel-Hamas War, not a direct clash between the two nations.
Given China’s balancing and neutral diplomacy tradition, it will likely seek to repair its ties with Israel through various engagements, especially in trade and commerce. However, China’s pro-Palestinian stance has disillusioned many Israelis who had once viewed their relationship with China more favorably.
Israel had hoped for China to adopt a more sympathetic stance toward its position, but China’s criticisms and lack of support have fostered feelings of betrayal and resentment. Convincing the Israeli public that China remains neutral and trustworthy will be a significant challenge.
China’s vision for Middle East security
China’s Middle East strategy aims to challenge Washington’s dominance by promoting a new regional security framework, one in which it can play a more influential role, given its growing economic power and political influence.
Chinese President Xi Jinping introduced the concept of building a common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security architecture in the Middle East in 2018 during the 8th China-Arab States Cooperation Forum. In 2022, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi further emphasized the need for a “new security architecture” for peace and stability in Asia.
Nevertheless, China’s limited influence over the ongoing conflict has highlighted its weaknesses as a regional security player. By refraining from condemning Hamas, the Houthis, Hezbollah’s attacks, and Iran’s aggressive actions, China compromised its neutrality and lost credibility as a potential peace broker.
China must deepen its relationships and expand its regional influence to strengthen its position. Post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and other war-torn areas present a significant opportunity for China to leverage its infrastructure development expertise and financial resources.
As the regional landscape continues to evolve, China’s relations with key countries will likely undergo a period of adjustment. This is particularly true for Israel, where ties have been most strained due to the war.
China will likely seek to deepen its relationships with Iran and Saudi Arabia, potentially contributing to rebuilding Tehran’s capabilities and improving its regional image. Additionally, China is expected to remain involved in peace, mediation, and reconstruction efforts in war-torn areas.
While the Middle East holds significant geopolitical importance for China, its approach has been characterized by cautious involvement, limited security engagement, a reliance on multilateralism, and an emphasis on economic cooperation. Consequently, despite its desire to increase influence, China does not seek to become overly active in regional affairs or dominate the regional order.
As a result, China’s Middle East strategy will likely enter a phase of retrenchment and contraction, requiring a new development path that includes improving relations with key countries and reassessing its stance on Israel. This adjustment could significantly shift China’s Middle East strategy if it gains traction.
The writer is a senior lecturer in the Department of Politics and Governance and the Multidisciplinary Studies in Social Science division at Ashkelon Academic College and a research fellow at the Asian Studies Department, University of Haifa, specializing in Chinese foreign and strategic relations. He can be reached at motih1308@gmail.com.