The insistence on Greater Israel had been like an immutable religious dogma for you? An absolute faith. We raised many security arguments in defense of Greater Israel. But the truth is, even if there hadn’t been security issues, we would not have agreed [to any compromise]. Because for us, our “faith” meant that in order to take from us one inch of the western land of Israel, you would have to kill us first. And it wouldn’t matter if it was Tel Aviv or Nablus or Hebron – each would be exactly the same. Not one inch; we do not have the moral right. Better to pay a very heavy price, including wars. Not to lose the state entirely. Not that. But close to that. We were obligated to fight every conceivable fight.My metamorphosis was further strengthened after some conversations that I had initiated as chairman of the [first Netanyahu-led] coalition with the head of the opposition, [Shimon Peres]. I had attacked the Oslo Accords in a Knesset debate. He told me later, outside the plenum, that he feared the various interim steps [of the Oslo process] would cause the entire process to fail and that, since we were strong and held the key cards, we should skip [the interim stage] and try for a complete agreement.At first, I disagreed strongly with the whole process. But I began to realize that we had entered a new era – we had moved from the era of Greater Israel to the era of territorial compromise. It was clear that Begin’s “autonomy” [for the Arabs] would not be “personal autonomy” [inside an expanded Israel with sovereignty throughout Judea and Samaria]. It would mean a “state-minus” [for the Palestinians].And so it came to pass that, as coalition chairman, charged with defending Bibi’s positions, I wasn’t defending them because I had to, because of my job, but rather, because I recognized that Bibi was handling the situation in the appropriate way. That now we were in power, we could not bring all our goals to fruition, just as Begin had been unable to fulfill them in practical policy.Not only would we be unable to annex Judea and Samaria, but if things were to proceed [in negotiations with the Palestinians], the minimum that would be demanded in order to get to an arrangement would be a “state-minus” – [sovereignty with certain limitations for the Palestinians]. This was one major turning point.A second, incredible turning point [for me] was [prime minister] Sharon’s acceptance of the road map [in 2003]. The road map provides for a Palestinian state. And yet Likud ministers, and more right-wing ministers from the National Union, stayed in the government.It’s worth looking: Israel raised 14 reservations regarding the road map. But there was no objection raised by us that specified that we would continue to build in the settlements, that we considered this our right, until there was a final-status agreement.That was a bigger turning point for you? Absolutely. Remember, after the Hebron accord, when we were in power, when I supported Netanyahu’s nationalist, realistic policies, I had worked toward understandings with Yossi Beilin on the framework of an accord. That cost me dearly. It didn’t destroy me politically, but it hurt me badly. Beilin and I were trying to create a platform for a unity government, setting out the red lines of the Zionist enterprise, as the basis for negotiations with Arafat. When people [on the Right] called me a traitor, I told them that time was working against us, and that one day they’d wish for what Beilin and I were working on.And that’s absolutely the case. Our agreement specified that most of the settlements and their residents would be annexed to Israel. That Jerusalem would stay within its municipal borders as the capital of Israel. There’s a complete rejection of the right of return. It’s written there that the Jordan Valley will be our security border. There’s a sentence there that Beilin would be afraid to have people see – that even in a permanent accord, Israel would not uproot settlements. That the settlements would retain a special status – as communities and individually, with linkage to the State of Israel.And your next turning point? The point after that is Bibi’s speech [at Bar-Ilan University] last year. He got up and he said my policy is two states for two peoples. People started to say, he doesn’t mean it, it’s a bluff. People don’t understand that a declaration like that, combined with reaching out to all the states of the world – that’s a fact. That is the declared policy. And it is inconceivable that the issue of settlements will continue to roll forward as though we’re still in the era of Begin and have to settle every hilltop.And that means that if our policy nowadays began with a moratorium, and we are finishing the period of the freeze, we need to sit down with ourselves. In my letter, and openly, I say that the freeze is automatically ending and nothing needs to be done about that. It doesn’t have to be renewed. But between not renewing the freeze and not sitting with ourselves and thinking, “Dear colleagues, what is the right settlement policy for the State of Israel at this moment?” that’s ridiculous. To today use the resources, take the risks and pursue a settlement policy that utterly contradicts the declared policies of Bibi Netanyahu? You just do damage, without any benefit.
Why doesn’t Netanyahu get up and say this? He does.No, he doesn’t say I made my declaration more than a year ago and my policy has to reflect that.Well, that’s the difference between me and him. I’m No. 16 on the Likud list and that’s where I’ll stay, if I’m lucky. And he’s in the No. 1 position and needs to stay there and needs to reflect a wider consensus. But I’m sure that in his policies, when he has to resume settlement, he’ll place practical limitations.So, why did I write my letter? Because I’m trying to put to the Likud members what I’ve been saying to you, and there are more and more people [who are receptive]. When I went with Beilin, they didn’t kick me out of the party. They pushed me down the list a few places. Those who want to leap into the leadership positions must reflect a wider consensus. So I forgo those votes, the votes of people who, in their faith, and I respect them for it, believe that I am saying things that are not appropriate for the Likud.There are colleagues who bring money in from abroad and they have support circles and they send out letters and petitions and so on. I don’t. But I have an opinion which is no less important than theirs and I want it to be heard in the Likud. I’m certain that I influence some of the people.You’re saying that to build outside the blocs and Hebron causes us damage. It doesn’t protect the state? Quite the reverse? The flux is moving to a situation where there’ll be a Palestinian entity which will have territorial control and it will have judicial authority over the territories it holds. Those are our declarations. That’s the direction we’re moving.So we can’t build settlements there which we’ll subsequently have a problem dismantling and replicating elsewhere. We saw how difficult, and rightly so, how painful it was to pull people out [of Gaza and northern Samaria in 2005]. So today or tomorrow morning we’ll bring more people, and put them in places we’re telling the world will be Palestinian territory?Now, there are places where we say no, where we will battle to ensure that they stay in our hands. So let’s put the people there!Again, I’m not directly involved in negotiations. That gives me certain advantages, as I said. Now let me talk about the disadvantages. I don’t know the details. I don’t know the dynamics. And by the way, that goes for the overwhelming majority of the ministers. The average member of cabinet has next to no information. They don’t know more than what’s written in the newspapers. Members of the [inner ministerial] septet get a little bit more information.Here, too, my thinking has undergone something of a revolution. I see the problems for the executive branch in our democratic system. Look at what’s happening now [in the battle of recriminations] between [former prime minister Ehud] Olmert and [Defense Minister Ehud] Barak. It’s shameful. And these are talented people. This stems in part from the coalition system and the clashing egos within it.So I asked myself, should Bibi seek advice from his fellow politicians when they have their natural ambitions? If he tells them everything, it’ll be leaked in a minute.Bibi said to the Likud ministers, give me a mandate to run [these negotiations] my way. “My way” means he has a few people he personally trusts, his people. They’re not in the political system. Bibi takes the political responsibility.Once, I wouldn’t have accepted this easily. But now I’m reconciled that there’s no alternative in our political system. And Bibi has made clear that if we reach a deal that requires a decision, he’ll present it. We can argue. Everyone can speak and we’ll put it to the test of the democratic process. It will pass or it won’t. I think that’s the right approach. On these matters, and I stress on these matters, I rely 100% on Bibi. And I have enough patience to give him the opportunity to explore the whole issue.We mustn’t miss any opportunity for an agreement. And if we can’t reach a permanent accord, then an interim accord. We have to assess the opportunities and the risks.We were so happy to be accepted into the OECD. But if we continue to act as though we are not in the OECD, we won’t have achieved our goal. We need to measure ourselves against benchmarks on different subjects: democracy, transparency, open government, economics, education, every field. To compare ourselves to the global reality and to seek to be the most excellent.My aspirations for the nation have not contracted, but perhaps they have moved to a slightly different place at the cost of that tie to the territorial issue. It’s not that I am neglecting the territorial issue – it’s central to life and death and security, and as a value in and of itself, but not to the degree that it once was.Let me just add perhaps the most important sentence. At certain stages, I’ve heard Netanyahu lament that our international status creates situations where we are denied the legitimate right to self-defense.
Of course. A tiny example: Nick Clegg, who is today Britain’s deputy prime minister, called for a halt in arms sales to Israel and other sanctions at the time of Operation Cast Lead, when he was in the opposition.We have the right to defend ourselves and yet we are gradually being silenced and shut down. If someone is denied the right to self-defense, he is laid vulnerable to being lynched. In this kind of situation, the most urgent thing is to regain your legitimate right to self-defense. It makes no difference that you think you ought to have that full right. What matters is the situation that has been created, whether it is your fault or not.And I tie that to the issue of readiness to enter negotiations and to hold negotiations and to do so honestly. Netanyahu went to all the countries that were prepared to listen to him, in Europe, in the US, and said, I want to start these talks. I want these talks. And [Egypt’s President] Mubarak said at the recent Washington summit, okay, we’ve heard you. Now we want action.So people would say to me now, why isn’t everyone making demands of the Palestinians? But that’s not relevant right now to our status. I’m not saying we should take steps that are dangerous to the State of Israel. I’m saying we may have to take steps that are dangerous for our politics [– a presumed reference to the constellation of the coalition – DH]. And I’m certain that if there’s a leadership that takes the right moves, it will be able to bring the public with it.But if we say we have political problems and so we can’t take the decisions we need to take for the national interest, both [political] camps will suffer. It will worsen our international situation and we’ll have problems at home. We [in the Likud and the national camp] will have kept the vociferous believers, but we’ll be in opposition.Netanyahu has convinced me that it is vital to extricate Israel from its isolation, from deadlock. This has to be handled with a readiness for concessions. We’re not yet making concessions, but we have declared a readiness.So what will happen when the freeze ends? In my opinion, nothing.The leader of the free world has asked us to extend the freeze.I don’t want to prophesize. But I assume they’ll find a path. There’s ending the freeze and there’s settlement policy after the freeze. Do we need to build now everywhere we built until 10 months ago? Not necessarily.Settlement should continue according to the needs of the State of Israel today. If we squeeze every last drop of the lemon, utilize every last inch of our room for maneuver, of our political power, and beg and implore and ask every country in the world to understand that we have to build [everywhere], those drops of lemon that we’ll need for the problems of the permanent accord won’t be there any more. We’ll have confrontations a thousand times worse, where we’ll need to extract every last drop of support for issues of much more importance, including for the settlers themselves.Aren’t we already costing ourselves dearly by prolonging this argument now?
These are some of the problems of our democracy. Ultimately wisdom will prevail. I believe that Bibi will clear this obstacle without blowing up the talks.Critics on the Right would say that your position on the territories is defeatist, and that if we more forcefully asserted our rights we’d be able to get to a better accord from a position of strength. And from the other side, your critics would say, Abbas is going to go home if we miss this opportunity and aren’t more forthcoming.And that’s the nature of compromise – that it is attacked from both sides. You have to find the point of balance, and I’ve told you where I think the point of balance is based on my experience. That doesn’t necessarily mean I’m right. There is a time for extremism. But I think Netanyahu’s approach now is correct.The dangers are profound. We see the fragility in the Arab world. We’ve already seen the Palestinian entity fracture into two and we don’t know which side will prevail, and these kinds of things can happen to every Arab state, wherever they may stand right now.We just marked the Yom Kippur War. I ask myself, what would have happened, heaven forbid, if the [Arab] invasion had begun not from the [Suez] canal, but from Kalkilya. We must not forget those lessons. So the dovish approach that says we’ll take risks? Well, we have to weigh the level of risk we can take.I favor a more calibrated approach. I favor progress, bit by bit. I favor the creation of economic peace, the creation of interest groups that want to strengthen peace. And not on our side alone. It won’t work if we’re the only people making concessions.On the issue of building, we’ll find an arrangement, but the settlement blocs will not be dismantled. The world has to respect our problems, not just the Palestinians’ problems.