Israel needs to realize UAE will use F-35 jets against Iran, not Israel

Those jets are not meant to be used against Israel but, rather, against Iran, our common enemy - Israel has never been at war with the UAE.

The F35 fighter jet plane, also known as the Adir, on the Tarmac at Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, Texas (photo credit: LOCKHEED MARTIN / ALEXANDER H. GROVES)
The F35 fighter jet plane, also known as the Adir, on the Tarmac at Lockheed Martin in Fort Worth, Texas
(photo credit: LOCKHEED MARTIN / ALEXANDER H. GROVES)
Israel, accustomed to bad tidings, needs to learn how to deal with good ones.
US President Donald Trump announced on Thursday that Israel and the United Arab Emirates – an important, wealthy, technologically advanced Arab state just the narrow Strait of Hormuz away from Iran – have normalized relations. The move, truly historic, holds within it the seeds of dramatically altering the Middle East.
Within minutes, Israelis were raining on the parade.
First it was the Right, angry that one price Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu apparently paid for the deal was agreeing not to extend Israeli law over parts of Judea and Samaria. Then it was Blue and White, miffed that Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi were cut completely out of the loop. And then, in recent days, it was those among the security establishment and the punditry fretting that as part of the deal, the UAE will apparently be able to purchase state-of-the-art F-35 fighter jets that the US has sold to an exclusive group of countries, Israel included.
And while there may be some justification in each of those complaints, it is important to realize that nothing is 100%, everything has a price, and that the enemy of the good is the perfect – meaning that if you hold out for something perfect, you are likely to miss out on getting anything that’s “just” good.
And the deal with the UAE is good – even very good. It formalizes a relationship between one of the Mideast’s richest nations with its leading technological one. It shows that the Arab world is no longer willing to be held hostage by Palestinian rejectionism and unrealistically maximalist demands. It sends a chilling message to Iran that two of its most formidable foes have joined forces. And it opens the door to other Arab countries interested in following the Emirates’ lead.
But imagine you are the leader of Bahrain, sitting in Manama reading about the brouhaha in Israel over the likelihood that the agreement includes a clause allowing the UAE to buy the F-35s, and that Jerusalem is vowing to fight the sale of the planes. As Bahrain’s ruler, you could be excused for thinking: What’s with these people? Do I really want to deal with them?
The reported F-35 part of the agreement has laid bare the dysfunctionality of the current government.
In a normal world, the prime minister – on the verge of signing an important accord with an Arab state – would bring the top security brass into the decision-making process, and together they would evaluate it from every possible security angle, including the likelihood that the UAE will get access to top-notch US military hardware.
They would then do a cost-benefit analysis. In all likelihood, that analysis would conclude that normalization of ties with a key Persian Gulf state that might acquire the F-35s within the decade is much better than no ties with one not in possession of those planes. Israel has more to gain from normalization than it has to lose if those planes reach the UAE.

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Why?
Because those jets are not meant to be used against Israel but, rather, against Iran, our common enemy. Israel has never been at war with the UAE, and – barring unforeseen circumstances and a coup that brings radical Islamic elements to power there – is unlikely to be anytime soon. True, strategic planners need to factor in even unforeseen circumstances, but those possible future developments – if their risks are low – need not paralyze Jerusalem.
The problem is that this cost-risk analysis at the level of the country’s top security echelon never took place, because Netanyahu did not want to bring Gantz into the loop. In other words, Israeli political infighting prevented a proper decision-making process, and the lack of that proper process is currently being debated domestically in view of the entire world.
Everyone is watching: The US, shocked that Israelis cannot graciously take “yes” for an answer; the UAE, flabbergasted that Israel is now making this into an issue; and other Arab countries, wondering what hiccups await them if they normalize ties with the Jewish state, a country with this seemingly bizarre knack of spinning gold into straw.