In response to “China-Middle Eastern relations: A shifting regional landscape” by Mordechai Chaziza (The Jerusalem Post, December 31) – an analysis of China’s evolving Middle East strategy and its call for a policy recalibration amid shifting geopolitical dynamics – it is imperative to assess whether Beijing’s actions align with the strategic ambitions attributed to it.
While the discussion highlights China’s deepening economic and political engagements in the region, a closer examination reveals that China’s Middle East strategy remains fundamentally constrained by its limited appetite for meaningful political and strategic involvement, favoring vehement rhetoric that secures benefits in other areas oversubstantive contributions.
A notable example is China’s endorsement of the “right of return” for Palestinian refugees, an incendiary and highly controversial stance in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
For Israel, such support constitutes one of the most provocative moves imaginable, as it implies the dissolution of Israel as a Jewish state. This stance is comparable to the hypothetical scenario of Israel expressing support for Taiwan’s independence – a line Israel has never crossed, even at the nadir of its relations with Beijing.
This endorsement, expressed by China’s top statesmen for the first time in decades following the October 7 attack, marks a stark and provocative shift. By adopting a stance that Israel perceives as existentially threatening, China has decisively abandoned the remnants of its cautious diplomatic approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict maintained over recent decades.
This, far from signaling a genuine commitment to active participation in Middle Eastern politics and reshaping the region’s political landscape, serves Beijing’s broader anti-Western narrative and appeals to Global South (Latin America, Africa, and most of Asia and Oceania) nations.
While Beijing likely understands how profoundly its support of the “right of return” will be perceived in Israel – if not, it represents a significant failure on the part of both Israeli and Chinese diplomacy – it appears to have calculated that the anticipated diplomatic gains among Muslim-majority and other Global South nations outweigh the potential damage to its relations with Israel.
This calculation likely reflects Beijing’s assessment of its limited prospects for deepened ties with Israel and, perhaps, an overestimation of Israel’s capacity for forgiveness. It also indicates China’s lack of interest in taking part in the political and strategic restructuring of the region, a role that requires substantial involvement in regional processes (which it avoids) or at least a minimal degree of neutrality.
China's anti-Israel rhetoric
China’s most recent anti-Israeli rhetoric, including an editorial in the Chinese Communist Party-owned China Daily accusing Israel of exploiting Hamas’s October 7 attack for territorial expansion and aligning with the United States’ strategic interests in the region, reflects Beijing’s reluctance to even feign neutrality.
Rather than fostering diplomatic channels or taking proactive steps to mediate, China has amplified a narrative that bolsters its opposition to perceived Western hegemony. This approach aligns with its long-standing preference for leveraging the Middle East as a theater for ideological posturing rather than substantive intervention.
AT THE same time, China’s economic ties to the region, particularly its dependence on Middle Eastern hydrocarbons, have expanded significantly, with trade volumes reaching hundreds of billions of dollars. Yet this economic footprint has not translated into a proportionate political or security engagement.
For instance, despite its vocal support for the Palestinian cause, China has neither leveraged its considerable economic influence over Israel to advance Israel-Palestine talks prior to the outbreak of the war nor provided substantial aid to Palestinian factions after October 7.
Its aid contributions, amounting to several million dollars in practice and a $69 million pledge for Gaza, pale compared to contributions from other nations and demonstrate its limited commitment to altering the regional status quo.
Furthermore, China’s reluctance to engage in meaningful diplomatic or security efforts, such as using its influence on Iran to restrain the overall situation or investing in long-term peacebuilding, highlights its detachment from the region’s most pressing challenges.
Even its calls for an international peace conference lack the depth and follow-through necessary to position Beijing as a credible player in Middle Eastern politics.
China’s Middle East posture, including its strident anti-Israeli rhetoric, should be viewed within the framework of its broader geopolitical strategy. This approach reflects a deliberate choice to prioritize economic ties and ideological positioning over political-strategic engagement in regions beyond its traditional sphere of influence.
By aligning itself with the Palestinian cause and harshly criticizing Israel’s actions, China seeks to bolster its standing among Muslim-majority countries and the Global South, reinforcing its narrative as a counterweight to US influence.
However, this strategy comes at the cost of alienating Israel and diminishing its credibility as a constructive arbiter in the region, should it choose to pursue such a role. Beijing’s support for contentious issues like the right of return highlights its preference for symbolic gestures over meaningful intervention, reaffirming its role as an opportunistic observer rather than an active participant in the region’s complex geopolitics.
Consequently, it is essential for decision-makers to understand the implications of China’s strategy – or lack thereof – for future regional alignments and political processes.
While China’s economic presence in the Middle East will continue expanding, its reluctance to engage substantively in the region’s political affairs persists, limiting its potential to serve as a constructive transformative actor. Similarly, despite implicit indications, or hopes, that China’s diplomatic stance on Israel might have moderated following recent developments in the war, such a shift is yet to materialize.
The writer is an associate professor of Chinese studies and political science at the University of Haifa. His current research focuses on China-Middle East relations and civil-military technology cooperation. His recent publications include the co-edited volumes Israel-Asia Relations in the Twenty-First Century: The Search for Partners in a Changing World and East-West Asia Relations in the 21st Century: From Bilateral to Interregional Relationships.