Egypt’s deafening silence in the face of the revolution in Syria – a country that was historically its ally for decades despite the ups and downs in their relationship – speaks volumes about the fears of the al-Sisi regime. These fears include the potential domino effect of revolutionary movements spreading to Egypt and, more importantly, the growing power of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkey’s territorial-religious ambitions, backed by Qatari financial resources.
Surprisingly, and in light of the dramatic events in Syria, Egypt maintained a relatively lukewarm stance, limiting itself to hollow declarations about its commitment to Syria’s territorial integrity. This was a surprisingly mild reaction from a country that had been Syria’s partner in significant actions over the past few decades.
For many years, Egypt and Syria shared Soviet patronage, briefly formed a short-lived and failed union (the United Arab Republic), fought monumental battles against their mutual Israeli adversary, and later clashed over Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel. After many years of estrangement, largely due to Bashar al-Assad’s repressive regime, they warmed their relations once again. How could Egypt then abandon Syria and refrain from assisting it?
The solution to this puzzle lies in understanding Egypt’s relations with Turkey – once dubbed “the sick man of the Bosporus.” Egypt, with its illustrious pharaonic history, served as a central religious hub under the auspices of Al-Azhar University and contributed significantly to the shaping of Islamic orthodoxy.
Even during the Ottoman period, when Egypt was administratively subordinate to the Ottoman Sultanate in Istanbul, Egyptians viewed the Turks as culturally and religiously inferior, believing that Egyptians contributed the human capital the Ottoman Empire lacked.
Modern Turkey, established on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, pursued forced secularization and emphasized Turkish nationalism over Arab identity. Islam was relegated to a strictly controlled sphere, confined to the boundaries of the state-supervised madrasas.
The rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Erdogan, with its aspirations for influence in the Arab world, initially created an apparent opportunity for cooperation between the nations, especially during the brief presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mohamed Morsi.
However, Morsi’s swift fall and the rise of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2013 led to a peak in tensions, culminating in a decade-long severance of relations. This period was characterized by fierce competition over leadership in the Islamic world, as well as economic and military struggles in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, and even Africa.
Conflicting interests between Turkey and Egypt
Turkey and Egypt have numerous conflicting interests that could lead to renewed crises. Egypt, along with Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, controls large gas fields off their coasts, enjoying ownership based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (EEZ). Turkey rejects this arrangement, especially regarding Greece, but also with respect to Egypt’s activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Additionally, the two nations are at odds over Libya. Egypt supports General Khalifa Haftar in eastern Libya, while Istanbul backs the Government of National Unity in the west, led by Fayez al-Sarraj, ostensibly to justify Turkey’s maritime claims.
Neo-Ottoman Islamist Turkey is also expanding its influence in Africa and recently mediated a ceasefire agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia. This development could adversely affect Egypt in its dispute with Ethiopia over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, which poses a potential trigger for war between the two nations.
Turkey’s potential success in toppling Assad’s regime and its efforts to gain military and economic control over Syria – together with Qatari backing – pose significant challenges for Egypt. The possibility of a renewed resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, coupled with Egypt’s deep economic crisis, limits its ability to focus on Syria, which Erdogan increasingly seeks to dominate.
For Israel, which has often benefited from bipolar systems in the region, this development does not bode well.
The writer is a Middle East expert and a former lecturer at Bar-Ilan University and Netanya Academic College.