National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said earlier this month that “the United States and Iran are not close” to an agreement and that “there are still gaps in the question of sanctions"
By ZALMAN SHOVALIranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said on Thursday any U.S. or Saudi military strike against Iran would result in "all-out war"(photo credit: REUTERS/EVGENIA NOVOZHENINA)
The Biden administration may have begun to realize that renewing the nuclear deal with Iran, also known as the JCPOA, won’t be the easy walk in the park it anticipated.National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said earlier this month that “the United States and Iran are not close” to an agreement and that “there are still gaps in the question of sanctions and the restrictions Iran will accept to ensure that they can never get a nuclear weapon.”Similar remarks were made by Ron Klain, the President Joe Biden’s White House chief of staff. Also, as revealed by the disclosure of Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif that the radical Islamic Revolutionary Guards have a stranglehold on major policy decisions, the Iranian Foreign Ministry negotiators are in no hurry to comply with American demands – also believing that Biden needs the agreement more than Iran does.By the way, another interesting revelation from Zarif’s remarks was that Russia opposed the nuclear agreement at the time, believing that isolating Iran would increase Moscow’s influence on it while the agreement would strengthen America’s role.The Biden administration genuinely wants to prevent Tehran from achieving a military nuclear capability, also being concerned about Iran’s terrorist activities and its hegemonic aspirations in the Middle East, and, one may assume, also knowing that Iran has instigated the current Hamas external and internal aggression against Israel, and being the main supplier of the rocket technology and the missiles and drones launched at Israel’s civilian population.In this connection, it must also be noted that another inevitable result of renewing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action will be to augment Iranian efforts to stir up Palestinian violence, given that solving or even managing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict goes counter to Tehran’s interest of expanding its hegemonic designs by supporting the “Palestinian case.”But reducing America’s military presence in the Middle East and concentrating its main strategic resources on China comes first for Washington. The Biden administration believes that an agreement with Iran, even if less than perfect, in addition to the planned withdrawal from Afghanistan, will facilitate this.Though the administration’s supposedly mitigating remarks may indeed reflect reality, they may also be meant to allay the growing opposition in Congress to the US return to the nuclear agreement – especially if this were, as it seems, largely on Iranian terms.Not only the Republicans have announced they will take steps to prevent the lifting of sanctions imposed by president Donald Trump, possibly also resorting to the 2015 law that gave Congress some oversight on the nuclear deal and which the Obama administration at the time had to scramble to get a critical mass of Democrats to support the deal, but there are also Democrats in Congress who are skeptical about the chances of reaching an agreement that would meet the administration’s declared demands – with the chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Democrat Bob Menendez, expressing doubt based on past experience whether there was any value to Iranian commitments.However, on the other hand, the administration is also under growing pressure from the Democrats’ increasingly vocal “progressive” left wing – which is mostly anti-Israel and partly also antisemitic – to swiftly move ahead with renewing the deal.
BE THIS as it may, a clear-eyed assessment of the situation points to the conclusion that despite all the doubts and obstacles, the Biden administration is determined that nothing – neither internal opposition nor political and diplomatic efforts from outside – will stop it from returning to the agreement.The Arab world, or part of it, is aware of this. This is how to interpret Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s statement that his country is interested in improving relations with Iran, with another though unconfirmed report stating that Saudi Arabia had promised Iran it would not normalize relations with Israel.The Biden administration is making an effort to reassure the Gulf states that the agreement would not hurt their interests though whether they have been persuaded by this remains doubtful. Israel is, of course, very much in the focus – evidenced by US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s visit to Jerusalem and the important talks held in Washington by the prime minister’s envoys, Mossad chief Yossi Cohen and National Security Adviser Meir Ben-Shabbat.Israel’s position is crucial, both because being a close ally of the US and its relations with the Gulf states, but also because of its ties to both sides on the US political aisle. Nor does Biden ignore Israel’s concerns about Iran’s aggressive designs, but what he sees as America’s global interests will take priority.Considering this, Israel will thus have to prepare for a variety of courses or situations while continuing the effort to halt the Iranian race to the bomb – but also maintaining close ties with the United States.American author F. Scott Fitzgerald wrote that “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function” – and this indeed is the challenge facing Israel today.Until now, Israel was able to formulate a successful strategic policy with regard to the emerging and often contradictory reality in the Middle East, but recent and expected future developments may force it to reexamine at least some of its assessments and possible modi operandi.Until recently it also seemed that Israel’s mystifying domestic politics might impair its ability to continue to pursue its strategic options – and had their religious edicts not forbidden this, the ayatollahs in Tehran would probably have uncorked bottles of champagne at the possibility of Benjamin Netanyahu’s eviction from leadership – but this may have been prevented for now.Israel’s options would include the pros and cons of preemptive military action, a continuation and deepening of the “war between the wars” campaign attributed to Israel, and deterrence based on clearly and unambiguously indicating the means available to it.Israel will also have to continue to improve its defensive capabilities – and the current situation should help her reach both positive and negative conclusions in this respect. To take all eventualities and options into consideration the Israeli leadership will not be able, however, to ignore the possibility that at least temporarily it would have to consider containment in spite of the drawbacks of this – or in other words, to contemplate how to deal with a reality of a reinstituted agreement but without giving up on other options.It is to be hoped that Israel’s recent diplomatic contacts with the Biden administration have contributed to advancing understandings on this matter.The writer is a former Israeli ambassador to the US.
